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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF THE AUTEUR
As conventional history has it, Andrew Sarris adapted François Truffaut’s 
European formulation (“la politique des auteurs”) as the stateside “auteur theory” and the 
status of film appreciation changed forever, in the U.S. at least. Film had always carried 
cultural importance in France, with the high-art imprimatur of the likes of Jean Cocteau 
and André Malraux. But, as Kent Jones says, “To embrace American movies and 
moviemakers in Paris was one thing. To embrace those same movies and moviemakers in 
the country that had made and marginalized them in the first place was a far riskier 
proposition” (“Hail the Conquering Hero” 49). In order to grasp the sense in which these 
movies were “marginalized,” when in fact they were the dominant form of entertainment, 
or the sense in which their “embrace” made for a risky “proposition,” we should consider 
the rhetoric of the article that established the auteur theory, “Notes on the Auteur Theory 
in 1962.” Sarris writes that, “like most Americans who take film seriously,” he has 
“always felt a cultural inferiority complex about Hollywood” (41). We hear, in this 
admission, the sense in which movies were “marginalized” is a sense in which one could 
draw no cultural capital from them, as one could from literature, and thus Sarris deploys 
auteur theory, trading as it does on the cultural capital of the literary author, as a 
technology for conferring European high-art tradition and respectability on what Jones 
refers to as the “culturally disreputable” Hollywood film.
Interpreted this way, Sarris’s “theory” begins to sound like nothing more than the 
familiar project in a class society of policing the divide between high and mass culture, 
2only with the kitsch for the masses being revalued as the art of the elite. I use the word 
“kitsch” here with reference to Clement Greenberg’s “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” where 
Greenberg takes up a distinction between high and mass art as the fault line in a 
modernist project that has an Arnoldian provenance. In Greenberg’s words, kitsch is a 
“faked article” that might dupe “the naïve seeker of true light” (103), his “light” no doubt 
aligning with Arnold’s “sweetness and light.” Sarris, in turn, puts himself in this tradition 
by using similarly Arnoldian vocabulary in such a phrase as, “there is little point in 
wailing at the Philistines on this issue” (40-41). Sarris, by self-description, is a critic with 
the “audacity” to say “the cinema is an art” and the cultural goodwill to become the 
curator of this art’s canon.1 The Arnoldian charge had, at its heart, the notion of “do[ing] 
away with classes” by making “the best that had been thought and known in the world 
current everywhere.”
The problem with Sarris’s critical declaration, for Pauline Kael and others in 
1962, is that the relationship of the modernist project and the class project have changed, 
such that modernism no longer frustrates class domination but sustains it. Kael had 
discerned this historical shift in the status of filmgoing in her 1961 essay, “Fantasies of 
the Art-House Audience”: “For several decades,” she claims, “educated people have been 
condescending toward” “all those with ‘impoverished’ lives – the mass audience – who 
turned to movies for ‘ready-made’ dreams,” yet these same educated people have used 
“art” films only as a means of “cheap and easy congratulation on their sensitivities and 
their liberalism” (Kiss Kiss 31). Thus, on Kael’s view, Sarris only aped those liberals, 
descended straight from the Old Left, who once used high art as an instrument against the 
establishment but, having become the establishment themselves, could do nothing other 
3than render high art the establishment’s instrument.2 Wary of Sarris’s part in this 
usurpation of the cinema, a proudly democratic art to Kael’s mind, she wrote “Circles and 
Squares” as her 1963 rebuttal to Sarris’s “Notes on the Auteur Theory.” She there floats a 
cynical interpretation of the auteur theory in which Sarris only brings to bear high-art 
methodologies on a director such as Raoul Walsh because, “without some commitment to 
Walsh as an auteur, he probably wouldn’t be spending time with these movies” (47).
“Circles and Squares” directs its anger (“I am angry,” Kael writes, “but am I 
unjust?”) at the class politics of auteur critics, the “ever-so-intellectual protestations” of 
critics who function as the elite guardians of “where the secrets are kept” (54), but the 
essay does not count as anti-auteurist. Within it, that is, Kael does not repudiate the 
practice of giving sole authorship of a film to its director; she only bristles at the rhetoric 
and methods whereby such critics make this practice so distinctively elitist. There are, 
however, those who seem undisturbed by auteur theory’s class politics but are still 
troubled by its flawed descriptions. Thomas Schatz, for instance, takes exception to 
auteur theory as a historical description, noting that it “would not be worth bothering 
with if it hadn’t been so influential, effectively stalling film history and criticism in a 
prolonged stage of adolescent romanticism” (Genius of the System 5). Schatz argues that 
the closer we analyze Hollywood as a historical situation, “the less sense it makes to 
assess filmmaking or film style in terms of the individual director – or any individual, for 
that matter” (5). Indeed, Pauline Kael did produce an anti-auteurist text, but it was 
“Raising Kane,” not “Circles and Squares.” Like Schatz, she decries the need to think of 
Citizen Kane as “the result of a single artistic intelligence” (131), arguing instead that
Orson Welles, an icon of auteur criticism, was finally undone by trying to be “Orson 
4Welles” “a one-man show” when in fact “‘Orson Welles’ had stood for the activities of a 
group” (145).
While one may object that auteur theory fails because it misdescribes the group 
work of Hollywood production as the work of an individual, one may also say it succeeds 
in a different register of history writing for precisely this failing: as a post-war discourse 
(Truffaut’s “A Certain Tendency of the French Cinema,” by many accounts the first salvo 
for auteurism, appeared in 1954), auteur theory doesn’t so much record a moment in the 
organization of the film industry as it indexes a response to the capitalist triumphalism 
promoted by World War II, the extension of its world system and the convergence of 
institutions in this increasingly deregulated environment. In this respect, auteur theory 
might describe an aporia in the ideology of liberalism tout court, in which it’s somehow 
suspected, on a rather broad scale, that the individual is no longer the basic unit of market 
or political agency. Thus, the discourses of various strata of Western societies began to 
reimagine the dynamic between the individual and institution, and whether the former is 
subsumed or wholly determined by the latter. Such an account of beleaguered 
individualism makes sense of why the auteurist discourse (one in which the individual is 
reinstalled as autonomous of the system) was first very popular in the U.S., Britain, and 
France, but then quickly gave way to the cine-structuralist discourse (one in which the 
individual, the auteur, is nothing but an effect of the structure, a residue of its systems of 
signification).3 The first discourse is compensatory, and the second alarmist; but both 
respond to the same set of social conditions.
While one might argue that auteur theory can shine a light on the crisis of 
individualism in post-war Western societies writ large, the focus of this study is more 
5narrowly the situation of U.S. film culture, and how the auteur theory, as it was 
instantiated in both film criticism and Hollywood production, was inflected by a set of 
questions about perceived changes in institutional life. We might consider exemplary 
studies such as C. Wright Mills’s White Collar (1951) and William H. Whyte’s The 
Organization Man (1956), as well as President Eisenhower’s speech on the “unwarranted 
influence” of the “military-industrial complex” and the later deployment of this concept 
in Clark Kerr’s lectures on the notion of the “multiversity”;4 we might single these out as 
data in a profile of the opaque and intractable character of institutional life in the post-
war era. And, in this mood, we might return to Sarris’s “Notes on the Auteur Theory” and 
note how it reads differently if narrowly construed as film criticism as opposed to being 
more generally construed as social criticism. Sarris’s “third and ultimate premise” of 
auteur theory, the one that bestowed “ultimate glory” on “the cinema as an art” but 
confounded Kael, is that of an “interior meaning” “extrapolated from the tension between 
a director’s personality and his material” (43). Kael struggles to understand how “glory” 
might be found in “what has generally been considered the frustrations of a man working 
against the given material,” but we might take “the given material” as metaphor for “the 
intractable institution” and swiftly hear in Sarris’s auteur theory a chastened recourse to a 
metaphysic of personality, a fantasy amidst damaged life5 in which one gathers 
personality up to himself as a proof of essence, a promise of autonomous subjectivity, 
without reference to the ruthless determinations of institutional life.
Indeed, if we take Sarris’s auteur theory figuratively6 rather than literally, as Kael 
did, then we can better understand his pertinacious resistance to Bazin’s acknowledgment 
of Hollywood as a historical condition of an auteur’s status. “The cinema,” as Bazin 
6writes, “is an art which is both popular and industrial” (251). We should note that Bazin 
has no problem calling cinema both “art” and “industrial” and, in fact, evaluates “these 
conditions” as “a group of positive and negative circumstances which have to be 
reckoned with” (251). Sarris, however, deems these “circumstances” universally 
negative, it would seem. In his 1968 The American Cinema, he describes the agonistic 
relationship between a director and his “circumstances” as the heroic context in which the 
director “almost miraculously” “extract[s]” “a sublimity of expression” “from his money-
oriented environment” (37). The miracle, for Sarris, is that one could make art in accord 
with the profit imperative of industry. And thus the historical development of industry, 
and chiefly of that corporate capitalism of which classical Hollywood only marked the 
monopoly stage, must be repudiated by the example of the “strong director”: in 
preserving a remainder of personality amidst the impersonal transactions of industry, the 
“strong director” heroically refuses the determining power of history. We can hear this 
behind the concessionary rhetoric Sarris deploys against Bazin’s frequent mentions of 
“capitalism’s influence on the cinema”: “Without denying this influence,” Sarris says, “I 
still find it impossible to attribute X directors and Y films to any particular system or 
culture” (“Notes” 40). He concedes, in fact, that we can’t imagine “Griffith’s October or 
Eisenstein’s Birth of a Nation,” but insists on what sounds like the weak claim that “we 
are, nevertheless, compelled to recognize other differences in the personalities of these 
two pioneers beyond their respective cultural complexes” (40).
The ostensibly weak claim, however, elucidates the way in which this is a zero-
sum debate: to concede that history determines at all, for Sarris, one must concede that 
history determines absolutely. As such he can’t celebrate “the genius of the system,” as 
7Schatz will, but must celebrate the differences between personalities described as “an 
élan of the soul,” now raised to a metaphysical principle. In discussing Sarris, Schatz 
recognizes that auteur theory discloses an attitude toward capitalist formations (“the 
dehumanizing, formulaic, profit-hungry machinery of Hollywood’s studio-factories,” as 
Schatz ventriloquizes Sarris’s outlook [5]), but he stops short of historicizing the theory 
as a discourse dovetailing with emergent counterculture grievances (the “dream factory” 
of Hollywood, at its most debased, shading into the “knowledge factory” of the university 
system). Schatz stops short, that is, of naming the auteurist disunity between the director 
and his “given material” a metaphor generated by the historical shift from a classical 
relationship between a culture and its institutions to a romantic relationship.7
Auteur theory registers anxieties about the closed and total nature of the 
institutions of a fully administered world, to echo the language of the Frankfurt School; 
Fredric Jameson characterizes this cultural topos of the 1960s as an anxiety of the 
“Institution itself as the radically transindividual,” whose “laws” are “not those of the 
individual human action or intention” (“Periodizing the 60s”). But auteur theory works in 
the mode of a reaction formation, with the closed and transindividual institution now 
being occasion for overstating and magnifying the role of the individual. Adorno 
discusses this as a kind of compensated subjectivity, when he reasons that “the more 
individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the societal totality as they are 
connected up to the system, the more the person, pure and simple, is consoled and exalted 
with the attributes of creative power, absolute rule, and spirit” (Critical Models 248).
I argue, then, that the auteur theory, though it inadequately describes the 
production and source of meaning in films, can serve, in spite of itself, as a hermeneutic 
8device that gives a historicist foothold on the meanings of a variety of post-war texts, 
both filmic and otherwise. In focusing on films produced roughly between 1967 and 
1974, I use the auteur theory to highlight a set of interlocking concerns with the 
individual, the institution, and the techniques developed by the latter to better manage the 
former. On one hand, we might say that 1967-1974 comprises the auteur moment in 
Hollywood cinema, in that during these years there emerged a group of “strong directors” 
(Mike Nichols, Stanley Kubrick, Michael Cimino, and Steven Spielberg, to offer a short 
list) in whose name the Hollywood industry was ostensibly reorganized. On the other 
hand, we might call this span of years the moment of technocracy – the ascendancy of 
that regime of techniques that, by certain accounts, incited the total reduction of human 
autonomy to a set of technical and impersonal controls. In one such account, The Making 
of a Counterculture (1968), Theodore Roszak sounded the notorious claim that the 
counterculture of the 1960s was an explicit response to the conditions of technocracy.8 In 
the fullest reckoning, what we find is that the relationship between the auteur and the 
Hollywood industry, perhaps on the same order as that between the counterculture and 
the technocracy, is less one of opposition than of symbiosis: the latter terms (Hollywood, 
the technocracy) give rise to the former terms (the auteur, the counterculture) in order to 
renovate their structural flaws.      
I say the auteur theory works “in spite of itself” because, if we interrogate the 
motivations behind the theory, the theory can explain its own historical origins in a 
moment of ideological crisis, and, explaining this complex of intellectual and affective 
matters, it can illuminate much else. In short, the fallacy in the theory becomes its great 
asset, making it productive more in a world-historical key than in the more local film-
9historical one to which it first aspired. On the face of it, auteur theory is an intervention 
in aesthetics, and the development of the branch of philosophy known as aesthetics has 
been the world-historical charge of the bourgeoisie. In The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 
Terry Eagleton describes the incipience of aesthetic discourse in German idealism as the 
“cast into which conditions of social backwardness had forced the thinking of the late 
eighteenth-century German middle class,” which meant that the mind dreamt “a bold new 
social life as yet quite unachievable in reality” (19). The aesthetic, that is, was forged as 
the place where a contradiction between imaginative overdevelopment and material 
underdevelopment sought resolution. And thus the work of art came to model the kind of 
free subjectivity or exalted particularism that would become the unum necessarium for an 
operational political order; the work of art became the subject that citizens were not yet. 
This would-be bourgeois subject, which Eagleton calls “an entirely new kind of subject,” 
“only receives laws from itself,” as Rousseau remarked (19).9 Because this political order 
turns on the appearance of self-issued laws of the individual, bourgeois ideology is 
always haunted by its need for a unitary subjectivity that it may fail to produce.
Understanding auteur theory as an aesthetic discourse, then, is license for 
understanding it as another kind of discourse, paradoxically enough. If we acknowledge 
the precedence by which the aesthetic realm offers another order on which to work out 
problems of social life, then we see plainly enough how the auteur theory proffers an 
aesthetic solution for what’s basically a social problem. In this respect, we might say the 
auteur theory, as Sarris advanced its thesis in 1962, is the aesthetic subset to the concerns 
raised in the Port Huron Statement that same year, the document whose goal it was to 
redescribe the citizen as fully participatory.10 But it was important for Sarris, as noted, 
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that the aesthetic realm bear no strong relationship to the social. “If directors and other 
artists cannot be wrenched from their historical environments,” Sarris states, “aesthetics 
is reduced to a subordinate branch of ethnography” (40). Kael has no problem with this 
outcome, retorting, “what does he think it is – a sphere of its own, separate from the study 
of man and his environment” (79). As mentioned, Sarris urgently retains art’s autonomy 
because to compromise it by degree is to compromise it totally. Once compromised, art 
goes from being autonomous to functionalist; if it responds to and salves ideological 
crises, it gets reduced to an ideological instrument.
My interest, though, is not in contesting Sarris’s version of art’s autonomy, for I 
think the tradition of Marxist literary criticism has evolved nuances in historicism that 
avoid the traps of a vulgar determinism. Instead, my interest lies in showing the 
consistency between this position on art’s autonomy and an insistence on the autonomous 
and unitary character of the subject. Given that aesthetics first springs from a concern 
with the autonomous subject, and that the work of art models a solution to this problem, it 
follows that lost autonomy of art signifies lost autonomy of the subject. What this has 
tended to mean in the discourse of auteurism, though, is that for a film to be taken as a 
work of art it must be the work of a single author. We find in the early auteurist texts a 
chronic return to questions of “undivided authorship,” as V.F. Perkins puts it (“Direction 
and Authorship” 68). In modifying such a notion, Perkins engages the aesthetic demands 
of Ernest Lindgren, whose call for the “vision of a single man” (68) furnishes deep 
background for the debates of British auteur critics. While Perkins will reconfigure the 
notion of “undivided authorship” to interesting effect, which we’ll address shortly, his 
encounter with the very concept of a unitary auteur is marked by the aesthetic prehistory 
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that surfaces in Lindgren’s decree to “Look to the operations of the mind which precede 
conscious creation” (68). We might deem fallacious Lindgren’s reasoning that because a 
work of art appears unitary, a single personality must dwell behind it; but, however 
fallacious, we must see that his is a representative outlook, chiming as it does with 
Dwight Macdonald’s belief that unity in art “will result only when a single brain and 
sensibility is in full command” (“Theory of Mass Culture”).
Even as British critics began to turn away from the “conscious” “single brain” 
model, the provenance of the conception of unitary works and auteurs in bourgeois 
ideology still exerted its influence, no matter how attenuated, in remarks such as this 
from Robin Wood: “It seems probable that artistic value has always been dependent on 
the presence – somewhere, at some stage – of an individual artist” (“Ideology, Genre, 
Auteur” 87). Written in 1977, Wood likely hedges his claim as he does, suggesting only 
that it’s a probability that an “individual artist” be involved at “some stage” in the 
production of artistic value, because the cine-structuralists have by now rewritten the 
early auteurist texts in accord with the posthumanist turn taken by Roland Barthes, 
Michel Foucault, and others. In “The Death of the Author,” Barthes’s claim that “writing 
is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin” (97) instigated a reversal in 
auteur theory by which the auteur was no longer the agent for meaning in a film, but was 
now the name for the meaning constructed from a film. In the canonical declaration of 
this reversal, Peter Wollen explains that the “auteur is constructed a posteriori” (“The 
Auteur Theory” 566) but does not preexist the film. The critic, in this case, assembles the 
auteur, and this constructed personality “can then post factum be assigned to an 
individual, the director, on empirical grounds” (578). If there seems to be something 
12
ungainly in the logic for how a constructed auteur happens to correspond, by luck, to an 
individual, we might suppose it to be symptomatic of a transition between the antinomial 
discourses of the early auteur critics and the cine-structuralists. The structuralist 
methodology had meant to displace the individual, but Wollen nonetheless retains the 
individual as a significant unit, rather than seek another organizing precept. One might 
think he does so because it consoles, as Adorno suggested it would, speaking of ideology 
as a whole.
A Theory Pressed into Service
In Narration in the Fiction Film, David Bordwell turns the same ground as does 
Wollen, but to a different end. Where Wollen decides that a textual construct (called 
“Hitchcock,” say) must be the singular vision for whom auteurist critics should seek an 
empirical individual as its “best available source” (“Michael Curtiz” 68), Bordwell 
simply argues that the cognition of a film is aided by imputing the unity and motivation 
behind its narration to a singular person outside the text: the director. The viewer 
benefits, in his analysis, from identifying “the narrational process” with a narrator – but 
this works for the “international art cinema,” with its “overt self-consciousness” (211), 
not Hollywood. Timothy Corrigan cites this passage from Bordwell in his book, A 
Cinema without Walls, in order to insist that this utility to auteurism, both cognitive and 
commercial,11 might well have originated in the art cinema, but its uses soon extended 
from there into Hollywood. The “rise of the international art cinema,” as Corrigan 
contends, occurred during and was supported by “changes in production and distribution 
strategies” of Hollywood cinema, and as such it happened that Hollywood lifted 
13
auteurism from the art cinema and deployed its prestige as “a kind of brand-name vision” 
to “distinguish” Hollywood product from “other, less-elevated forms of mass media 
(most notably, television)” and to “guarantee a relationship between audience and movie” 
(102). As Corrigan puts it, Hollywood cultivated the “commerce of auteurism.”
Because Francis Ford Coppola had a talent for blustery self-promotion, critics 
such as Corrigan, David Cook, and Jon Lewis refer to him in this context as a case study 
for the marketing trajectory of auteurism.12 Yet if we look to The Conversation (1974), in 
many senses the most auteurist film involving Coppola,13 we see that Coppola 
appropriated the concept of auteurism as the director’s means for fending off the rank of 
mere technician and becoming the proprietor of the meaning of his work. The 
Conversation depicts a crisis in the career of Harry Caul (Gene Hackman), a surveillance 
expert who both designs and deploys sound-recording technology. Caul finds himself in 
crisis when he refuses to cede ownership of a conversation he was commissioned to 
record. His refusal, predicated on not knowing how the content of his recording will be 
utilized, marks his ambivalent disposition toward his work: he goes between feeling that 
it’s his “business” to get “a nice, fat recording” and feeling that his “beautiful” recording 
is “a work of art.” In the former event he’s the executor of the form, but in the latter he 
bears ethical accountability for the content. Defining the meaning of one’s work, thus, 
becomes the privilege of the artist, whereas having one’s work defined by another is the 
lot of the technician. This tension characterizes Caul’s self-definition; an intensely private 
man, he tells his girlfriend that he’s “kind of a musician, a freelance musician.” Caul’s 
redescription of his surveillance work as an expressive art is meant in earnest, in that his 
development of technologies for extending the field of perception is, first and foremost, 
14
the extension of his field of perception, which counts, fundamentally, as the work of the 
artist.
From the opening shot, The Conversation confuses the work of recording sound 
with that of producing music. As an aerial shot pans in on the activity of a city plaza, we 
hear the Dixieland jazz of a band evidently playing for the lunchtime crowd. Shortly, we 
hear electronic burbling, a distortion that interferes with the pick-up of the music. We 
learn quickly enough that the surveillance equipment, arranged by Caul and his team, is 
straining to gather all the sounds of the plaza. But the telling opposition is established 
between jazz, the iconic art of self-expression, and electronic burbling, a signal limit to 
be negotiated by the technician. As if to drive the point home, Harry Caul is himself a 
saxophonist who spends his private moments playing along to jazz records. Whether we 
are meant to construe Caul’s expansion of the sound field through surveillance 
technology as the same endeavor as his production of meaningful sound with his 
saxophone, or whether we are meant to counterpose the one as technical work to the 
other’s artistic work is less important, I would argue, than the fact that, within 
filmmaking, there had existed a contested hierarchy in which some were redeemed as 
artists while others were dismissed as technicians. 
Gore Vidal sketched this hierarchy with polemical flourish in a New York Review 
of Books article, “Who Makes the Movies?,” when he described directors as erstwhile 
“brothers-in-law” who had been transformed into “autonomous and original artists” 
(149). This rankled for Vidal not because directors had historically been “at best, bright 
technicians,” but because the promotion of director to artist entailed the demotion of 
writer to the ranks of Hollywood anonymity. Being a writer, and a writer who worked in 
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Hollywood, Vidal intensely felt the unfairness of this shifting of credit. Vidal believed, 
quite traditionally, that a high level of technology encumbered the creation of art, and the 
writer, being so lightly dependent on technology, was therefore more fully immersed in 
experience. “Those who have spent too much time with cameras and machines,” Vidal 
sniped, “seldom have much apprehension of that living world without whose presence 
there is no art” (155). In moments, Harry Caul reproduces this sentiment, as though 
hewing to party line. “Listen, if there’s one surefire rule that I have learned in this 
business,” Caul says, “it’s that I don’t know anything about human nature, I don’t know 
anything about curiosity. That’s not part of what I do.”
The Conversation, though, is a story about reconfiguring the parts of what one 
does professionally in an effort to include “curiosity” about “human nature” in that 
purview. It is, finally, a story about extending the domain of one’s work to annex the 
affect that, otherwise left to the purveyors of the aesthetic, had allowed one’s expertise to 
be shunted to the status of the merely technical. Jameson observes that The Conversation
(as well as the 1981 film Blow Out), being another version of Blow-Up (1966), 
problematizes its protagonist’s status as an artist simply by shifting his trade from a 
visual to an auditory one. As a photographer, the protagonist of Blow-Up still curated the 
visual dimension that, in Jameson’s phrasing, offers “some bewildering Bazinian field of 
Being for desperate inspection”; thus the photographer still secures “the philosopher’s art 
function,” even though he shoots fashion models, whereas the sound expert is forever a 
“technician for sale to the highest bidder” (Geopolitical Aesthetic 20). I refer to 
Jameson’s insight, on one hand, because The Conversation does cling to the spatial logic 
of the visual even as it strives to transfer those concerns to the temporal logic of the 
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auditory. Harry Caul’s obsession with privacy is visually figured in the four locks on his 
apartment door. Though he works in auditory surveillance, we nonetheless understand 
matters of privacy principally in the spatial terms of an inside and outside. On the other 
hand, I refer to Jameson’s insight because The Conversation seems to be invested in the 
project of relocating affect, the precise outcome of which is to unsettle where the “art 
function” now falls.
In the film’s terms, relocating affect does not betoken a new or heightened 
concern with affect, but rather a concern with who gets to manage it. Harry Caul tells his 
landlady, after all, that he has four locks on his door not because he has valuables within, 
but because his management of those locks is itself the value: “I don’t have anything 
personal, nothing of value,” he admits, “except my keys, you see, which I really would 
like to have the only copy of.” Caul wants, in other words, to be in the position to name 
the content inside the form, so to speak, which is the affective dimension; he wants to do 
so, we might extrapolate, because he wants to control it. And this act, we should observe, 
is consistent with, or derived from, Caul’s cathexis on church rituals, specifically his 
visits to the confessional. Linking Caul’s organization of affect with church protocols 
puts The Conversation in line with Michel Foucault’s analysis of “pastoral power,” a 
mode of constituting subjects that structurally requires a person to have interior space, 
psychologically speaking.14 But, most germane, reference to church rituals suggests that 
Caul, as the sole holder of the keys, occupies the hierarchical spot of the priest, which 
only returns us to the realm of aesthetics, whose charge had been holding down the 
hieratic function in the passage from feudal to bourgeois society.
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I draw on The Conversation so extensively because it explains the origins of 
auteurism not as some instrument developed by the industry in an effort at self-
renovation. The “brand-name vision” that auteurism supplied Hollywood was an effect, 
not a cause of auteurism. The Conversation, instead, explains the origins of auteurism in 
the impulse to disavow the status of technician and reclaim the meaning of one’s work, 
with the position of the Hollywood director simply being incidental or symptomatic of
the more general condition of “the organization man.” But, importantly, the film accounts 
for autonomy as at once aesthetic and professional, and in fact makes a case for the 
interpenetration of what I’ll call the aesthetic or the affective and the managerial, a case 
made elsewhere in Douglas McGregor’s 1960 work on management theory, The Human 
Side of Enterprise. McGregor’s book struck a blow against the scientific management 
that supposed people, on average, “prefe[r] to be directed, wis[h] to avoid responsibility, 
[have] relatively little ambition”; it suggested instead the basic need of “self-fulfillment,” 
the need “for continued self-development, for being creative in the broadest sense of that 
term” (34, 39). Sanford Jacoby describes this “change in the postwar era” in terms of “the 
growing importance of psychology to personnel management,” a movement stemming 
from Elton Mayo’s ideas (“dubbed human relations by his followers”) that “managers 
should give more attention to the worker’s psyche” (208-209). In short, when Harry Caul 
becomes an artist rather than just a technician, by fusing a “curiosity” about “human 
nature” with his “business,” he at once becomes a new ideal for management.
In this light, we might regard auteurism as an episode in a managerial revolution 
that rolled back the bureaucratic dominion shaped through what C. Wright Mills termed 
the corporate restructuring of the United States “from a nation of small capitalists into a 
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nation of hired employees” (White Collar 34). We could perhaps say that the decisive 
contribution made in the corporate sphere by the auteurism of New Hollywood was the 
habit of describing creative or affective work as the province of the individual as opposed 
to the deadening and prescriptive work of the wards of an organization, which amounts to 
the substitution of the artistic function for the managerial one. When Martin Scorsese said 
that “Sarris and the ‘politique des auteurs’ was like some fresh air,” we might hear this 
not only as a remark on the local significance it had for film culture, but, in describing a 
condition of the individual’s ascendancy over organizational imperatives, we might hear 
it as a remark holding a general promise that self-expression, even beyond Hollywood,
might become one’s work, that “hired employees” might think of themselves as artists in 
a business world, and that rather than toil as a function in a framework, one might think 
of the framework as issuing from one’s creative, unified self. That is, auteurism helped 
restore to the bourgeois ethos of individualism a “fresh” theoretical realism for how an 
individual mattered vis-à-vis the overwhelming scale of corporate structure: as a self-
expressing artist, that is, rather than an organizational-replicant of the corporation.
One could argue that what auteurism expressed all along were the tendencies of a 
good manager. Indeed, if we return to Kael’s anti-auteurist tract, Raising Kane, we note 
that she means not to diminish Welles’s artistry, but only to say that his real achievement 
was of a managerial kind. Given that big-studio filmmaking tended to offer its crews “the 
limited opportunity” that McGregor claims characterize the “conditions of modern 
industrial life” (39), the “designers and technicians,” Kael reasons, “were hostile and 
bored.” “The worst aspect of the factory system,” she continued, “was that almost 
everyone worked beneath his capacity” (132). As a director given carte blanche, Welles 
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was shrewd and spirited enough to “liberate and utilize the talents of his co-workers,” 
who, languishing as they had in “studio-factory productions,” eagerly “came forth with 
ideas they’d been bottling up for years” (132). Welles’s already considerable talents were 
amplified in an environment, created by what we should call his managerial vivacity, in 
which everyone “seems to have had the time of his life because he was able to contribute 
something” (132). The resulting film was not only marked by its quality, but, as Kael 
observes, “the craftsmen were so ingenious about giving Welles the effect he wanted that 
even now many audiences aren’t aware of how cheaply made Citizen Kane was” (133).
Indeed, it now seems in behalf of managerial prerogative that V.F. Perkins, one of 
the auteurist critics at the British journal Movie, reconfigured the notion of “undivided 
authorship” in filmmaking. Perkins deemed it necessary to back off Lindgren’s strong 
claim for “one man’s vision,” because it so often proved counterfactual in filmmaking, 
and reasoned instead that, “[p]rovided that a film has its own unity, it seems unimportant 
whether the unity was evolved through cooperation and compromise within the 
production team or conceived by one man and imposed on his collaborators” (68). The 
director’s distinction, on Perkins’s argument, will derive from “his advisory function” 
and his capacity for “coordination,” seeing as film production “involves so many and 
such varied kinds of creative decision” (72). In order for a film to possess “even the most 
elementary form of unity,” then, a director must harmonize the work of “actors, 
designers, and technicians” “towards an agreed end” (72). Yet Perkins is flatly wrong, 
however, to assert that so long as the statements in a film are unified “it makes no 
difference to the spectator how they came, or were brought about, or to what extent their 
significance was intended” (68), as the history of auteurist debate attests. There is, after 
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all, a certain momentum in denying that a film is “group work” and insisting instead that, 
“if the film’s form embodies a viewpoint, explored in depth and with complexity, it is 
almost certain to be the director’s” (74). And we elect to call this figure an artist, with all 
its unitary implications, because he alone “has possession of the means through which all 
other contributions acquire meaning within the film” (74 emphasis original).
The genius of auteurism, we might say, lies not in its mechanisms for figuring the 
unity of a film as a kind of individual, but for the property of commutation it has for then 
explaining the unity of a group such as a corporation as a kind of individual, thus adding 
to the intelligibility of the long mystifying legal tradition of corporate personhood. 
Jerome Christensen’s scholarship has arrived as a late entry in the auteurist debate, 
arguing that auteurism has mistakenly scrabbled for individual authors in its more 
oblique project for understanding the operations of the corporate author. In his argument, 
the studio qua corporate subject solves the problem of imputing intention, in an industrial 
situation, to one of two extremes: either to an “actual individual’s contribution” or to 
“some mode or means of production, some apparatus” (173). That unity that we dimly 
sense in the corporation can be figured, as he cites Phillip Selznick on organizations, by 
“prizing” “the device” of the corporation for “its own sake,” such that individuals can 
“become attached to an organization or a way of doing things as persons rather than as 
technicians” (174). Thus, in Christensen’s argument, the unity that presupposes persons 
licenses a “process that involves a change of perspective among technicians who become 
persons by treating the device of the corporation as if it were a person and not just a 
mechanism for making products, profit, and persons” (175). While auteurism models this 
process, the corporation benefits from it.
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The corporation benefits because, as a person, it can shed the encumbrance of law 
in the name of friendship, artistic passion. This explains another, production-side use of 
auteurism, as explicated in Derek Nystrom’s work. The Hollywood auteurs, such as 
Coppola, Robert Altman, and Brian DePalma, felt entitled to slip many of the union 
regulations in Hollywood in the name of their communal and artistic enterprises. In 
naming themselves artists rather than business people, they bypassed a history of labor 
laws. In Hard Hats, Rednecks, and Macho Men, Nystrom claims that “the auteurist 
industrial strategies of the New Hollywood legitimized a PMC reclamation of workplace 
autonomy and control that, ultimately, was purchased against both capital and labor” 
(82).15 For instance, DePalma avoided hiring union crews on Hi, Mom! (1970) because he 
would “probably have very little in common with them” and he needed to establish a 
fraternal or communal spirit on set in which “everybody’s committed, politically, because 
they like the material, in all ways” (Nystrom 78). Likewise, Deborah Fine, a former 
employee at Coppola’s Zoetrope film company, says that Coppola didn’t care if workers 
thought they were “getting paid enough or if [they] thought [their] working conditions 
[were] good enough” because “there’s a million people out there that would kiss the 
ground to work for him for nothing” (Nystrom 78). In other words, if a corporation were 
run by or identified with an artist, it might invoke a private set of norms as opposed to the 
public laws that govern the world of brute commerce.
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Auteurism as Hermeneutics
In the ongoing contest for the substantial truth of auteurism – whether it best 
organizes film canons, predicts the rising and falling fortunes of directors, collates themes 
across films, serves as a marketing instrument or a production protocol – my project 
seeks not to fix the meaning of the term, but rather to use it to mark off a set of historical 
conditions and concerns. Those conditions and concerns can be broadly called the 
counterculture, the technocracy, and the consolidation of a corporate hegemony in 
postwar America, all of which were shot through with a transforming ideology of 
individualism and personhood, at times in decline and at times on the rise. Auteurism
functioned as a response to these conditions, taking the form of a compensation as well as 
a prescription. Like Thomas Schatz, I take auteurism to be a poor historical description of 
Hollywood filmmaking; but I take its simplifications to bear powerful ideological 
messages. As with any ideological question, I take it to possess no substantial truth, only 
a differential metric: it gauges the friction between the material life and imaginary life of 
a culture, and issues figurations of the contestatory definitions of what that culture means 
and how it will carry on. This dissertation turns to films made between 1967 and 1974 to 
weigh these figurations against each other, with the category concerns of auteurism as a 
hermeneutic device for tracking negotiations of the individualist credo so vital to classic 
liberalism.
The second chapter documents what I will call the genre of “defection” films, a 
genre whose first iterations came with the 1967 release of The Graduate and Bonnie and 
Clyde. The defection film typically involves the narrative of a couple escaping from 
society, with the emphasis always falling on what they flee from rather than toward. I use 
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the term “genre” not to suggest that production units were formed to develop defection 
films, but on the same order that Stanley Cavell refers to comedies of remarriage as a 
genre. Cavell claims that a “genre emerges full-blown, in a particular instance first (or set 
of them if they are simultaneous)” (27-28). I take this to be the case with the defection 
film, that is was found “full-blown” in both The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde, and 
then these two instances solicited “further instances” to work out “internal consequences” 
(28). In this sense, Cavell remarks, a genre “has no history, only a birth and a logic,” 
along with a “prehistory,” which would be the “setting up of the conditions it requires for 
its viability” (28). The importance of this genre is that it tells the story that we might 
presume so-called auteurs told themselves, that of the reduction of institutional 
dependence in favor of an augmented individual independence. As well, we can also 
consider this the story the counterculture tells itself in this moment.
Chapter 3 focuses on an ostensibly very different film cycle, that of the disaster 
film. Critics tend to characterize these films as politically conservative, whereas the 
defection film is regarded as politically radical, as consistent with the counterculture’s 
self-regard. My argument insists that the difference is only apparent: the defection film 
erased the technocratic institutions of postwar life, while the disaster film accentuated 
them only to imagine their collapse, but in each iteration the status of these institutions 
functions as a precondition for reinstituting autonomous subjectivity.  Chapter 4 
counterposes a form of corporate individualism to the autonomous kind wished for in the 
film narratives of defection and disaster films. It considers a series of films about the 
intelligibility of corporations, suggesting that the corporation models subjectivity in its 
contemporary form. This form of subjectivity, however, produces paranoiac reactions 
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from the standpoint of an obsolescent autonomous subjectivity. But it offers, somewhat 
ingeniously, the appearance of autonomy, and I will take the occasion to spell out the 
reasons that this appearance could be called the offering of auteurism. Chapter 5 situates 
the ideological ferment of 1967-1974 in the larger historical context of postwar American
culture, arguing that the autonomous individualism ideally figured in the cowboy hero 
was a product of the territorial logic of a bygone phase of the nation-state. We indeed see 
the passing of the cowboy hero into the figure of the Vietnam veteran after the 1960s, an 
index of the fading relevance of a certain form of individualism, I argue, under the 
capitalist logic of an emergent corporate state. 
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Notes         
                                                
1 Sarris is an incessant list-maker, notoriously creating a “pantheon” for the great 
directors and generating lists of the best directors of the American cinema in toto as well 
as of the best cinematic output for each given year.
2 We might take the Partisan Review crowd as shorthand for the cognoscenti of the 
liberal consensus, especially figures such as Greenberg, Dwight Macdonald, and Daniel 
Bell, who had a fraught relationship with the emergent figures of the New Left. In 
Chapter 2 I discuss a roundtable published in The American Scholar in which selected 
figures of the Old and New Left attempt to clarify their different politics.
3 For the seminal texts of the auteurist discourse, one should see André Bazin’s “De la 
Politique des Auteurs” and Ian Cameron’s “Films, Directors, and Critics” along with the 
aforementioned essays by Truffaut and Sarris. For a sense of how auteurism was 
reconstituted within cine-structuralism, see Peter Wollen’s “The Auteur Theory” and 
Charles W. Eckert’s “The English Cine-Structuralists.” One can find essays on auteurism
and authorship in collections such as Virginia Wright Wexman’s Film and Authorship
and David Gerstner and Janet Staiger’s Authorship and Film, but Barry Keith Grant’s 
recent Auteurs and Authorship provides perhaps the most complete historical overview, 
and indeed anthologizes the essays cited above.
4 For a selection of essays representing an oppositional student response to Kerr’s 
envisioned “multiversity” and its relationship to the military-industrial complex, see Carl 
Davidson’s The New Radicals in the Multiversity and Other SDS Writings on Student 
Syndicalism. Kerr’s original lecture, “The Idea of a Multiversity,” can be found in The 
Uses of the University.
5 I take the phrase “damaged life” from the subtitle (“Reflections on a Damaged life”) of 
Theodor Adorno’s Minima Moralia because Adorno is so often the implicit reference 
point in my discussions of imperiled subjectivity. I discuss Adorno more fully in Chapter 
3. 
6 Sarris himself suggests, somewhat abstrusely, that “the auteur theory is merely a figure 
of speech” (36). But he seems to consider it a “figure of speech” in a different way than I 
am here proposing; for Sarris, it’s a figure of speech in that it would seem, when 
weighing the relative merits of artists, to foreclose the reputation of a lesser artist in favor 
of a total critical absorption in the greater artist. In an odd turn, he argues that it’s a figure 
of speech and doesn’t literally work that way because, “If the man in the street could not 
invoke Shakespeare’s name as an identifiable cultural reference, he would probably have 
less contact with all things artistic.” The implication is that the auteur theory will have no 
effect on people who don’t know the auteur theory, who have no investment in the 
relative standings of artists. As such, the theory’s only an instrument for the scholar: “The 
Shakespearean scholar, by contrast, will always be driven to explore the surrounding 
terrain, with the result that all Elizabethan dramatists gain more rather than less 
recognition through the pre-eminence of one of their number” (36). This caveat, that the 
theory’s utility only be measured in the rarefied domain of scholars and critics, becomes 
incoherent when later he says that “to argue against the auteur theory in America is to 
assume that we have anyone of Bazin’s sensibility and dedication to provide an 
alternative” (39). I think Kael is right when she says this defense amounts to saying “that 
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the auteur theory is necessary in the absence of a critic who wouldn’t need it” (“Circles 
and Squares” 47). Thus, the auteur theory is less for the refined critic than it is for the 
man in the street. I admit, however, that I am less concerned with analyzing the 
coherence of the theory than in using it as a “figure of speech” against the grain of the 
argument.
7 In Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan, Robin Wood utilizes the terms “classical” and 
“romantic” to describe artistic practice (“Classical, when the artist is at one with at least 
the finest values of his culture” [42]) during the transition from studio-system Hollywood 
to the more fragmented Hollywood of the 1960s.
8 The “American young,” Rozsak writes, “grasped most clearly the fact that, while such 
immediate emergencies as the Vietnam war, racial injustice, and hard-core poverty 
demand a deal of old-style politicking, the paramount struggle of our day is against a far 
more formidable, because far less obvious, opponent, to which I will give the name ‘the 
technocracy’” (4).
9 Eagleton cites this passage from Rousseau’s Émile, explaining that the “liberated 
subject is the one who has appropriated the law as the very principle of its own 
autonomy, broken the forbidding tablets of stone on which that law was originally 
inscribed in order to rewrite it on the heart of flesh” (19). Thus it becomes the case that 
law for the bourgeoisie, being immanent, must be understood sensually and affectively; 
the work of art, as such, becomes the best model as well as an agent of instruction in this 
endeavor. “The ultimate binding force of the bourgeois social order,” Eagleton explains, 
“will be habits, pieties, sentiments and affections” (20).
10 The Port Huron Statement was the mission statement of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), composed chiefly by Tom Hayden. I refer to the document in more detail 
in Chapter 2.
11 We should note that Bordwell grants auteurism not only a cognitive function, but a 
commercial one as well. He argues that the “consistency of an authorial signature across 
an oeuvre constitutes an economically exploitable trademark” (211). When Corrigan 
characterizes Bordwell’s as a “formalist and cognitive” critique (103), it’s difficult to 
know if Corrigan is overlooking the commercial dimension of Bordwell’s critique, or 
simply saying it’s underdeveloped.  
12 Alongside Corrigan’s Cinema Without Walls, one should consult David Cook’s 
“Auteur Cinema and the ‘Film Generation’ in 1970s Hollywood” and Jon Lewis’s Whom 
God Wishes to Destroy for discussions of Coppola’s role in endowing the auteur with a 
commercial vocation.
13 I call The Conversation “auteurist” in various registers: it was the film Coppola opted 
to make for the Director’s Company, a “production unit” granting authority to three 
directors (Coppola, Peter Bogdanovich, William Friedkin) formed by Paramount 
executive Frank Yablans “on the heels of the commercial success of The Godfather” 
(Whom God Wishes to Destroy 15-16); Coppola received sole writer’s and director’s 
credit for it, as well as co-production credit for it; Coppola regularly cites it as his 
personal favorite, along with Rumble Fish (18); and its story reads so plainly as an 
allegory for auteurism.
14 In an essay published in Critical Inquiry, “The Subject and Power,” Foucault describes 
the evolution, since the 16th century, of a “new political form of power” of the state, 
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which is “both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power.” “The modern Western 
state,” Foucault writes, “has integrated into a new political shape an old power technique 
which originated in Christian institutions,” and this form of power, which he terms 
“pastoral power,” “cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, 
without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It 
implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.” With respect to state 
power in the era of the bourgeoisie, Foucault makes the case that this form of power “has 
spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution” (782-783). 
15 The acronym “PMC” refers to the professional-managerial class,” a term coined by 
Barbara and John Ehrenreich to describe as a class situated “between labor and capital” 
whose members “engineer, administer, and supervise the workplace,” the expertise of 
which often place them “at odds with the capitalist class, especially over issues of 
occupational autonomy and technocratic reform” (Nystrom “Hard Hats and Movie Brats” 
19). 
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CHAPTER II
ETHOS OF DISAFFILIATION: DEFECTION AS AUTEURISM
In Thomas Elsaesser’s 1975 Monogram article, “The Pathos of Failure: 
Hollywood Films in the 1970s,” he describes what he calls the “unmotivated hero” of 
New Hollywood films as a challenge to Hollywood classicality, a critique of the 
“ideology of forms.”1 Citing such films as Two-Lane Blacktop (1971), Five Easy Pieces
(1970), and The Last Detail (1973), Elsaesser claims that the problem for these films is 
precisely a formal problem: “The contradiction – or tension – lies in the combination of 
the unmotivated hero and the motif of the journey”; where the latter supplies motivation 
“from outside,” there exists no “corresponding motivation on the inside,” no “inner drive 
or palpable conflict” in the protagonist (280).
By the terms of classical Hollywood, as outlined in David Bordwell, Janet 
Staiger, and Kristin Thompson’s study The Classical Hollywood Cinema, this indeed 
constitutes a violation of classical norms. The motivation cannot come from outside, such 
that external forces are altogether determining, because classical form specifies, by dint 
of repetition, that narrative causality places the outside systems of space and time in 
contest with a character’s inner drives, with the latter ultimately subordinating the former 
(6). This narrative causality, in classical Hollywood, is construed as the “psychological 
causality” of the protagonist (13). The components of the journey, space and time, cannot 
then be the prime agents of narrative; that’s the province of the character, whose goals 
must make the journey. Of course, as Elsaesser notes, classical form had an ideological 
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dimension that its critics identified as “a fundamentally affirmative attitude to the world it 
depicts, a kind of a-priori optimism located in the very structure of the narrative” (281). 
A Hollywood with formal discontinuities or inversions – in which characters didn’t make 
their own journeys but their journeys, reluctantly inherited, made them – would be an 
ideologically upended Hollywood.
Critics have generally averred that New Hollywood cinema finds us on the terrain 
of ideology critique.2 But, while Elsaesser is perspicacious to note how this critique is 
formally waged and even to detect something like a genre of films involved in such 
critique, I believe he has mistakenly elaborated it under the name of the “unmotivated 
hero.” It’s not that “hero” counts as too strong a word, but that “unmotivated” misses the 
point. Some of these films, Five Easy Pieces most notably, psychologize their 
protagonists so roundly as to seem more like character studies than narratives, with the 
interrogation of character motivation eclipsing the importance of plotted events. Often 
poignantly, these protagonists tend to have motivations that, owing to prevailing 
ideologies, are not recognizable as such.  
If we turn to Five Easy Pieces, we hear this dispute over the eligibility of 
motivations, over what counts as a story, plainly spoken. Outwardly, Five Easy Pieces
concerns the son in a family of classical musicians, Robert Dupea (Jack Nicholson), who 
rejects his family’s lifestyle in favor of a working-class experience. In the film’s 
culminating scene, Robert pushes his father’s wheelchair to a remote clearing on their 
property. Robert and his father, mute due to his recent strokes, hold “half a conversation,” 
in order to “reach an understanding”: the father-son relation, as Robert’s sister Partita 
believes, is the one broken filial connection. Robert says to his father, “I don’t know if 
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you’d be particularly interested in hearing anything about me. My life, most of it doesn’t 
add up to much that I could relay as a way of life that you’d approve of.” The sense that 
the events of Robert’s life don’t “add up” to an approved “way of life” to his father is the 
sense that the values that sustain a calculus for adding up lives are fundamentally 
different for father and son. The son, that is, has no motivation to reach the goal set for 
him by his father, and thus, judged by the logic of the father, he appears “unmotivated.” 
Robert continues, “I move around a lot, not because I’m looking for anything really, but 
because I’m getting away from things that get bad if I stay.”
The challenge is not to hear Robert’s words as a confession of “unmotivated” 
shiftlessness, but to recover in them the other order of motivation characteristic of “the 
sixties.” Theodore Roszak, in his popular 1969 book The Making of a Counter Culture, 
explains that the youth of the “affluent society”3 felt that, if they were to contribute to 
“epochal transformation,” they would need to resist the incentives of the technocracy, 
that the goals of this “high-consumption, leisure-wealthy society” (30) were not of their 
devising. In short, theirs was “much more a flight from than toward” (34 emphasis 
original); or, as Clyde Barrow says in Bonnie and Clyde (1967), “At this point, we ain’t 
heading to nowhere, we just running from.” The popular slogans of the period – Nicola 
Chiaromonte’s “total rejection” and Herbert Marcuse’s “Great Refusal” – trade on this 
notion that a set of ethical goals, amidst the positivity and superabundance of affluent 
society, could only be negatively articulated. Assessed in the key of film narrative, then, 
we can say that a formal disjunction between psychological causality and external effects 
does obtain, as Elsaesser observes, but the disjunction stems from the inadmissibility of 
the protagonist’s motivations, the basic mismatch between the goals of youth and the 
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society of elders. The mutation in narrative is not one of lost motivations, but of 
vanishing telos.  
With this in mind, I wish to propose a redefinition of Elsaesser’s insight. A genre 
does emerge in the late 1960s, one that I will name the “defection film.” As Elsaesser 
remarks, “Over all the movies that take to the road on quests that are escapes and escapes 
that are quests, there hangs like a haze the sweet poignancy of defeat” (286). The stress 
should fall on “escapes,” in that the “quests that are escapes” denote social goals with no 
society to nurture them, and the genre that seeks to formulate this negative impulse as a 
narrative has a “pathos of failure” as its coefficient. The “pathos of failure” accompanies 
hopes of a new society that, increasingly, can’t be imagined. We can sense the stirrings of 
this genre early in the decade, in David and Lisa (1962) or Mickey One (1965), but in 
what Paul Monaco calls the “watershed year” of 1967 (182), a succession of films 
penetrated the popular imagination: Cool Hand Luke, Bonnie and Clyde, and The 
Graduate. The genre elaborated its features across Midnight Cowboy (1969), Easy Rider
(1969), Five Easy Pieces (1970), the Bud Cort sequence of Brewster McCloud (1970) 
and Harold and Maude (1971), The Panic in Needle Park (1971), Straw Dogs (1971),
Two-Lane Blacktop (1971), Wanda (1971), The Heartbreak Kid (1972), Badlands (1973), 
The Last Detail (1973), Scarecrow (1973), Cockfighter (1974), Thunderbolt and 
Lightfoot (1974), and The Sugarland Express (1974).4  
Of all elaborated features, the most significant is the almost metanarrative concern 
with endings, the missing telos and lapsed closure. We find this in the form of abrupt 
deaths, such as those of Easy Rider and Bonnie and Clyde, that amount to a narrative 
solution to Bonnie Parker’s quandary over where flights from society lead. “When we 
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started out, I thought we was really going somewhere,” Bonnie tells Clyde, “But this is it 
– we just going.” By 1971, we find this narrative recourse to death thematized in Harold 
and Maude by Harold (Bud Cort) staging his suicide every few minutes, to his mother’s 
unconcern. We also find the theme of lost telos expressed otherwise, not as the tragic 
conclusion of death but as an inversion of the comic closure of marriage and the implied 
reproduction of society: we encounter a prevalence of nonreproductive couples, whether 
because two men form the couple, as Laura Mulvey observes of this era in her classic 
1975 essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,”5 or another obstacle causes 
nonreproductivity, such as the enormous age disparity of Harold and Maude. Of course, 
the tragic and inverted comic conclusions coexist in several films, including Bonnie and 
Clyde and Harold and Maude.
The theme of defection feeds on diffuse anxieties about the value and potency of 
the individual subject within U.S. institutions.6 Such fears took on discursive life when 
members of the Old Left, frustrated by the end-of-ideology rhetoric of consensus 
liberalism, began warning of the subsumption of the individual into institutional life, seen 
in David Riesman’s concern with “groupism” and C. Wright Mills’s description of white-
collar conformism to technocratic imperatives.7 By 1962, such concerns were amplified 
by the nascent New Left in the Port Huron Statement, wherein they voiced restored faith 
in “man” over against “dominant conceptions” that “he is a thing to be manipulated,” 
their opposition being directed against the “depersonalization that reduces human beings 
to the status of things” (Miller 332). In 1965, as Sean McCann and Michael Szalay 
argue,8 Paul Potter, then-president of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), converted 
this network of power relations, “in one stroke,” into “the system,” a system that proved 
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capable of producing people as its objects.9 The political task concerned, as Potter says, 
how “to control it, make it bend itself to their wills rather than bending them to its.” This 
problematic of the subject’s agency vis-à-vis the institution’s emerges saliently in crises 
in the institutions of the ruling class, most obviously, at both Tom Hayden and C. Wright 
Mills’s behest, in the university.  
But it also plays out, as formal disruptions in defection films show, in the 
institution of Hollywood. Filmmakers expressed anxieties about institutions, and about 
Hollywood as a scaled model of the institution writ large, under the name of auteurism, a 
movement that repressed the institutional apparatus in order to celebrate the individuality 
of the director. Auteurism, simply put, described the individual’s relation to the 
institution, and whether accurate in fact it certainly had influence in discourse. 
Considered discursively, auteurism involved the staging of dramatic proof of the imprint 
the individual had on the institution, and in extreme cases it figured as the individual’s 
annulment of the institution. As a mode of criticism, auteurism is embattled; it has 
required renovation10 so that it doesn’t simply lapse, as Thomas Schatz has hoped, into 
film studies’s “stage of adolescent romanticism.” In part, auteurism fails a cost-benefit 
analysis because we sacrifice the work of, say, Vilmos Zsigmond in order to carve out an 
integral body of work we call Robert Altman. When we perform the critical 
gerrymandering that produces the construct “Robert Altman,” we have to wonder how 
criticism benefits from subsuming Altman’s collaborators under his name.  In contrast, if 
we take auteurism as a story filmmakers and cinephiles told about the dynamic between 
the subject and “the system,” we see that it’s of a piece with spreading discourses about 
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institutional life and but another iteration of the defection film. Indeed, the defection film, 
we might say, is the story so-called auteurs told themselves.
The Graduate, Berkeley, and the Radicalized Affluent
Not all defection films take affluence as their setting, though we might say 
affluence is the deep background for the genre. In Bonnie and Clyde, for instance, 
affluence is negated by the displacement operations of the period piece: youth audiences 
related to the film’s portrait of disaffection and lawless flight as their issues, even though 
contemporary affluence had been swapped out for Depression-era scarcity. The 
Graduate, however, directly addresses affluence as a condition, even a stimulus, for 
defection. Benjamin Braddock (Dustin Hoffman) finds himself flush with material wealth 
– an Alfa Romeo for his graduation, an absurd wetsuit for his 21st birthday – yet he is 
confounded by the opportunity, by what consent to this system of rewards would actually 
mean. Graduation itself begins to seem like a baleful form of consent. “Intellect has 
become an instrument of national purpose, a component part of the ‘military-industrial 
complex’,” as the University of California president, Clark Kerr, explained.11 The 
confusion, for Benjamin, originates in the fact that none of this is of his choosing, that 
he’s merely been shuttled through this “approved track” that, while guaranteeing him a 
share of blandishments, will lock him in as a “component part” of a morally questionable 
economy (Gitlin 20). “It’s like I’ve been playing some kind of game, but the rules don’t 
make any sense to me,” Benjamin confesses to Elaine (Katharine Ross).  “They’re being 
made up by all the wrong people. No, I mean no one makes them up, they seem to have 
made themselves up.” We can count this as the film’s most verbal articulation of the
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objective appearance of the system, or its “immediacy” as Marcuse calls it, the lack of 
intervening agency on the subject’s part: the subject no longer has a free “inner 
dimension,” Marcuse argues, to adjudicate the acceptability of the “outer,” deciding 
whether inner or outer adjustments need to be made; the subject, now, is merely mimetic 
of the object world, and thus it is that objects appear, bewilderingly, to exercise agency 
over subjects.12
But The Graduate is otherwise verbally inarticulate, for thematic reasons. Thus 
cinematography makes many of its statements. Mike Nichols encouraged Robert Surtees, 
the cinematographer, to devise photography that would endow the film with a “subjective 
look” (Monaco 77). Surtees generated a language of isolation and confusion by 
designing, say, a long tracking shot of Benjamin alone on the airport’s moving walkway, 
using depth of field to compose scenes of barren domestic spaces where subjects could be 
nearly identical with their acquisitions, and employing a wide-angle lens to render Mrs. 
Robinson at an abyssal distance from Benjamin in what, in truth, is only a short hallway. 
The film’s most resonant joke – the single yet cryptically suggestive word, “plastics” – is 
set up when mobile, tight-framed camerawork produces the sense that full disorientation 
would be required, a well-nigh ethical unmooring needed, before the laconic advice of 
“plastics” could be recognized as good advice.  
At the beginning of the “plastics” sequence, Benjamin’s parents usher him down 
their stairs and, as the three leave the frame, the camera rests on a ghoulish black-and-
white painting of a sad clown, an emblem of the funhouse into which he descends. The 
mobile camera then captures Benjamin and his parents in tight close-up as they descend 
the stairs and are stopped by friends, who ask a series of perfunctory questions, all 
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delivered too rapidly for the disoriented Benjamin. He excuses himself on the pretense 
that he needs to check his car, and, still held in a tight close-up tracking shot, he reaches 
the door, just as a man brusquely enters, an old family friend that greets him, “Hey, 
here’s the track star.  How are you, track star?” Benjamin doubles back to re-ascend the 
stairs, but his effort is arrested by a hand that reaches into the frame and seizes his 
shoulder. He turns around to the greeting of two middle-aged women, one of whom 
caresses his face while the other intones a refrain of “proud, proud, proud.” A clap on the 
back turns Benjamin around, and Mr. McGuire stands on the step above him. He says, 
authoritatively, “Come with me for a minute, I want to talk to you.” We cut to the two 
men, Benjamin and Mr. McGuire, as they emerge from the house. We follow them in a 
medium-length tracking shot, and, perceptibly, the rhythm of the shots has slowed so that 
we might at last settle into a more placid conversation. We now feel the absence of prior 
establishing shots because, with the illuminated swimming pool behind the pair of men, 
we at last have our bearings, a relationship to the setting. Mr. McGuire begins, “I just 
want to say one word to you, just one word.” Benjamin prompts him, “Yes, sir,” and Mr. 
McGuire lets slip, “Plastics.” The scene has a mystifying effect: Having been lead 
through a labyrinth, deposited at its center with a self-styled oracle, Benjamin receives a 
key that would seem to unlock nothing.
The question stands: Why did this one-word advice, said knowingly, in the clubby 
overtones of one who cares about the future of his own class, resound with the film’s 
audiences (who were, by one survey, 95% under age 30)? How, that is, did the word 
“plastics” so perfectly account for the difference between the old and young generation? 
Read metaphorically, we could say that “plastics” bespeaks the artificiality of the 
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suburban happiness forged by the old generation, that generation that recalled the 
Depression-era scarcity but relished the postwar plenty. Read literally, as advice to a 
graduate mulling his future options, we can take it as a sound tip on a growth industry. 
Prima facie, history confirms Mr. McGuire’s intuition that “there’s a great future in 
plastics.” But, for a young generation politicized in the universities, the great past of 
plastics served as the exact measure of what they perceived to be the ethical failure of
those over thirty. Plastics, for them, functioned as the lynchpin in the military-industrial 
complex.  
In his recent book, Nylon and Bombs, Pap A. Ndiaye documents the two faces of 
DuPont, that of the producer of women’s nylons – one of the most iconic stills of The 
Graduate shows Mrs. Robinson’s unrolling her nylons before Benjamin – and that of the 
producer of plutonium for the Manhattan Project.13 A company like DuPont, known as a 
pioneering corporation in the union of the private sphere of mass consumption and the 
public sphere of politics, became an emblem of the past generation’s surrender of politics 
for comfort. As Ndiaye remarks, such corporations came to symbolize a menace for the 
“powerful political protest” of the 1960s, awakening early-century Progressive critiques 
of the corporation’s threat to democracy: the threat, now, took the form of a “technical 
neutrality” that had the force “to make politics disappear as a public space of liberty” 
(225). To a youth audience in 1968, “plastics” would be code for the underside of the 
affluent society’s consumption habits, calling to mind such corporations as DuPont and 
the “shadow” the “the Bomb” cast “over all human endeavor” (Gitlin 23). “Plastics” 
meant, in a word, the production of comforts without the acknowledgment of their 
political entailments.
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In this light, we can see the choice of Berkeley for Elaine Robinson’s university 
as not at all innocent. Berkeley became known not only as a locus of radicals, both 
student and non-student, and a theater for protest; it also became known as the university 
which first became self-conscious of its own role in the production, as Roszak then 
phrased it, of the “brains the technocracy needs” (29). As noted above, Clark Kerr 
explained without embarrassment the university’s triangulated spot between industry and 
the state in the military-industrial complex. The students resented this, considering 
themselves, as Mario Savio fulminated, nothing more than “raw material.”14 The Free 
Speech Movement (FSM) made its clamorous presence known during the Berkeley 
protests of 1964-1965, roughly three years before The Graduate hit theaters. Savio, as the 
movement’s charismatic orator, outlined the university’s several problems, suggesting 
that university problems were a synecdoche of America’s problems. “We have come up 
against what may emerge as the greatest problem of our nation,” Savio said, 
“depersonalized, unresponsive bureaucracy” (75). This problem was a familiar one, the 
old chestnut of a critique of what the Frankfurt School called the “administered society.” 
In fact, Mike Nichols had riffed on it with his comic partner Elaine May in their popular 
sketch “Telephone,” the problem being that no one, in a world of bureaucratic 
corporations, can actually speak for the corporation.  
But the problem, in its second order of energy, was that the university should not, 
or so Savio believed, be run like a corporation, that it should “be in the world but not of 
the world” (77). The university, nonetheless, evinced the same problems of any 
“unresponsive bureaucracy.” A corollary problem to the one of a “total lack of response 
on the part of the policy makers,” then, took on the form of a problem with language 
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itself: If the university bureaucracy sought to “suppress the students’ political 
expression,” what kind of language, beyond the “speech [that] has no consequences,” 
would the students need to invent to speak with institutions (75-77)? Savio and his fellow 
protesters opted for the “sit-in,” the nonviolent tactic of the Civil Rights movement, and 
they first deployed it by sitting “around a police car and ke[eping] it immobilized for over 
thirty-two hours” (76); in essence, to speak with the immovable object of the institution, 
Savio reasoned, one must make oneself over as an immovable object.
Savio’s speech makes sense of Benjamin’s sluggishness and inarticulacy, and, 
with the Berkeley campus as a reference point, Benjamin’s inert state – raw material that 
remains raw material – can be taken for incipient resistance. In fact, Benjamin produces 
echoes of Savio’s “An End to History”: his concern that the rules were “made up by all 
the wrong people,” or worse, “made themselves up,” assumes the perspective on post-
campus life that Savio described, of one “looking toward a very bleak existence… in a 
game in which all of the rules have been made up” (78). Thus, when Benjamin visits 
Berkeley, purportedly to marry Elaine, he dimly senses his place in a community.  
Savio’s observation that “many students here at the university, many people in society, 
are wandering aimlessly about” (77) frames Benjamin’s way of life as a recognizable one 
– recognizable enough that the landlord at his boarding house needs assurance that he’s 
“not one of those agitators, one of those outside agitators.” In the sequence of his arrival 
on campus, a crane-shot follows him through foliage until, at last, Benjamin sits at the lip 
of a fountain in the middle of campus. He is alone one moment; after a dissolve he is 
instantly accompanied by a throng of students. We can read this dissolve, most obviously, 
as Benjamin, a non-student, suddenly being surrounded by students once class lets out. 
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We can, more figuratively, see Benjamin’s solitary confusion growing into something 
like a movement, a movement grown on college campuses.
Of course, Benjamin expresses no political credo; he only resembles those who 
would become political. Mike Nichols has said that, while Benjamin’s a “worthy kid 
drowning among objects and things,” “he doesn’t have the moral or intellectual resources 
to do what a large percentage of other kids like him do – to rebel, to march, to 
demonstrate, to turn on” (Gelmis 284). Indeed, the community of parents, which appears 
so teeming in scenes at the Braddock house, compulsively oedipalizes Benjamin not 
because he acts to overthrow their values and lifestyles, but because he does not act to 
reproduce their values and lifestyles: he has not been properly initiated into the social. 
The Graduate crystallizes the problematic that comes to define the defection film, that of 
a protopolitical negation of the social order waged without the program for a new social 
order in mind. The films exhibit, that is, an absent telos. In Berkeley, Elaine chides 
Benjamin, “I don’t want you to go anywhere… until you have a definite plan.” We might 
assess the famous final scene of Benjamin and Elaine escaping the world of institutions –
of marriage, family, and the church – in terms of absent telos and unformulated plans. If 
the defection film generically extends itself by rendering its protagonist couples 
nonreproductive, we might posit the Mona Lisa ambiguity of Benjamin and Elaine’s 
expressions as a contemplative rest, a kind of glyph in this new narrative language of a 
politics of the present in lieu of the future. It’s a moment, in other words, that requires a 
genre to answer the questions: Will they have children? Will they found and reproduce a 
society to replace the one they abandon?
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Bonnie and Clyde, the New Left vs. the Old
The Graduate, as noted, explicitly addresses contemporaneity, in the topic of the 
generation gap and failed middle-class reproduction. It developed, we might say, a 
language for objecthood, one that registered Savio’s fatalistic plea that his generation 
would “die rather than be standardized, replaceable, and irrelevant” (78). But, as its self-
contemplative ending suggests, it did not produce a language for new subjectivity. By 
turning its focus on the past, Bonnie and Clyde seemed to dramatize, somewhat 
ironically, the schisms in contemporary politics.15 The sensational quality of the film, its 
vivid and nonchalant violence,16 was matched by the sensational quality of its reviews. 
New York Times film critic Bosley Crowther was incensed by “the upsurge of passionate 
expressions of admiration and defense” for the way in which this “buffoonized picture” 
was purported to achieve “some sort of meaningful statement for the times in which we 
live” (Sept. 1967 52); Pauline Kael, as the film’s ardent champion, explained that a 
movie so “contemporary in feeling” is bound to “divide[] audiences” because it “brings 
into the almost frighteningly public world of movies things that people have been feeling 
and saying and writing about” (Kiss Kiss 47). When Newsweek critic Joseph Morgenstern 
made what Variety called “the virtually unprecedented step of retracting a negative 
review” (Aug. 1967 1), he signaled that the choice to fall on one side or other of Kael’s 
“divide” was one of generational identification. And this, it went without saying, was a 
politically pregnant choice.
While The Graduate limns a political difference between a radicalized youth and 
their satisfied parents, Bonnie and Clyde describes a political difference between two 
generations of the politically left. Crowther’s bristling concession that young audiences 
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respond to the fact that the film makes an antagonist of “society,” the “Establishment” 
(52), was echoed by Jerry Rubin’s proclamation that Bonnie and Clyde were “leaders of 
the New Youth” (Imagine Nation 298) and Todd Gitlin’s like claim that the pair were
“children of the sixties set three decades back” (Whole World Is Watching 197). If certain 
members of the New Left hoped to reclaim Bonnie and Clyde as their icons, this perhaps 
underlines the fact that the film’s setting in the 1930s invokes the politics of that decade, 
which we might describe as historically favorable for oppositional agency, at the same 
time as it neutralizes the political content of Bonnie and Clyde’s story by rendering them, 
via the media apparatus, a strictly cultural image.
Crowther’s attitude toward Bonnie and Clyde’s supporters, in fact, maps neatly 
enough onto the Old Left’s appraisal of the New Left. The Old Left, by one criterion or 
another, included intellectuals such as Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, and Lionel Trilling, 
the once Trotskyist thinkers who were now counted, by the New Left’s leading lights, 
among the political neuters of the liberal consensus. As documented by Joseph Dorman’s 
Arguing the World (1997), these former Marxists, who were themselves radicalized as 
students at places like City College, were now siding against the student protests of the 
FSM and Columbia University. Even a Leftist such as Irving Howe, whose journal 
Dissent maintained socialist convictions while his fellow New York intellectuals became 
more conservative, alienated a New Left that he found too obstreperous, embodied best in 
what he called Tom Hayden’s “authoritarian personality.” The New Left returned the 
insult when they carped that Irving Howe “doesn’t listen to us, he’s always telling us 
what to think.”17 Bonnie and Clyde, then, spoke to a young audience, in part, because it 
spoke in a language, desperate because historically bedeviled, that the New Left favored 
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but the Old Left belittled. While invested in the state of politics in 1967, however, the 
film’s approach to questions of difference between the Old and New Left is obscure 
enough that it only gains clarity when situated in these debates.
In a March 1967 forum between spokespersons of the two Lefts, Ivanhoe 
Donaldson complained that the “attitude of the Old Left to the New is paternalistic” 
(580). Donaldson was no doubt provoked to this declaration by Dwight Macdonald’s 
remark: “I’ve been wondering why I feel rather disappointed in [the New Left]. I think 
because I assumed these groups would have the same intellectual and moral style, as you 
might say, that my own generation had” (575). Macdonald’s disappointment, paternal in 
tone, derived from his interpretation of “their principled refusal to learn from the past, 
from history, because you have to go to a library, probably, and look up all those big dull 
books” (575). Along these lines, the moderator, Daniel Aaron, closes the forum with the 
regret that it “is hard, I think, to have a very close communion when there seems to be a 
certain ahistorical attitude on the part of some of the New Left people” (588). Richard 
Rovere, though, refrains from paternal assessments of the New Left, limiting himself 
instead to a characterization of the two generations of radical Leftists that could also 
double as a description of the defection film. “The most important difference between the 
two is to be found in differing degrees of alienation,” Rovere notes, adding that “there is 
on the New Left a spirit of undiscriminating rejection of society” (574).
Rovere’s remark underscores a sense, expressed by both Tom Hayden and 
Donaldson, that the New Left lacked faith in the “forces of social change,” as Donaldson 
phrases it, that had subtended the political activity of the Old Left. The Old Left, Rovere 
observes, had “a kind of selective hostility toward political institutions,” but not in 
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institutions per se; they in fact used the “health in particular institutions” as a vehicle for 
change on behalf of dispossessed groups (574). Hayden contends that his generation of 
the Left has no access to the established institutions, that their assessment of government 
might not be paranoiac at all, but might “turn out to be so true that there won’t be any 
operating room for any Left, New or Old” (569). But Hayden’s reasoning for this 
institutional apostasy is generation-specific: he believes that dissent is in the process of 
being bought off and managed as a merely cultural project, with its political impulse 
being purged. “The New Left is in danger,” he argues, “of being swallowed up as a 
cultural artifact.” The government “does not want the changes [they] propose, but it 
wants the image of being tolerant and friendly toward protest” (570). “The mass media,” 
in charge of such “images,” has converted the New Left into “a piece of fiction or cut-out 
caricature” (571). And the “only space for people who want to change the system seems 
to be in theaters like this, or in magazines, but not in the world where power is 
accumulated” (571).
Bonnie and Clyde makes a likeminded critique, though certain ambiguities result 
from the fact that it seems to address the politics of the 1930s and 1960s at once. The film 
begins not with moving images, but with a slideshow of sepia-toned photographs of 
poverty, in the style of Walker Evans. We view a series of hard-luck pictures of farmers, 
portraits of toil that will prepare us for protagonists who will fight against institutions 
because those institutions, mutatis mutandis, signify the institutionalization of class 
exploitation: on one hand we have farmers who add value to the land, on the other we 
have the banks that foreclose on farmers, stealing their value with institutional sanction. 
Clyde Barrow (Warren Beatty) enters already a criminal, if only of the two-bit kind –
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Bonnie chides him for trying to steal an “old lady’s car,” her mother’s. Yet Clyde, when 
he later claims his gang is “just folks,” can pass off his crimes in the name of the 
struggling poor. He can, that is, attack institutions and claim legal high ground because, 
in this historical moment, institutions have an alleged role in immiserating the poor. 
As such, when Bonnie and Clyde hide out in an abandoned house for a night, and 
its dispossessed owners visit the next day, Clyde can align himself with the former owner 
because they share an adversary. The old farmer says, “The bank took it.” And Clyde 
replies, “We rob banks,” as if the farmer’s situation will now warrant the Barrow gang’s 
crime spree. The farmer, in turn, accepts Clyde’s offer to shoot holes through the bank’s 
“foreclosed” sign. For the farmer, this gunplay serves as catharsis; for Clyde, though, it 
functions as authorization of his own campaign against institutions. The force of the 
film’s critique is to suggest that the actual politics of the situation, understood as a 
difference in access to resources, becomes a matter of culture insofar as the attention 
shifts onto the one who represents the political dimension, the one who acts on behalf of
the oppressed. Such a perceived conversion of politics into cultural capital explains a 
common New Left frustration, seen, for instance, in Ivanhoe Donaldson’s exasperation 
with Michael Harrington’s The Other America and with Dwight Macdonald, whose 
satisfaction with writing political books will mark the difference between the Old Left 
and New.18
And, of course, Bonnie and Clyde does tell the story of the poverty class’s vague 
respect for the Barrow gang and the image they project. When the media begins to more 
fully document their bank robberies, a farmer, whom Clyde allowed to hold onto his 
deposit, tells the newspapers: “All’s I can say is, they did right by me, and I’m bringin’ 
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me a mess of flowers to their funeral.” Yet the story the film tells more damningly is that 
of Bonnie and Clyde’s campaign to reproduce themselves by way of image culture. The 
film operates, at one level, as an allegory of Clyde as the director to Bonnie’s movie star. 
When Clyde first meets Bonnie, he flatters her by asking, “I bet you’re a movie star.” 
Throughout the film, Clyde styles Bonnie’s image. In a café scene, he criticizes a curlicue 
in her hair and demands, “Change that, I don’t like it.” All the while, the film is larded 
with reference to movie culture, from C.W. Moss’s wondering if Myrna Loy is in the 
latest Screenland Magazine to the quotation of Battleship Potemkin when Clyde shoots 
his first victim, a bank teller, through the lens of his eyeglasses.  
In smaller degree, text accompanies their circulating images, in an effort to 
narrate their meaning. When the Barrow gang gives two lovers a joyride, Clyde smugly 
asks, “I suspect you’ve been reading about us?” Aside from the story elaborated by the 
media, Bonnie produces their story in text through the poems she composes. She begins 
to write poems, it seems, as a lark, a distraction from their fate. But, by the end of the 
film, her poems have become an instrument for realizing their fate as cultural images. 
After all, her verse, “If you’re still in need of something to read, it’s death for Bonnie and 
Clyde,” translates the politics of their campaign into the pure stuff of narrative. Bonnie 
and Clyde, we might say, is not Reds (1981) because it expresses interest in the folk 
heroes, the media icons, instead of the categorically political events and actors. That 
Partisan Review, likewise, was not New Masses gets at the ambiguity at the core of 
Bonnie and Clyde: Does the film blame the Old Left for transforming Left politics into a 
“cultural artifact,” given the notorious habit the Old Left had for starting journals as its 
chief response to political ills, or does the film attack the media tout court, a media grown 
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omnivorous by the 1960s, as the agent in glamorizing political subjects so that they 
become all image and no reality?
As an early member in this genre of defection films, Bonnie and Clyde establishes 
the self-reflexivity of this genre, its narrative problem with ending a story about couples 
that defect from society. The film twice renders Bonnie and Clyde nonreproductive, by 
first making Clyde no “lover boy” and then having the couple place themselves under the 
sign of death. Bonnie knows too well the imminence of their deaths, which confers on her 
the authority to write their story: she knows how it will end, “death for Bonnie and 
Clyde.” When she does write their story, and Clyde recognizes it as such (“You know 
what you done there? You told my story. You made me somebody they can remember”), 
newspapers blow in the wind – their story, that is, spreads – and the couple is finally able 
to make love. Of course, on-screen couples often wait until the end of the story to 
consummate their love, but such a narrative technique has traditionally contributed to 
projecting their happiness beyond the end credits, a happiness that continues, an audience 
would suppose, by including a family. Bonnie and Clyde, however, only consummate 
their love when their death is assured, but they do so knowing that their reproduction, 
obstructed biologically, will be carried out culturally.
Now, the act of positing an outlaw couple that can be culturally incorporated, in 
spite of or because of it itself, might set the minimum condition for the genre. The twin 
solutions of death and nonreproductivity register the problem that there is, in prevailing 
cultural analyses, no longer an outside to “the system.” The analyses themselves, though, 
were undertaken as cultural solutions at a remove from political problems, but the 
apolitical mood induced by their grim forecasts sequestered them, as acts, from “the 
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world where power is accumulated,” as Hayden says. This describes the sort of Möbius 
strip political act that results from a certain acculturation of the sphere of politics. As 
McCann and Szalay argue, Paul Potter’s claim that, regarding “the system,” we “must 
name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it” (212) is a redescription of 
revolutionary activity as the historic charge of the intellectual, i.e. a culture worker. If 
“analysis” were the fulcrum of politics, “the intellectual” would become the “agent of 
social change,” as he put it (211). C. Wright Mills had advanced similar claims in his 
“Letter to the New Left.”19 Mills stressed that “the seeming collapse of our historic 
agencies of change ought to be taken as a problem, an issue, a trouble – in fact, as the
political problem which we must turn into issue and trouble” (20). When Mills refers to 
the “collapse of our historic agencies of change,” he refers to the collapse of the Left’s 
most effective political agency in the 1930s: the working class and political parties 
“acting in its name, ‘representing its interests’” (19). In the 1960s, Mills called for the 
renovation of political agency by turning to “the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals, as a 
possible, immediate, radical agency of change” (21). In other words, Mills, and Potter 
after him, call for the transfer of agency from those represented to the one who 
represents.  
The problem, as Bonnie and Clyde begins to formulate it in 1967, and perhaps we 
could deem it a problem unforeseeable in Mills’s historical moment, is that the “cultural 
apparatus” was precisely the nemesis of the Left. Culture, as it functioned in bourgeois 
society, possessed the capacity to fold opposition back into itself. In an early essay, 
Marcuse describes this sinister function of culture as a pivot by which participatory 
politics can be rendered totalitarian politics. He argues that culture alone “assume[s] 
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concern for the individual’s claim to happiness,” but cautions that this merely 
compensatory realm “exalts the individual without freeing him from his factual 
debasement,” thus solving ideally what it cannot materially.20 For instance, it was surely 
a case of épater le bourgeois when Mills strode the halls of Columbia University in 
“working-class clothes” and rode a motorcycle to class, but Happy Days’s Fonzie would 
one day model this style to the approval of middle-class audiences. Like the beats, as 
Gitlin remarks, the politics of the disaffiliated was “at the mercy of the mass media,” 
which had “chewed the beats’ reputation to pulp” and made of their subversive traits so 
many marketable affectations, such as “black turtlenecks, tights, and jeans” (52). In short, 
culture was capable of turning the erstwhile political into so many lifestyle choices and 
fashion options. As Fredric Jameson has said of the process,” “the as yet unregistered and 
unexpressed experiences which the beats were able to discover on the margins of the 
system have themselves – along with the very figure and role of the beat writer as such –
become part of the culture and its stereotypes” (Signatures 93).
The two defection films of 1967, The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde, establish 
the poles of the genre, with the former floating “total rejection” as the only ethical 
response to affluent society, and the latter suggesting that even the politics basic to this 
“ethos of disaffiliation” could be culturally recontained. These representational limits 
registered the sense that “operating room” was fast closing, as Hayden worried, and the 
subject clung to vanishing autonomy as “the system” came to appear ubiquitous and fully 
objectifying. Phrased thusly, Theodor Adorno might be the specter haunting late 1960s 
discourse, as his diagnosis of a “total system” and his lapsed Marxist faith in a 
revolutionary subject, what Susan Buck-Morss calls “Marxism minus the proletariat,” 
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suggest his pessimism lagged just behind Marcuse’s political commitment. However, in 
that decade “known in retrospect as the sixties,” Jameson observes, “Adorno’s sense of 
Apocalypse seemed very retrogressive indeed, focused as it was on the moment of 
Auschwitz, and obsessed with the doom and baleful enchantment of a ‘total system’ that 
few enough – in a ‘pre-revolutionary’ moment defined notoriously by the sense that ‘tout 
est possible!’ – sensed impending in our own future” (Late Marxism 5). I will discuss 
Adorno in relation to films of technological disaster in Chapter 3, but in this context, 
Marcuse’s influence makes sense of the protopolitical valence of defection. It is worth 
suggesting, though, that the pessimism we associate with Adorno, namely that the 
protopolitical will be cut off at the knees, may well subtend this genre in its waxing phase 
of 1967-1974.
Five Easy Pieces and the Making of a Genre
When Bob Rafelson directed Five Easy Pieces in 1970, a genre of defection had 
already spelled out its problematic; as well, the genre had crafted a set of semantic 
features. Such a semantic feature, as noted, was the couple at the heart of the narrative, 
whether Benjamin and Elaine or Bonnie and Clyde, whether Wyatt and Billy in Easy 
Rider (1969) or Joe Buck and Ratso Rizzo in Midnight Cowboy (1969). And the syntax 
for these semantemes, to deploy Rick Altman’s terms, was conventionalized within a few 
repetitions and variations. For instance, the open-ended question concluding The 
Graduate – whether Benjamin and Elaine’s expressions, turned abruptly from glee to 
grimness, mean we have seen comedy turn to tragedy, the destruction of the future rather 
than its regeneration – gets revisited by Midnight Cowboy just two years later. In the last 
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scenes of Midnight Cowboy, we see Dustin Hoffman in the back row of a bus with his 
partner, once again, as a kind of nod of fellowship to The Graduate. Midnight Cowboy
reinterprets Benjamin’s sullen look so that the stillness, the lack of expression, become 
the death of Hoffman’s new character, Ratso Rizzo. While Joe Buck (Jon Voight) 
imagines aloud their future in Miami, and talks about a new job because being a hustler is 
no line for him, Ratso dies at his arm. This scene, in turn, is reprised in the final scenes of 
Thunderbolt and Lightfoot, when the fugitive Lightfoot (Jeff Bridges) dies next to 
Thunderbolt (Clint Eastwood) in their fleeing car, very much a self-conscious tribute to 
Midnight Cowboy. Repetitions such as these knit together the genre, in the process 
consolidating the fatalistic outcome as the only outcome of defection.
While The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde tapped problems that resonated with a 
young audience, problems that the United Artists film Midnight Cowboy recognized as 
good material to rework, the Hollywood industry did not immediately detect in their 
success anything like a fledgling genre, one whose replication could be assigned to 
production units, as in the studio days. Not until Easy Rider scored similarly phenomenal 
success, that is, did Hollywood see bankable results in this style of film. The genre, 
however, was not being assessed along the lines of content – young couples defecting 
from affluence, say – but rather along the lines of an audience demographic and a scale of 
production, or, more precisely, size of investment to size of return (Easy Rider cost 
$375,000 but earned $19.3 million). The genre, then, was termed the “youth-cult” and the 
budgets were slight (Lost Illusions 162). On the strength of Easy Rider, Columbia 
contracted the film’s producers, Bob Rafelson and Bob Schneider, to make another six 
films, carte blanche, so long as they came in under $1 million.
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In retrospect, we can see plainly that the film industry left much of the nuance of 
Easy Rider unread, as it were, in favor of a broad attention to its formula for success: 
hippies, drug use, and rock-n-roll. Overlooking the nuance perhaps led to the poor 
receipts of Getting Straight (1970) and The Strawberry Statement (1970), movies that 
bore superficial counterculture signifiers but failed to access the philosophical insights 
that excited the youth audience (Lev 17). Recent studies, indeed, continue to mistake the 
historical specificity of the contribution Easy Rider made to genre. Lee Hill measures the 
film’s “full impact” in terms of its launch of the youth-cult cycle, as well as the benefits 
accrued to director autonomy, in its name, to those directors known as the “movie brats.” 
While these count as some of its true effects, they narrowly describe how Easy Rider was 
instrumentalized as a model for industrial reorganization. In a history of film form, 
however, Hill consigns Easy Rider to the “road movie” genre, indeed ordaining it as “the
road movie” (58-72). In this capacity, Easy Rider has a diachronic function in the 
development of the road movie that stretches from It Happened One Night (1934) to 
Thelma and Louise (1991), but it will have no essentially synchronic function for the 
1960s, discussions of auteurism, or the counterculture. While its historic role can cut both 
ways, diachronic and synchronic, I want to insist that Easy Rider becomes more 
generically vivid if placed in sequence with The Graduate, Bonnie and Clyde, and, 
significantly, Five Easy Pieces. Further, the suasion of my account for its genre function 
turns on close attention to how the film locks into place the ineluctable outcome of 
defection from society, chiefly the necessarily political reverberations of this act.
In considering Easy Rider, we need to place it in context of Midnight Cowboy’s
reinterpretation of The Graduate’s final scene. Benjamin’s uncertainty about the future 
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becomes the decedent Ratso’s certainty about there being no future in 1969. The death, 
that is, of one or both members of the couple henceforth constitutes the meaning of the 
genre. For instance, Ratso’s death releases the meaning of Midnight Cowboy in that it 
strips Joe Buck of his lone reserve for imagining a future, throwing him back on society 
as no more than one of its average and atomized parts. Likewise, we should predicate a 
reading of Easy Rider on its multiple deaths. The film’s protagonist couple dies for the 
generic reason that they flee toward nothing, a condition that can only be narratively 
characterized by death. Wyatt had once used a Florida retirement as a flimsy pretext for 
their journey, but when he discredits this telos, we find only the exhausted motivation of 
the something from which they flee.  
The death that imbues the film with meaning, however, is George Hanson’s (Jack 
Nicholson). Wyatt and Billy encounter George in a Texas jail cell, and he at first 
represents “square” society to the pugnacious Billy. But they soon learn he’s an ACLU 
attorney and, holding sway in the community as the scion of an important family, can get 
them safely out of jail. His presence, as a figure of law generally and civil rights law 
particularly, explains in part why Easy Rider is a Western in reverse, that is, why Wyatt 
and Billy, bearing the names of great Western heroes, travel from the terminus of the 
Western frontier, California, back into the Deep South. It’s not simply for the symbolic 
reason that the law is being rolled back as they travel into the South; it’s rather for the 
recent historical reason that the counterculture grows out of the civil rights movement, as 
SDS and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) did, and the journey that 
many leaders of this movement made, such as Tom Hayden, Paul Potter, and Mario 
Savio, was from the west into southern states such as Mississippi and Alabama. George’s 
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death, then, refers to the movement’s passage from formal politics into a “politics of 
consciousness” (51).21 In other words, in 1969 the once ritualistic encounter with forms 
of law began to look less interesting to the counterculture than the exploration of forms of
consciousness: George Hanson trying marijuana with Billy and Wyatt and discoursing on 
the “Venutians” is narrative shorthand for this shift. 
Irwin and Debi Unger argue in their book Turning Point: 1968 that the titular year 
was the breakpoint for a liberal consensus that had long demanded reform, but, under a 
welter of crises, had traded its stake in politics for one in culture (a revolutionary culture 
in the case of the Black Panthers and Weather Underground).22 Most obviously, 1968 
was marked by the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, the 
ongoing ghetto riots, and the Tet Offensive. Hence, the dead body of George Hanson 
becomes a screen proxy for a gruesome number of dead bodies that impacted the 
country’s political imagination, the liberal imagination most traumatically. Making Easy 
Rider a Western in reverse, or an “Eastern” as Peter Fonda quips, underscores the sense 
that there are no political open spaces left, or that perhaps the political openings closed 
because they went unrecognized: Wyatt and Billy leave behind the self-sufficient farmer, 
the commune, they bury the ACLU lawyer, in favor of their spree of individualism. We 
likely hew closer to the point if we call Easy Rider a “Southern,” not after its writer Terry 
Southern but in recognition of the political defeat handed to the loud individualism of the 
Left by the “silent majority” of the emerging Right, engineered through Kevin Phillips’s 
“southern strategy.”
Notwithstanding its generic mélange (road movie, neo-western, southern), Easy 
Rider makes one statement with clear genre implications: “We blew it.” Wyatt’s famous 
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confession of failure lights up the defection genre, in a way that permanently suffuses the 
idea of defecting from society as a political act with the “sweet poignancy of defeat,” a 
pathos that Elsaesser had attached categorically to unmotivated beings. This pathos more 
powerfully attends these films after Easy Rider because the protagonists of that film, 
following the death of George Hanson, come to self-consciousness regarding their lack of 
a social program. As an effect of the popularity of Easy Rider, Wyatt’s confession rings 
profoundly, as though before a public tribunal, as the confession of the counterculture 
tout court. In its wake, Five Easy Pieces is the film that registers these failures and 
gathers up the dead bodies into a statement of generic purpose. Five Easy Pieces, in fact, 
conjures the public appearance of this genre by cementing the image of its emergent star, 
Jack Nicholson, as a counterculture hero and as a new type of star for this new type of 
film; by self-consciously placing itself in this burgeoning film tradition; and by 
literalizing the trope of defection as the act of emigrating from one’s country because it 
had foreclosed social alternatives.
Five Easy Pieces produces continuity between itself and Easy Rider, at the most 
basic level, by using the same personnel. The Raybert production team of Bob Rafelson 
and Bert Schneider, reformed now with Steve Blauner as BBS Productions, had a hand in 
direction and production, with Rafelson in the former capacity and Schneider in the latter. 
Laszlo Kovacs again photographed the film, and Karen Black and Toni Basil again 
appear as actors. Most conspicuously, Jack Nicholson goes from being the 
unacknowledged center of Easy Rider to the acknowledged center of Five Easy Pieces. 
While this personnel carryover might suggest a budding movement within the industry –
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the production-side analogue to the youth-cycle films that became known as the “New 
Hollywood” – it hardly accounts for the extension of the genre.
Rather, Five Easy Pieces extends the genre because the social questions that form 
the internal disorder of the other films are sedimented in it. Questions that motivated The 
Graduate, such as whether, once deprived of subjectivity, there exists any political 
speech proper to objecthood, and, if agency can hence be newly imagined, can this 
objecthood reproduce itself; questions back of Bonnie and Clyde, such as whether the Old 
Left had not converted political questions into cultural ones, and, with that conversion 
realized, did matters of culture now function to mask the operations of class ressentiment; 
questions examined in Easy Rider, such as whether the New Left itself had not cashed in 
politics based in legal forms for the politics of consciousness and lifestyle. Five Easy
Pieces has the virtue of structuring all these questions into a framework for the action, or 
perhaps inaction, of its protagonist, Bobby Dupea. Any determinations as to the 
motivations of Bobby Dupea, I suggest, must be rendered within a framework thatched 
together from the thematic parts of these prior films.
Before treating the film’s generic continuities, though, I would like to address 
strategic decisions made in the production of Five Easy Pieces that had the purpose of 
suppressing certain unwanted continuities, with both recent Hollywood and European 
cinema. We should first note that the deaths of other films in this genre, those of 
Midnight Cowboy and Easy Rider that anchor the film’s meaning, are purged from Five 
Easy Pieces. Though no one dies in the film, that was not the intent specified in its 
original script by Carole Eastman (credited as Adrien Joyce). Instead of ending the story 
as the film does, by having Bobby hitchhike into a cold oblivion, suggested to be Canada, 
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Eastman ended it with Bobby and Rayette Dipesto (Karen Black) driving off a bridge, 
with Rayette surviving and Bobby dying. This, along with Eastman’s wish to cast Jeanne 
Moreau as Catherine, would make strong reference to François Truffaut’s Jules and Jim
(1962), in which Moreau plays a Catherine who drives off a bridge and kills both herself 
and sometime lover Jim. But Eastman and Rafelson changed it to a deathless ending; it 
became instead an ending of pure escape, with Bobby leaving Rayette at a filling station, 
his destination undisclosed. Additionally, the original script described Catherine as an 
older woman, which would make the affair between her and Bobby, in the mode of The 
Graduate, one of compulsive oedipalizing. Of course, Catherine ends up being Bobby’s 
age in the shooting script. In another suppressed continuity, Jack Nicholson wanted Janis 
Joplin to be cast as Palm Apodaca, the caricatured figure of the counterculture played by 
Helena Kallianiotes: Casting Joplin would have established the kind of overt connection 
with the counterculture that Easy Rider had forged.
In short, Five Easy Pieces avows its relationship to its fellow films as eagerly as it 
disavows it. Its minimalism, disquietude, and obliquity stem from its narrative logic, a 
kind of inner recognition of its story, that everyone is born into a system of avowals –
whether those of class, culture, or nation – and no disaffiliation from them, no matter how 
adamantine, can efface the avowals made on one’s behalf. Bobby Dupea, for instance, 
disavows a family identity propounded by his father, because the identity, that of 
classical musician, founds itself on hidden avowals of its position within a class structure. 
The film draws out the class issues ensconced in culture issues. Yet as Derek Nystrom 
observes, in an incisive essay, the film, as a product of New Hollywood’s auteurist
cinema, cannot help but express a conflicted relationship to its own provenance. Nystrom 
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claims that Five Easy Pieces is “shot through with antinomial impulses regarding cultural 
capital and class identity” (35). On one hand, the film exposes the protocols of high 
culture as a means of policing class borders; on the other, it makes its case “via the use of 
the culturally privileged filmmaking strategies that would come to signify the New 
Hollywood” (34). Its critique, then, concerns the aporia of making meaningful self-
critique without relying on, and finding solace in, the language that distinguishes the self.  
How, after all, can the critic renounce the training that enables the enterprise of criticism?
In this respect, Five Easy Pieces stands as the Ur-text of the auteurist movement 
in Hollywood, in that the film shares the tissue of contradictions that mark auteurism. 
The film posits the aesthetic experience as a preserve of “inner feeling” only to 
deconstruct the very autonomy of the aesthetic by disclosing its intersections with class 
politics. And, by various accounts, auteurism carried itself forward on such a 
contradiction: it was a means of isolating the figure of the artist amid relations of 
production, with the effect that the aesthetics of this isolated artist conspicuously 
resemble the politics of privilege of the workplace boss. The film’s opening scene, a
montage of Bobby and his friend Elton working on an oil rig, replete with the obvious 
class indicators of hard hats, denim jackets, and hulking machinery, frames a story that 
will, we expect, deal with blue-collar realities. The film’s reversal, it turns out, will be to 
deploy such class markers early in order to frame a story of the artist’s seclusion – on an 
island whose insularity will intensify absorption in cultural stuff, on the order of 
Bergman’s films – for the purpose of showing how deeply implicated in class relations is 
the secluded artist.
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When Bobby leaves the oil fields and returns to his family’s secluded island off 
the coast of Washington state, in order to visit his stroke-victim father, he does so as a 
strong critic of his family’s masked class commitments. His sister Partita (Lois Smith) 
and brother Carl (Ralph Waite) still live on the island with their father, who has been 
rendered mute, but not deaf, by two strokes. Carl’s fiancée Catherine (Susan Anspach) 
chooses to be on the island, training as a musician under Carl, and in turn chooses to 
avow the lifestyle into which Bobby was born. Catherine, in effect, wants to believe that 
the sanctuary of high art, to which the Dupea’s island existence is living tribute, can 
protect the emotional interiority of the subject. Bobby, in contrast, doesn’t believe that his 
family’s insulation makes them any less “ants” than the blue-collar workers stuck in 
traffic for “the most beautiful part of the day.” This comes to a head when, during a 
cocktail party of Carl and Catherine’s friends, a woman sermonizing about civilization 
and rationality calls attention to the brutish language of Bobby’s working-class girlfriend, 
Rayette, and, seemingly, how easily managed she is by the mass-cultural appeal of 
television. Robert fiercely rebukes her, asking what grants her the authority to “tell 
anybody anything about class or who the hell’s got it or what she typifies.” The 
partygoers all appear stunned by his outburst, and in part the script, it seems, would have 
us understand their discomfiture as turning on the double session of the word “class”: the 
artists and savants likely do not consider themselves united as a class by shared 
economic interests, but rather as confederates in high-mindedness, and it would be this 
latter trait that allows them to arrogate for themselves the class, understood as elegant 
taste, that they would deny Rayette.
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This swift conversion of political content into cultural mastery recalls Dwight 
Macdonald’s reference to all those “big dull books.” In fact, we can either regard as one 
of Five Easy Pieces’s subtle jokes the fact that one of these partygoers, one of the more 
avid auditors in this very conversation, strongly resembles Dwight Macdonald, or we can 
regard as one of the unwitting jokes of Leftist culture the fact that most Trotskyist 
intellectuals look like Dwight Macdonald: dark goatee and black horn-rimmed glasses. 
But Dwight Macdonald, whatever the status of the joke, remains an important figure in 
this conversation, insofar as he can account for a suppressed connection in this 
juxtaposition of mass culture (television, country music) and high culture (classical 
music, big dull books): the cinema. In “A Theory of Mass Culture,” Macdonald trades on 
the sense of avant-garde art practices that Clement Greenberg elaborated in his Partisan 
Review essay, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” The avant-garde “made a desperate attempt to 
fence off some area where the serious artist could still function,” Macdonald explains, “It 
created a new compartmentation of culture, on the basis of an intellectual rather than a 
social élite” (63) The distinction between this “intellectual” and “social élite” would seem 
spurious, at least from Bobby’s perspective. But Macdonald attributes to it “almost 
everything that is living in the art of the last fifty or so years” (63).
Macdonald does not attribute much that “is living in [] art” to the cinema, on 
precisely the lines of the auteurist problematic: “The only great films to come out of 
Hollywood,” he claims, “were made before industrial elephantiasis had reduced the 
director to one of a number of technicians all operating at about the same level of 
authority” (65). He calls Griffith and Stroheim “our two greatest directors” because they 
“were artists, not specialists; they did everything themselves, dominated everything 
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personally” (65). To be an artist, on Macdonald’s account, one must have autonomy, 
because the unity “essential in art” “will result only when a single brain and sensibility is 
in full command.” Macdonald’s essay, published in the journal Diogenes in 1953, echoes 
in Andrew Sarris’s “criterion of value” as the discernible singular “personality of the 
director” in his essay, “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962.”                               
  The problem, as the film conceives it, concerns how effectively the avant-garde 
artist could install himself in an area “fence[d] off” from the “social élite.” The problem 
is not simply that this figure of the artist provides an illusory outside to class relations and 
the kinds of subjects they must produce; the greater problem may lie in the viability of 
the concept of subjectivity. The fact that Bobby trained in childhood as a musician only 
to renounce serious performance in favor of odd work as a pianist in a Las Vegas musical 
revue confounds Catherine, who herself aspires to the very status he renounced. She 
dismisses the musical revue, sneering, “You don’t call that music.” Bobby objects, “Oh 
yes, I do, it’s music.” His refusal to draw a bright line between high-art music and that of 
mass culture imperils the safe place that modernist art, as its raison d’être, had preserved 
for the subject, the coordinates at which the subject produced “art for art’s sake,” not for 
commodity’s sake.  
Yet when Bobby, at Catherine’s request, does play a piece of serious music for 
her, she becomes the dupe of a commodity use from which she had exempted serious 
music. Bobby’s performance makes her sense feeling where there is none; she mistakes 
its utility as a means for its integrity as an end. Her admission that she was “very moved” 
by his playing elicits his mockery: he picked the easiest piece he could remember, one 
that he played as an eight-year-old and played “better then.” “Can’t you understand,” 
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Catherine urges, “it was the feeling I was moved by?” But Bobby’s insistence that he 
“didn’t have any,” that the piece was executed without “inner feeling,” leads her to assent 
that she “must have been supplying it.” The notion that she could have supplied the 
“feeling” means, most fundamentally, that a subject could fail to recognize the difference 
between a subject and an object, and could indeed ascribe subjectivity to an object.
The erosion of the clear boundary between subject and object comes, on the view 
of many commentators, from mass culture, or the “culture industry” as Adorno and 
Horkheimer called it. As Macdonald claims, folk art had formerly been the self-
expression of the “common people,” it “grew from below”; mass culture, on the other 
hand, is imposed from above, “becoming an instrument of political domination” (60). 
The “scientific and artistic technicians,” as Macdonald then remarks, degrade “the public 
by treating it as an object, to be handled with the lack of ceremony and objectivity of 
medical students dissecting a corpse” (70). High culture, however, no longer gives 
quarter for the subject in the age of mass culture because, “in a country like ours,” as 
Greenberg says, mass culture lays traps “even in those areas” “that are the preserves of 
genuine culture” (103). With the phrase “in a country like ours,” Greenberg means to 
signal the condition of affluence, by which society can “hold in solution the 
contradictions between its classes” (106). When this occurs, “the axioms of the few are 
shared by the many; the latter believe superstitiously what the former believe soberly” 
(106). At this point, kitsch appears as the “faked article,” threatening because it can 
sometimes be “high enough” to deceive “the naïve seeker of true light” (103). In sum, the 
effect of mass culture is to appropriate the findings of high culture and academicize them, 
leaving kitsch behind. This results, as Macdonald and Greenberg maintain, in a merger of 
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high and mass culture; it also results in a sort of shell game where one merely guesses 
whether a product of culture emits actual self-expression or whether it effects degraded 
self-manipulation, whether, that is, we can identify with a subject or object.
Five Easy Pieces, in this respect, returns us to The Graduate. Both films contend 
with the efficacy of the subject, on the premise that the category of “expression” –
seemingly the province of the subject – has been cast irredeemably into doubt. Given the 
avowals made on one’s behalf, whether Benjamin’s or Bobby’s, one is reduced to an 
object that expresses the values of a class. To arrest this process, one can only express 
resistance through disavowals and disaffiliation. In Five Easy Pieces, Bobby disaffiliates 
from his family and the privileges of their class not, as I remarked earlier it might 
outwardly seem, in favor of a working-class lifestyle. Indeed, Bobby chafes at the 
limitations of the working class as much as at those of the artist class. He disaffiliates in 
some sense absolutely, like Macdonald’s avant-garde artist who would “fence off some 
area where the serious artist could still function.”  
To this end, the movie concludes with Bobby first leaving his family’s estate, and 
then leaving Rayette at a gas station with his car, his wallet and all it contains: money, 
identification, whatever documents might authorize him as an American citizen. The film 
doesn’t give his destination, not explicitly at least. But we do receive indication from the 
film as to the order on which we should understand his defection. When Bobby first visits 
Partita at a Bakersfield recording studio, she tells him about their father’s strokes and his 
poor chances for recovery. Bobby promises to visit the father, saying that he plans to 
“drive up” and adding, somewhat mysteriously, “maybe I’ll go into Canada after.” The 
choice of Canada, like the locale of Berkeley in The Graduate, is not innocent, but 
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invokes the historic specificity of defection to Canada as one from the Vietnam war. The 
film more obliquely indicates Bobby’s destination when he climbs into the cab of a truck 
and the driver cautions him, “Where we’re going, it’s colder than hell.” As Peter Lev 
interprets this, “Bobby may, in fact, be heading for death at the end of the film” (21). 
Death, as noted, serves as only another trope for the total negation of an existing social 
order without the program for a new one in mind. Canada and death, in the cultural 
imaginary, operate as equivalents, in that neither one offers telos to a narrative of social 
dislocation.
With Vietnam as a backdrop, Five Easy Pieces perhaps suggests that anxieties 
about objecthood amount to personal concerns with being deployed as an object in a war. 
The Graduate, as argued, posits recognition of objecthood as the first term of a new 
politics, in that students can be most politically arranged as objects in sit-ins; Benjamin 
can be most threatening as an object that won’t take shape as a subject of his class; and a 
cross can function, against its prescribed use, as an object for locking people behind 
church doors. Five Easy Pieces promotes a similar philosophy, still only protopolitical, in 
that it seems to articulate a language of objecthood that at once superannuates self-
expression and compensates one for a lost subjectivity. We can observe this not only in 
Bobby’s efforts to live a life of the body, one in which the body qua object indulges in 
sheer sensuality, given over to “proletarian physicality,” as Nystrom remarks of Bobby’s 
fits of violence (32), but could as easily refer to Bobby’s sexual promiscuity. 
We can also see Bobby’s father, immobilized and stricken mute by his strokes, as 
an object of his class, “sitting there like a stone,” as Bobby remonstrates, ready to join the 
busts of the composers and the gravid photographs that dignify the Dupea house as one of 
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museum pieces telling the grand story of music history. The father, Nicholas, functions 
very much as Bobby’s counterpart, the other member of the pair in defection films, in 
that he “has ways of communicating,” as Partita says, but these are no longer the ways of 
language, that medium traditionally according the status of thinking subject. Both men 
are limited to speaking with their bodies, but Nicholas’s is sedentary and statuesque, 
monumentalizing the social order of the old generation, while Bobby’s is mobile and, 
once free of its documents, untrackable, subject to no class or state. They form a couple, 
though, in the generically strange way that Nicholas was reproductive, but his offspring, 
Bobby, is the member of the couple left to repudiate reproduction (biologically, in 
turning his back on a pregnant Rayette, and socially, in renouncing his family origins) 
such that, as a couple, they demonstrate the diachronic unmasking of the social and 
political mechanics of the subject, a circuit that runs from unwitting complicity to 
undeceived defection: from subject to subject no more.  
On Periodicity: Brewster McCloud and Genre’s Self-Knowledge
It is one sort of enterprise to catalogue the features of a genre such as the 
defection film, which amounts to reading for commonality across a set of films, but 
another enterprise altogether to explain why the genre came to life in its historical 
moment. Given how short-lived was the defection film (1967-1974), interest in such an 
explanation sharpens because it must account for peculiarity, for that which does not span 
cultural history but appears in its interstices. The genre’s brief lifespan, in short, suggests 
a historical shift. The year of 1967 marks, in some tellings, the moment in which “the 
sixties” takes shape in the cultural imagination, with the summer of love and the 
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Monterey Pop Festival offering images of the counterculture to the culture at large. On 
Fredric Jameson’s telling, however, 1967 does not show itself as the waxing of this era 
but as one of two “breaks” (the second occurring in 1973) that signal the end of the era. 
As Carl Dengler remarks in his 1968 study, Affluence and Anxiety, “the period from 1961 
until 1967 constituted the longest period of uninterrupted prosperity in the history of the 
nation” (169). Yet 1967, as Jameson explains, sees the flickering of prosperity and the 
onset of a recession that, aggravated by the oil crisis of 1973, will culminate in a 
“worldwide economic crisis” (“Periodizing the 60s” 205). In other words, the period in 
which the defection film emerges, 1967-1974, is the twilight of the “age of affluence.”
Of course, those experiencing it had different readings of the twilight of the age of 
affluence. Michael Harrington, for example, took it to be the twilight of capitalism. As 
well, members of the Weather Underground understood the decolonization and liberation 
movements in the Third World to be the first salvos in a worldwide overthrow of 
capitalism. With hindsight, however, we might say these symptoms were not those of a 
dying capitalism, but one in the midst of retrenchment. If something were dying, as 
David Harvey observes, it was a regime of capital accumulation known as Fordism. And 
the death of this regime might only have been a growth pang in the expansion and 
interconnection of capitalism around the globe, which made for greater domestic 
consumption of exports from the revamped economies of Europe and Japan. These 
patterns of production and circulation called for a flexibility that could only counterpose 
itself to the highly rationalized structures of Fordism, best characterized as “rigid.” We 
might consider in this context Five Easy Piece’s pairing of Nicholas and Bobby Dupea as 
a kind of cross-generational articulation of capital regimes, the father being fixed in his 
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station (socially, geographically) and the son mobile (on the same counts). Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri will call this difference between father and son the reconfiguration of 
the labor force, one precipitated by the cultural movements peopled by “youth who 
refused the deadening repetition of the factory-society” and thus “invented new forms of 
mobility and flexibility, new styles of living” (274). The large corporation, now 
articulated on a transnational scale, was the manifestation of capital that was able to adapt 
to and recontain the energies of these youth movements.
The corporation, in Mills’s analysis, is responsible for displacing the small 
entrepreneur, forcing a passage from economic individualism to socialized capital. The 
effect we then encounter is that of the death of the subject, a passing much heralded in 
poststructuralist theory; the subject dies, that is, because the death of an economic regime 
means the death of a certain “regime” for “the production of subjectivity” (Hardt and 
Negri 275). The defection film, we might say, narrates the act of the pressing against this 
moribund regime’s limits. The narrative imagination of this genre, though, concerns itself 
with the subject attempting to flee this collapsing regime, but the imagination falls short 
of picturing an outside to this regime to the very extent that it will not relinquish the form 
of subjectivity produced within this regime. Protest against the old regime, in these 
narratives, takes expression as the opting for intransigent objecthood as an alternative to 
the subjectivity on offer.
While this subset of Hollywood films gives us a glimpse of these refracted 
concerns, we might look at other discourses to see how the concerns play out in different 
registers. Some critics have called 1967 a watershed year because Michael Fried 
published “Art and Objecthood” in that year, and Fried’s essay represents, in the 
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discourse of art history, a fraught acceptance of the loss of a subjectivity that itself was 
deemed, under the terms of modernism, to be coterminous with art itself.23 Modernism’s 
Promethean struggle was again and again to wrest away from reified life a small space in 
which the subject could be free unto itself, buffered against the determinations of a viral 
exchange system that was, inexorably, rendering everything an object susceptible to its 
laws. Modernism, as Fried puts it, took for its “imperative that it defeat or suspend its 
own objecthood,” whereas the art he calls “literalism” (elsewhere called “minimalism”) 
aims “to discover and project objecthood as such” (120). The implications are great, for 
Fried, in that, while subjectivity may separate us off from other subjects, it at best 
predisposes us to grant others their subjectivity and, when seeking community, inquire 
into the depths of other subjectivity. Objecthood, because it bears a much bleaker hope 
for community, seems politically retrograde, in Fried’s account, beside the goals of 
modernism. Being a beholder of “literalist” objects, as Fried suggests, is not “entirely 
unlike being distanced, or crowded, by the silent presence of another person” (128 italics 
original). In short, objects and people being alike, they are both things that get in one’s 
way.
The resistance implicit in objecthood is, of course, the very protopolitical 
language The Graduate seeks to evolve. When Mario Savio insisted that you must “put 
your body upon the gears” in order to stop the “operation of the machine,” he was 
insisting that the body be used to obstruct the discharge of institutional power. I would 
like to consider the defection film as a genre that develops the political efficacy of such a 
philosophy – a philosophy, that is, intent on choosing objecthood over subjectivity – and 
I would like the occasion for such a consideration to be a reading of Brewster McCloud, a 
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film at once in the stream of and against the current of the defection film. If Five Easy 
Pieces counts as the Ur-text of the defection film, its most mature formulation, then 
Brewster McCloud must count as its deconstruction.
Brewster McCloud begins on a note of arch self-consciousness when the MGM 
lion, instead of roaring, confesses, “I forgot the opening line.” While this move evinces 
the obvious deconstructionist impulse to bare the conventions of filmmaking as arbitrary, 
though by now thoroughly naturalized, it also proffers a different sort of commentary: 
that on the conditioning of nature and, a corollary dear in this era, the prospect of 
deconditioning. That a lion made to shill for corporate interests might forget how to do so 
held out the hope, general in defection films, that a subject could forget its training and 
return to a natural state. At its heart, Brewster McCloud concerns this tension, whether 
one should claim one’s nature or transcend it. When, following the MGM card, Rene 
Auberjonois walks into a classroom as a lecturer and makes his address to the camera, 
Brewster McCloud tells us outright that it will not resolve this tension, only explore it. 
“Flight of birds, the flight of man, man’s similarity to birds, bird’s similarity to man,” the 
lecturer begins, “these are the subjects at hand, we will deal with them for the next hour 
or so and hope that we draw no conclusions, elsewise the subject shall cease to fascinate 
us and alas another dream will be lost.” In one respect, Brewster McCloud cannot hope to 
answer this question, but only unfold the meaning of its terms. It is, after all, a critique of 
the impulse of the defection film, a film genre that, not coincidentally, finds its full 
expression (Five Easy Pieces) in the same year Brewster McCloud offers its critique. The 
critique, in a Hegelian sense, could only be initiated when the terms of the discourse were 
fully evolved, fully known, and we might say that in 1970 – after Herbert Marcuse, 
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Norman O. Brown, and Susan Sontag; after the Summer of Love, Woodstock, and 
Altamont – the terms of the discourse had taken on a public life.
Insofar as the terms of this discourse were the narrative bed of Brewster McCloud, 
as well as the defection film generally, I will show how the local telling of the former 
film self-consciously reflect on the general terms of the latter genre. Brewster McCloud
has for its two prime movers the defecting couple of Brewster (Bud Court) and Louise 
(Sally Kellerman), whose defection takes the curious form of their fellowship in winged 
escape. Louise, whose back shows scars where wings had been, watches over Brewster as 
he constructs a mechanical set of wings, with which he will one day fly away from it all. 
In line with other films of the genre, the defection has no destination, and thus the 
narrative no telos. When Brewster’s admirer, Hope (Jennifer Salt), asks why he’s 
building wings, he tells her he’s “flying away.” When she further inquires, “Where you 
flying to,” Brewster corrects her preposition by stressing “away.” We hear, then, echoes 
of Clyde Barrow’s clarification that “we ain’t heading to nowhere, we just running from.” 
Brewster McCloud, however, assures the nonreproductivity of its protagonist couple –
which in other defection films is a tacit fact of the narrative – by way of an explicit 
interdiction on sex by one of its members. Louise warns Brewster about Hope’s passion, 
fearing that “she could involve” him in “sex.” The suggestive verb “involve” implies that, 
against Louise’s goal of defection, sex would be a lure for Brewster’s complicity, his 
entanglement with the verboten society, one chained, in Louise’s logic, to the status quo. 
“People like Hope accept what’s been told to them,” Louise says, “they don’t even 
believe they can be free” but that “their sex is the closest they have to…,” and there 
Louise trails off. Brewster finishes her sentence, “Flying.” Louise then continues that 
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such people “only at first” want to fly but, “as they grow,” “they turn more and more 
toward earth – when they experience sex they simply settle for it, and procreate more of 
their own kind.” “Their own kind,” of course, should be understood as the caged, the 
unfree.
If Brewster McCloud is unusual within the genre for explicitly naming and 
explaining the interdiction on procreation, we might say that it cuts even more sharply 
against the generic grain when it gives figuration to the otherwise abstract system of the 
technocracy. The Houston Astrodome, Brewster’s domicile, serves as a nearly science-
fiction figure for the kind of hyper-rationalistic proposal to improve upon nature that 
might be advanced by a technologically inclined elite of specialists. Of course, the 
structure, owing to its scale and blandness, seems indifferent to human wishes. The 
Astrodome renders visible the sense of enclosure that remains an absent cause in the 
other defection films, which more often than not invoke the bucolic landscapes of the 
American romance: landscapes that, in each case, conceal the machine in the garden, as it 
were, whose “fresh, green breast” belies the inescapability of a seemingly totalizing 
contemporary society. Making explicit the contemporary nature of his enclosure, 
Brewster lives in the fallout shelter in the dome, as a sort of hidden child of the nuclear 
age.
Brewster’s choices, then, are to believe in freedom and transcend this system, 
which in this parable means learning to fly, or to take solace in the pleasures of the body. 
The body, in the form of the “proletarian physicality” Bobby Dupea seeks, may seem like 
an abashed compensation for lost transcendence; but, in this historical moment, the body 
presents itself as a forgotten “battlefield,” as Theodore Roszak puts it, around which such 
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theorists as Marcuse and Brown began to establish new ideologies, new reality principles. 
Discussing Brown in an essay in Against Interpretation, Sontag explains that “the core of 
human neurosis is man’s incapacity to live in the body” (259). For Sontag, in fact, 
Brown’s claim that “we are nothing but body” fits as the cornerstone in a philosophy of 
objecthood that finds its fullest expression in her famous essay “Against Interpretation.” 
Her essay calls for a “flight from interpretation” because ascribing meaning beyond the 
surface fact, taking the thing as something other than “brute object,” usually entails 
placing it in service of a larger system (10, 11).24 Hers is an iteration of a fashionable 
poststructuralist claim that subjectivity comes as the effect of a larger structure. Thus she 
demands that we return to the sensual, to surfaces, and to the body qua object, an alterity 
that “a fatigued rationality” might seek “in the impersonal energies of sexual ecstasy or 
drugs” (“The Anthropologist as Hero” 69); she demands that we install “an erotics of art” 
“in place of a hermeneutics” (14). Her call is of a piece with “the new sensibility,” a 
“new attitude toward pleasure” for which intensified “sensations” take priority over 
“what furniture of ideas we have stocked in our heads” (“One Culture and the New 
Sensibility” 302, 300). 
What we might describe as her radical reduction to the body is precisely what 
Fried fears in the celebration of objecthood. He fears, in short, that advocacy of an 
“absence of anything beyond itself” is advocacy of a status quo. And this, as we have 
noted, informs Louise’s interdiction on sexuality for Brewster: the pleasure that Hope 
seeks is no more than a mark of her reconciliation to the status quo, suggesting that the 
“new sensibility” of which Hope is a stereotyped representative (she works in a health 
food store selling organic food) has been recuperated in advance by the larger system. In 
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this respect, Brewster McCloud critiques the turn toward objecthood found in the 
defection film. The turn toward objecthood might also help explain the waning of the 
genre in roughly 1974: objecthood, particularly in Marcuse’s account, is enabled by 
affluent society, in that the industrial society that first “turned the human organism into 
an every more sensitive, differentiated, exchangeable instrument” has also “created a 
social wealth sufficiently great to transform this instrument into an end in itself” (93); 
thus the oil crisis of 1973 could raise the specter of scarcity over the culture of affluence 
and, as such, quickly leave the philosophy of objecthood an exhausted politics.
Yet the defection film had begun to enunciate a language for objecthood only as a 
means of practicing oppositional politics within the system, and that because it rejected 
the form of subjectivity offered by the system. It had another, perhaps more quixotic goal: 
to annul the current social order and create a new one. The goal of annulling the social 
order produced fantasies of two kinds. On one hand, it was imagined that a series of 
violent acts against existing institutions, performed in concert with anti-capitalist 
movements across the globe, might actually spell the end of these institutions. The 
Weather Underground, for example, premised its violence on this conviction. On the 
other hand, a certain fantasy about autonomous individuality reemerged, one in which the 
strong individual had the power to blot out or transcend institutional life; this fantasy, as 
suggested, was the engine for auteurism. Brewster McCloud plays these fantasies off the 
objecthood Louise has criticized for turning “more and more toward earth.”
The story of Brewster McCloud is indeed saturated with the fantasy of annulling 
the social order through acts of violence. As noted, the main plot tracks Brewster’s 
construction of wings and physical preparation for flight. But a subplot involves the serial 
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killings of assorted Houston personages, most of them of some distinction and in 
possession of some wealth. We learn, gradually, that the team of Louise and Brewster are 
responsible for these murders, with Louise being the likely killer. Seemingly, Louise 
performs these murders as part of her charge in guarding Brewster, who is being 
threatened in some form by each of the victims. However, as we probe these killings, the 
explanation of Louise as guardian gives way to an explanation of her as avenging angel, 
visiting retribution on those who carry out injustice. Moreover, we begin to see, in the 
pattern of murders, that the specific form of injustice being avenged is racial injustice.
For instance, the first victim – Margaret Hamilton partially reprising her role of 
the wicked witch as a disagreeable socialite named Daphne Heap – shares space with 
Brewster in the Astrodome. She sings the National Anthem before ballgames in the 
dome, and Brewster has to listen to her off-key, screeching vocal performances as he 
works. But her true offense is the condescending manner in which she treats her 
supporting musicians, an all-black marching band. Though she herself caterwauls off-
key, she browbeats the band, “You’re in the wrong key … I want everything just exactly 
the way it should be, that’s why you’re in these uniforms!” Then she adds, “That’s why I 
bought you these uniforms!” And of course this clarifies, for the viewer, the logic of an 
arrangement in which Daphne Heap, a woman of no discernible musical talent, can place 
the considerable talents of the band in service of her own musical distinction: this is the 
logic of capital. The band, though, bucks this logic when they ignore her and launch into 
a version of James Weldon Johnson’s Black National Anthem, “Lift Every Voice and 
Sing”; by displacing the supposed hymn of democracy and freedom, the univocal “Star-
Spangled Banner,” with “Lift Every Voice and Sing,” they expose the racist hierarchy 
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inherent in American individualism and exult instead the more democratic dictum to “lift 
every voice” rather than let the orchestral voices sustain the soloist. 
Her racism is later made emphatic when, feeding birds in her backyard, she calls 
the raven a “nigger bird,” and then is promptly killed for it. The same happens to 
Abraham Wright (Stacy Keach), a rapacious capitalist who squeezes payments from the 
seniors in his nursing homes and rants against a “Black Panther conspiracy,” and the 
same happens to Douglas Breen (Bert Remsen), a venal police officer who denigrates a 
variety of ethnic groups in only a few lines. Obviously, the murders are designed to purge 
the ranks of institutional life of their bigots and profiteers. In some sense, these murders 
are a necessary adjunct to Brewster’s project of liberation. Yet it seems that Brewster 
McCloud still withholds its endorsement of these means of realigning social relations, 
given that such social relations are embedded in the social order, and Brewster’s greater 
objective is to transcend the social order altogether. In a Film Comment review in 1971, 
Roberta Rubenstein identified the ambivalence of Brewster McCloud’s critique when she 
wrote that, while some racial injustice may have been redressed by the murders of Heap 
and Wright, both of whom “survived by usurping the freedom of others” (46), the 
problem remains that “to destroy those who build cages does not insure that we ourselves 
can fly” (48-49).
While we might say that Brewster McCloud critiques the history of SDS and its 
mutation into the Weather Underground – a critique that deems its redress of race 
relations as drawing on the right intentions but, as time passed, on the wrong means – we 
might nonetheless observe that it saves its fiercest critique for the reemergence of an 
ideology of autonomous individualism, which, it must be stressed, auteurism
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emblematizes. License for such a claim is found in the final scenes, in which Brewster, 
attempting to flee the authorities, uses his wings to fly frantically around the Astrodome, 
never able to penetrate the enclosure of the dome. He falls to the ground and lies dead in 
a mangle of broken wings. Lying in this heap, he seems to represent the ruins of the 
dream of autonomous individuality. There is pathos, no doubt, in his failed efforts to 
escape the enclosure society had built for itself. The pathos, as Marcuse remarks, derives 
from the fact that “everyone, even at the very top, appears to be powerless before the 
movements and laws of the apparatus itself” (Eros 98). But the loss of agency, Brewster 
McCloud suggests, is not corrected by again producing the mirage of autonomous 
individuality, that “frozen manifestation of the general repression of mankind,” in 
Marcuse’s phrase, but by acknowledging the group relations that underpin the deeds and 
distinction of the individual. Thus Brewster’s need for self-distinction reproduces Daphne 
Heap’s on another level: she had wanted to extract the talent from her band and still claim 
credit for it. Brewster’s McCloud project of flying, which is in fact nothing more than the 
movie Brewster McCloud itself, is not reducible to the work of a lone person, an auteur
figure, but is spread across a company of workers. Signifying this, Brewster’s crashed 
flight is celebrated by a circus (“The Greatest Show on Earth”) in which the cast of the 
film parade out and, in place of credits, is introduced by a ringmaster – conspicuously not 
Robert Altman, but a random player. 
The circus imagery, of course, recalls the conclusion of Fellini’s 8 ½, the great 
behind-the-scenes testimonial to the director’s work. But Brewster McCloud minimizes 
the roles of those most insistent on self-distinction: while the marching band moves as 
part of the parade, Margaret Hamilton is conspicuously hidden behind a flag. And 
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Brewster, the figure of the auteur, lies in a heap on the turf. The critique, though it 
comprehends so many issues of the 1960s, seems to always have been directed at 
Hollywood cinema, as disclosed in this final circus-cum-parade: Jennifer Salt appears 
dressed as Dorothy, Shelley Duvall as the Scarecrow, and Margaret Hamilton, while 
obscured, is the wicked witch. And the critique, once seen to be operating within the 
domain of Hollywood, is understood to take for its main target the defection film, the pet 
genre of auteurs.       
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Notes
                                                
1 Elsaesser’s essay, “The Pathos of Failure: American Films in the 1970s,” first appeared 
in 1975 in Monogram but was reprinted in The Last Great American Picture Show. 
2 While I don’t wish to portray the criticism of New Hollywood as monolithic, I would 
say that most of the nuance in the criticism is articulated within a consensus that New 
Hollywood films represented a unique moment in Hollywood history in which ideologies 
were interrogated rather than enforced. The recent anthology The Last Great American 
Picture Show is representative of this consensus. In one of the several introductions to the 
volume, Alexander Horwath remarks that if one came of age “as a cinema-goer during 
the heyday of New Hollywood cinema,” one likely experiences the “main brands of post-
1970s American cinema” as “less political, as retrograde” (9). “Towards the end of the 
Seventies,” Horwath explains, “the increasingly complex narrative negotiation of (both 
fictional and very real) contradictions and conflicts started to recede behind the 
phantasms of a neoconservative discourse of re-mythologisation, re-evangelisation, and 
re-militarisation” (9). The essays in this collection mainly hew to this line. In Peter Lev’s 
study of the period, American Films of the 70s, he acknowledges that it was a 
heterogeneous period for Hollywood film and that “no binary opposition completely 
describes the range of films” but he nevertheless endorses Bordwell’s schema of “New 
Hollywood” and “Hollywood Continues”; Lev considers New Hollywood synonymous 
with ideology critique, such that a phrase like “a New Hollywood, socially critical 
movie” is routine (xvii, xx). Jack C. Ellis, in A History of Film, focalizes the critical spirit 
of New Hollywood by selecting Arthur Penn, Sam Peckinpah, Francis Ford Coppola, 
Robert Altman, and Martin Scorsese as filmmakers through whom to discuss the period. 
He says this group “maintained a strong interest in critically examining certain aspects of 
American culture” (383). As well, one might refer to a mainstay in New Hollywood 
criticism, Robert Kolker’s A Cinema of Loneliness; to the chapter “Landmark Movies of 
the 1960s and the Cinema of Sensation” in Paul Monaco’s The Sixties, in which he 
characterized the appeal of these movies as rooted in an audience “shared sense of 
alienation from middle-class American society, the values of America’s older 
generations, and the nation’s economic, social, and political ‘establishment’” (182); and 
to popular critical works such as Peter Biskind’s Easy Riders, Raging Bulls and Mark 
Harris’s Pictures at a Revolution. Even a critic such as David James, who saw the real 
undertaking of ideology critique occurring outside the aegis of Hollywood in 
underground film, still sees the impulse drawn within Hollywood film in the “brief 
dalliance with the counterculture” which inaugurated the New Hollywood (Imagine 
Nation 300).  
3 John Kenneth Galbraith popularized the term in his 1958 The Affluent Society. 
4 While each film might count as a genre member for slightly different reasons, or rather 
might force us to understand the genre in slightly different ways, the films selected here 
each makes a straightforward case for genre membership. In fact, it might be more 
instructive to assess in detail a borderline case, a film bearing resemblance to other genre 
members that, nonetheless, repudiates an aspect that seems crucial in defining the genre. 
The film The Getaway (1972) holds out just such an opportunity, in that a fugitive couple 
mortgages their future in order to chase their freedom. Yet the narrative ends in a way 
that secures closure. Though branded lifelong criminals by dint of their crime spree, the 
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couple creates a future for itself by escaping U.S. jurisdiction and fleeing into Mexico, 
which, in the film’s imaginary, stands as an order free of positive law. Once they cross 
into Mexico, their driver – an aging man, representing the other side of the generation 
gap – conspicuously counsels them on their reproductive status. “You know, if I was you 
kids what I’d do,” he offers, “I’d quit this running around the country, you know, get a 
little bit of money together, and buy a place and settle down and raise a family.” The 
respect and gratitude the couple expresses to their driver leaves the audience to believe 
they might repay him by acting out his advice, in other words, by producing a society 
that’s consonant with his understanding of social life. One might argue, of course, that 
The Getaway belongs to the genre because, while it denies the generic requirement of 
nonreproductivity, it wages this denial by way of canceling out the U.S. juridical order 
and replacing it with a suggested return to an order of natural law. Indeed, I refer to 
Stanley Cavell’s conception of genre because I consider genre to be a problematic that 
seems to emerge “full-blown” and “then works out its internal consequences (Pursuits of 
Happiness 28); The Getaway might simply work out those “internal consequences” in a 
nostalgic or mythological manner.
5 Mulvey notes that a “recent tendency in narrative film has been to dispense with this 
problem [that of the woman] altogether; hence the development of what Molly Haskell 
has called the ‘buddy movie’, in which the active homosexual eroticism of the central 
male figures can carry the story without distraction” (203). I agree with Mulvey’s 
assertion that the “buddy movie” developed in response to a problem, but not with the 
allied assertion that this development helps “carry the story.”   
6 Throughout this work I will use the terms “subjectivity” and “individualism” in a 
fashion that might suggest their equivalency, but that is only the effect of granting 
subjectivity priority in an ideology of individualism. I recognize, of course, that one can 
affirm subjectivity without endorsing individualism. For an illustrative debate on this 
topic, one might refer to Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut’s French Philosophy of the Sixties: 
An Essay on Antihumanism, a book that was very much received as an effort to roll back 
the philosophical work of poststructuralist theorists such as Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and 
Althusser. As Ferry and Renaut charge, “at least one thing is clear: French philosophy of 
the ’68 period resolutely chose the antihumanist position” (xxiii). Renaut’s The Era of 
Individualism in some ways continues the attack on “antihumanism” as well as defends 
and clarifies the earlier position staked out by himself and Ferry. In deploying these 
charged terms, I do not mean to take a strong philosophical position in the debate, but 
only to acknowledge how interpenetrating were the philosophical and political projects. 
The postsubjective philosophies were marked, as Ferry and Renaut demonstrate, by the 
politics of May ’68. Questions of subjectivity aside, I agree with Renaut’s claim that “To 
speak of individualism is to speak in a political key” (Era of Individualism 29). The May 
’68 student protest, sharing a dynamic with the American student movements, seemed 
indeed to be haunted by the political implications of individualism, which at least one of 
its spokespersons, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, took to be bound up with questions of 
technocratic management (Roszak 293). As Ferry and Renaut explain, “one of the 
leitmotifs of May” is a “defense of the person against the ‘system’” (xxi). They quote 
Cohn-Bendit’s “insistence that the ‘gears of the system’ be uncovered so as to accuse the 
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system of transforming individuals into ‘cogs in the wheels that guarantee society’s 
functioning’” (xxi).   
7 See David Riesman’s essay “Individualism Reconsidered” and C. Wright Mills’s White 
Collar.
8 Sean McCann and Michael Szalay say this in “Introduction: Paul Potter and the Cultural 
Turn,” their introduction to a special issue of The Yale Journal of Criticism.
9 It should be noted that, in this one locutionary stroke, Paul Potter reintroduced the 
Marxist terminology of the Old Left, which had dropped out of leftist politics 
considerably after dustups between New Masses and Partisan Review regarding the 
Moscow Trials; after the evident bureaucratic industrialism of the Soviet Union rendered 
the best-known instance of Marxism indistinguishable from the technocratic organization 
of American politics; and after postwar consumer plenty had gelded the political force of 
the working class. Potter’s reference to the political problem as “the system” can only 
seem to connote that capitalism itself was, yet again, the enemy. One explanation for why 
the political language had again become faintly Marxist is offered by John Kenneth 
Galbraith in The New Industrial State, where he suggests that the example of Cuba had 
rescued the figure of the Marxist from the status of industrial bureaucrat (xv). Potter 
insisted, however, that the vagueness of “the system” differentiated it from the Marxist 
language of the Old Left (McCann 210). 
10 While I have suggested in my introduction that Barry Keith Grant’s Auteurs and 
Authorship is perhaps the most valued comprehensive collection, I would single out 
David A. Gerstner and Janet Staiger’s Authorship and Film and Virginia Wright 
Wexman’s Film and Authorship as essays collected in an explicit attempt to reassess and 
renovate this mode of criticism. The compelling reason for both Gerstner and Staiger to 
reassess authorship is for the ways in which hitherto marginalized groups newly inflect 
the category. “For those cultural producers at the margins,” Gerstner explains, “the issue 
of authorship as a productive force rests not so much on reifying the privileged status or 
Being of author” as it functions to challenge “the authorities that have decidedly 
announced, once and for all, the parameters and limitations of the body’s involvement in 
the process of cultural production” (17). Or, as Staiger more bluntly puts it, “the 
attempted death of the author comes at a time particularly nonadvantageous for some 
individuals – feminists, gays and lesbian activists, and antiracists. Depriving us of our 
voices just as we are speaking more loudly seems a plot” (29).
11 Todd Gitlin cites this quotation from the Godkin lectures that Clark Kerr delivered at 
Harvard University in 1963, published as The Uses of the University, in The Sixties (20-
21). 
12 In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse claims that a novel form of “introjection” occurs in 
advanced industrial societies. “But the term ‘introjection’ perhaps no longer describes the 
way in which the individual by himself reproduces and perpetuates the external controls 
exercised by his society…. Today this private space has been invaded and whittled down 
by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire
individual, and industrial psychology has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. 
The manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical 
reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate identification of the 
individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole” (10).
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13 In his insider memoir of the Manhattan Project, Atomic Quest, Arthur Holly Compton 
discusses asking and contracting DuPont for the plutonium project. See pages 132-134 
and 162-167.
14 Mario Savio refers to students as “raw material” in both his address on Sproul Hall 
during the December 1964 protests as well as in his transcribed speech at Sproul Hall, 
published in Humanity as “An End to History.” “An End to History” is reprinted in the 
collection The Times Were A Changin’: The Sixties Reader, edited by Irwin and Debi 
Unger. I will refer to the transcribed speech by the page numbers of this volume.
15 In a Los Angeles Times preview of the film during its production, Robert Joseph wrote 
that while the contemporary trend has been for films to “make fun of the inanities of 
Prohibition and bathtub gin” and other events of the “Throbbing Thirties,” Bonnie and 
Clyde had captured the decade in the syntax of the 1960s: “The gun was their needle, 
splattering bullets their LSD, and excitement of the chase and escape their ‘kicks’,” 
Joseph wrote, drawing parallels where he could between 1930s criminal life and 1960s 
hip life. “To them,” Joseph continues, “citizens were the 1934 equivalent of squares” 
(Nov. 1966 13).
16 “Arthur Penn, the aggressive director,” Bosley Crowther wrote, “has evidently gone 
out of his way to splash the comedy holdups with smears of vivid blood,” a “blending of 
farce with brutal killings … as pointless as it is lacking in taste”   
17 Quoting William Phillips in a forum published in an Autumn 1967 The American 
Scholar, “Confrontation: The Old Left and the New,” which pitted members of the Old 
Left, Dwight Macdonald and Richard Rovere, against members of the New, Tom Hayden 
and Ivanhoe Donaldson. 
18 Donaldson inveighs against the idea that Harrington’s book makes poverty a legitimate 
cause. “My point,” says Donaldson, “is that people can legitimize themselves. You don’t 
take an established source to give you legitimacy. White people do not have the right to 
give legitimacy to black people” (583). In a swift locution, Donaldson shifts the critique 
from the “war on poverty” to matters of representation in civil rights, which shows but 
one way in which we might begin to transfer the critique set forth by Bonnie and Clyde 
into the context of the 1960s. 
19 C. Wright Mills, “Letter to the New Left,” New Left Review, September-October 1960, 
18-23. 
20 Marcuse’s 1937 essay, “On the Affirmative Character of Culture,” no doubt responded 
to the advent of German fascism, but it was of a piece with his evolving concerns with 
the function of culture in Western democracies. The essay appears in the collection 
Negations.
21 In the chapter “An Invasion of Centaurs,” Roszak discusses a shift in the 
counterculture from an early interest in C. Wright Mills to a later one in “the apocalyptic 
body mysticism of Norman Brown, the Zen-based psychotherapy of Alan Watts, and 
finally Timothy Leary’s impenetrably occult narcissism, wherein the world and its woes 
shrink at last to the size of a mote in one’s private psychedelic void. As we move along 
the continuum, we find sociology giving way steadily to psychology, political 
collectivities to the person, conscious and articulate behavior falling away before the 
forces of the non-intellective deep” (64).
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22 Irwin and Debi Unger claim that the “personal became the political” that year. “Groups 
of vocal Americans would organize to demand that ‘square’ and ‘straight’ society let 
them love and live as they wished” (371).   
23 In The Shape of the Signifier, Walter Benn Michaels uses this day as the beginning of a 
period, referring to Craig Owens’s characterization of Fried’s essay as the knell for “the 
death of modernism.”  
24 Many of Sontag’s notions of subjectivity as a kind of thralldom seem to issue from 
Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, a book she champions along with Brown’s Life Against 
Death for its insistence that “Freud’s psychological categories” be seen “as political 
categories” (“Psychoanalysis and Norman O. Brown’s Life Against Death” 258). In Eros 
and Civilization, Marcuse says that under the “function of reason” a person “becomes a 
conscious, thinking subject, geared to a rationality which is imposed upon him from 
outside”; a person’s relationship to reality, then, is “organized” by “his society” (14). In 
turn, Marcuse describes a new politics in which such a subject, organized within “a logic 
of domination,” is dissolved into a kind of objecthood by way of “the will to 
gratification” (124). However, the line of thought is by no means a strictly “sixties” one 
for Marcuse, given that he enunciated it as early as 1937 in “The Affirmative Character 
of Culture”: “When the body has completely become an object, a beautiful thing, it can 
foreshadow a new happiness. In suffering the most extreme reification man triumphs over 
reification” (116).
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CHAPTER III
TECHNOLOGICAL TOTALITIES: MACHINES AS FOES 
           IN THE DISASTER CYCLE
The switching point in Five Easy Pieces, when Bobby Dupea turns away from 
blue-collar life and revisits his high-culture origins, occurs only thirty minutes into the 
film. As Bobby and Elton eat lunch on an oilrig, Elton confides that Bobby’s partner, 
Rayette, is pregnant; the news follows a scene in Elton’s cramped trailer home, where 
Bobby plainly disdains the disruption of Elton’s son and the vacant mothering of Elton’s 
wife, Stoney, who sits in thrall to the television. Delivering the news on the oilrig, Elton 
counsels, “Somewhere along the line, you even get to likin’ the whole idea.” Bobby now 
crassly invokes the class difference that had hitherto been suppressed: “It’s ridiculous, 
I’m sitting here listening to some cracker asshole who lives in a trailer park compare his 
life to mine.” Following his outburst, Bobby stomps off and tells the foreman he’s 
quitting his job. The sequence of events suggests that the grudging responsibility that 
Elton sees as “the whole idea” is servitude for Bobby, with the lures of a certain form of 
class life becoming snares. When Bobby quits, Feds come to arrest Elton, as if to confirm 
that Bobby’s perspective on his as a carceral life is the film’s perspective. A fistfight 
ensues, and though Bobby takes up for Elton, the scene ends with Elton escorted in 
handcuffs by the lawmen. In the final shot of this sequence, Bobby walks away from the 
oil fields in silhouette, depicted in a long shot that renders him roughly the same size as 
the drill rigs behind him.
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While the shot records Bobby’s battle-weary gait as a triumphant one, it has the 
effect of translating the conflict between Bobby and Elton, or even Elton and the law, 
into a conflict with machines. Bobby emerges from a field of machines a free man; Elton, 
less fortunate, has been captured among machines. We might dwell on this irruption of 
technological life in Five Easy Pieces simply because defection films are, in the main, 
conspicuously free of technological menace;1 or, to make the point through chiasmus, 
they minimize technology so their characters can be conspicuously free. Five Easy Pieces
otherwise follows the generic trend of representing the American landscape as sprawling 
and open, a bucolic space for rambling, with the state of technology only incidental in the 
quests of its characters. 
But the very fact that the switching point from one class milieu to another is 
studded by technological operations suggests that the state of technology, repressed but 
now bubbling to surface, sets the conditions, in the genre’s imagination, for one’s 
enfranchisement to and power to defect from society. In Five Easy Pieces, not only does 
the fight among the oilrigs rely on a technological mise-en-scene, nor just the preceding 
one of Stoney narcotized by the television. As well, and as instructively, the subsequent 
scene of Bobby visiting his sister Partita at a Bakersfield recording studio insists on the 
conjunction of a technological setting and her self-expression as a classical pianist. 
Although Partita angers the recording engineers by incorrigibly humming along with her 
piano, alluding to Glenn Gould’s polemical stance on the technological reproduction of a 
music once prescribed for concert performance, the fact is that Partita is enfranchised to 
this new technological order by way of class privilege. This manifestly technological 
passage suggests that Five Easy Pieces has acknowledged this mediation of self by 
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technologies as an entailment of a technocratic regime. Defecting from this regime, 
though, requires that we minimize the appearance of technological dependency. Thus, 
when hitchhiker Palm Apodaca rants against the “crap” created by “mass production” 
that has left little “room for man,” saying she herself means to escape to a much 
“cleaner” Alaska, she explains for the viewer Bobby’s drive from the California oil fields 
to his idyllic island home: feeling the squeeze of technocracy, he means to return to an 
appearance of pastoralism, where brother Carl rides his bicycle to “the post office in the 
village.” His return is temporary because bought, as he knows, with class privilege. 
This seems, in one respect, to be an iteration of the “undefiled, green republic” 
that Leo Marx describes as an ideological deflection from the “intricately organized, 
urban, industrial, nuclear-armed society” (6, 4) the U.S. appeared to be in the 1960s. And 
while the defection film surely counts as a version of the American romance, its
relationship to this tradition poorly explains its vexed theme of subjectivity vis-à-vis the 
scale of technology. In Five Easy Pieces, for instance, we can make more synchronic than 
diachronic sense of the perspective that renders Bobby roughly the same size as the drill 
rigs in the moment he departs the oil field.2 In other words, this moment plays as a 
repudiation of technocracy when contrasted with a divergent peer, such as Airport (1970), 
in a way it cannot when compared with a kindred predecessor, such as Walden (1854). In 
fact, I choose Airport tactically, not only because its broad popularity contrasts with Five 
Easy Pieces’s niche popularity, but because we might consider the cycle of disaster films 
that Airport inaugurates to be the opposite number of the defection film, ideologically 
and otherwise. The disaster film imagines technology on a monstrous scale, as the 
virtually inescapable arena for social action; the defection film, as the scene from Five 
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Easy Pieces evinces, imagines technology on a personal scale, as a “match,” as Leo Marx 
puts it, “for the power of intellect” (146).3
In calling these genres opposite numbers, I mean to insist that they be understood 
jointly, as counterparts in a historical “structure of feeling.” The disaster and defection 
cycles are coeval (Five Easy Pieces as the fullest articulation of the latter appearing in the 
same year as Airport, the first articulation of the former) because they respond to the 
same problem, that of technology as the reification of technocracy and, its corollary, the 
usurpation of individual agency within technocracy. They propose different figurations 
for what is, per the ideological terms of individualism, a battle. Defection films displace 
the technological into the personal, such that people often look like mere instruments of 
some transpersonal cause, inert objects that once were subjects. Thus, Bobby can ridicule 
his brother Carl, whose sprained neck causes him to walk in stiff, mechanical fashion, as 
an ideological tool. Carl is, on Bobby’s account, a technology (in the shape of a person) 
of class perpetuation, a drone who teaches his fiancée how to succeed as a cultured drone. 
As such, Carl is like a drill rig to Bobby, or like a vehicle (“Crashes into a jeep and totals 
his neck,” Bobby remarks). Disaster films, in contrast, condense transpersonal agency 
into the hulking figures of technology, making foes of airplanes, skyscrapers, and cruise 
ships. Given that neither genre devises representational means for transpersonal agency, 
it’s hard to say that the genres differ politically, as has been generally said;4 the genres 
chiefly differ symbolically.
However, if disaster films speak to the issue of technology by metastasizing it 
rather than repressing it, as do defection films, we have a chance to see, through one kind 
of distortion that clarifies another, what Hollywood considers the stakes of technology. 
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Auteurism, as a kind of formal statement issued by Hollywood extratextually but 
instantiated textually in the films of the defection genre, expresses suspicion of 
technology. This suspicion looks like a paradox, given that the auteur has chosen to 
practice what is likely the most technologized art form, unless we grant that status to 
architecture. But, then, the technologized arts have tended to experience identity crises as 
arts. Robert Fishman, remarking on how such a crisis played out for one of the twentieth 
century’s more ambitious architects and planners, Le Corbusier, notes the tension 
between the roles of technocrat and artist: “Le Corbusier’s concept of the planner 
combines two distinct images. One is the planner as scientist, surgeon, ‘technician’ – the 
man of reason, a disinterested lover of humanity who studies the problems of the city, 
formulates clear solutions, and carries them out with unswerving will. The second is the 
planner as artist, the isolated man of vision whose insights are the most profound record 
of his nation’s spiritual life” (210). We can characterize the auteur as experiencing this 
split as a conflict, strenuously disavowing the status of technician in order to more fully 
claim the status of artist.5 This conflict, I posit, evokes not simply the timeless 
relationship between technology and the arts; it rather signals a historic watershed in 
which the double movement of technical progress – as at once giganticized in the space 
station minuets of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and miniaturized in the motherboard 
circuitry of Juggernaut (1974) – makes the human body the wrong vehicle, so to speak, 
for subjectivity.
Thus, when Five Easy Pieces imagines technology on a human scale, it deploys a 
different strategy for narrating a world in which a certain traditional subjectivity, both 
personal and autonomous, retains significance. In contrast, when a disaster film such as 
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The Towering Inferno (1974) imagines technology on a monstrous scale, it does so in 
order to narrate the catastrophic collapse of that technology as the condition for the 
reemergence of that traditional subjectivity, which had been rendered obsolete within the 
still-hale technocracy. I will discuss the films of the disaster cycle in terms of their 
development of an imaginary that is adjacent, and sometimes antagonistic, to the 
auteurist imaginary. I say “antagonistic” because, as they attack the monuments of 
modernity such as skyscrapers and ocean liners, the disaster films occasionally make the 
complicity of Hollywood with this technological regime an implicit object of their 
dreams of annihilation. 
I will begin, however, by looking at how the proto-disaster films of the 1960s (Dr. 
Strangelove [1964], Fail-Safe [1964], and Billion Dollar Brain [1967]) imagine not the 
scene of disaster, but the scene of decision-making that leads to disaster; here a set of 
technocratic imperatives banishes humans along with “human error” from all decisions, 
meaning that while persons may identify with each other across ideological systems, such 
identification no longer matters because the work discharged by ideological systems has 
been entrusted to non-human subjectivities. 2001: A Space Odyssey, then, bridges the 
proto- and disaster film proper, in that it charts an evolution of human subjectivity in 
which, by its inception in the self-objectifying operations of technology, it necessarily 
displaces itself into the object, which accounts for a situation in which, “because we read 
our subjectivity off the things outside,” as Jameson has remarked, “the cinema is the truly 
decentered subject, perhaps indeed the only one” (The Seeds of Time 9, 10).6 With these 
terms in place, I will turn to Airport as indeed a technophobic film, but one whose hidden 
phobia seems to be of the cinematic apparatus and not, as we’d expect, of airplanes. 
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Finally, after elaborating compensations of the individual in The Poseidon Adventure
(1971) and The Towering Inferno, I will conclude my argument with a claim for Jaws
(1975) as the last word of the disaster cycle because, shrinking the scale of technology to 
a more personal man-versus-nature battle, it merges the defection and disaster 
imaginaries, which amounts to a cinema of auteurist special effects.
Dr. Strangelove, Rational Planning, and the Technocrat’s Brain
Strangelove is, by most lights, the story of the technocracy produced by the 
confluence of the age of affluence and consensus liberalism.7 The story involves a 
stalwart liberal belief in reason, that “[l]eaders were to embody reason,” as Todd Gitlin 
says (58), a belief, knitting together the Kennedy cabinet, that “sheer intelligence and 
rationality could answer and solve anything” (Halberstam 44). Of course, Strangelove
crystallizes a fear that the installation of instrumental reason known as technocracy would 
end in total unconcern for human life, echoed in Buck Turgidson’s (George C. Scott) 
reassurance that “ten to twenty million” deaths would be “modest and acceptable civilian 
casualties.” This unconcern, expressed statistically on the order of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s canon of numbers, marks the difference between Strangelove and Fail-
Safe, the latter of which tells the very same story as the former but somehow fails to be 
the story of technocracy. Fail-Safe chronicles a situation in which automated decision-
making enables an accidental, but irrevocable, nuclear war. Yet Fail-Safe confers a tragic 
tone on the miscalculated apocalypse by having the U.S. president (Henry Fonda) put his 
wife at the site of the falling warhead, thus personalizing the procedural war, whereas 
Strangelove conveys the personal feelings of all involved in the black-comic tones of 
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President Muffley’s (Peter Sellers) petty squabble with Premiere Kissoff over who is 
more sorry about the imminent nuclear holocaust. The point of Strangelove is that the 
event has been lifted from the personal into the statistical, where Stalin’s quote that “The 
death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions a statistic” presides; personal feelings 
don’t factor into decisions of such magnitude.
As such, the character of Dr. Strangelove himself (Peter Sellers, again) is the 
avatar of technocracy, the character without feeling but with the capacity for shrewdest 
planning. As the Director of Weapons Research and Development, he plays as a 
caricature of the highly specialized military authority C. Wright Mills described in 
alarming terms in 1959’s The Power Elite.8 Faced with the event of doomsday, 
Strangelove shows a certain relish in sketching a scenario in which a “nucleus of human 
specimens” could be preserved, with even his language about humanity saturated with the 
terms of nuclear physics. Planning is his pleasure,9 as shown, in one of the film’s finer 
jokes, when he consults his decoder ring for the radioactive half-life of Cobalt Thorium G 
– a childish trinket for a monstrous calculation. His plan for preserving human specimens 
involves a eugenicist fantasy of selecting out desired traits: “youth, health, sexual 
fertility, intelligence, and a cross-section of necessary skills.” To President Muffley’s 
concern that he “would hate to have to decide who stays up and who goes down,” 
Strangelove placidly instructs that such scruples “would not be necessary” because “it 
could easily be accomplished with a computer.” President Muffley is only a 
compassionate figurehead, a mere accessory to the working technocracy.
If Strangelove in this moment displaces subjectivity into the computer, and refines 
his pleasure in its graceful programs, his foil character is Buck Turgidson. Turgidson too 
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easily slips out of planning an experience into living it. When describing the B-52s 
chances for reaching its target below radar, he begins to act out the adroit flight of a B-
52, laughing animatedly, recreating its “vroom,” and thrilling at its “jet exhaust frying 
chickens in the barnyard.” Turgidson is too much body to Strangelove’s too much brain. 
The plan to rehabilitate humanity in a mineshaft, first skewing the population in a ratio of 
ten women with “highly stimulating” “sexual characteristics” to each man, obviously 
titillates Turgidson, who seems eager enough to abandon the “so-called monogamous 
sexual relationship.” But Strangelove, on the contrary, has been deliberately 
characterized as one for whom pleasures of body and brain are disconnected. His arm, for 
instance, disobeys him and salutes “Mein Führer,” then tries to strangle him; his 
wheelchair signifies his strict dependence on his mind. The abstraction of Strangelove 
from his body makes the blandishments of the mineshaft – the male-female ratio so 
attractive to Turgidson – of less importance to him and, in fact, suggests that his 
subjective self-indulgence can only be imaginatively embodied: “Mein Führer,” he 
proclaims, “I can walk,” as though his mind, at its most invigorated, can activate the 
object world, which had long claimed his immobile body.
Indeed, if we were to do away with the film’s multiple viewpoint characters, such 
as President Muffley and Buck Turgidson, and narrate the story from Strangelove’s 
perspective only, we would approach the narrative of a nonhuman subject, that of the 
sheer object of the brain that will, pushed to its logical end, shade into computer life. This 
might recall Kennedy’s cabinet of intellectuals, MacGeorge Bundy foremost; it might 
also recall Roland Barthes description of Einstein’s “reified” brain (Mythologies 68). As 
Barthes explicates, “the supermen of science-fiction always have something reified about 
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them,” and in Einstein’s case, that of the begrudging hero of the technocracy, it’s the 
brain as a purely technological object, “the most up-to-date machine” (68); this is why, 
Barthes continues, “two hospitals are still fighting” for its possession, so they might 
“dismantle” it and discover its inner workings (68). Of course, the notion of narrating the 
brain tout court (that is, telling the story from Strangelove’s perspective alone) presents a 
set of challenges, not the least of which is the loss of affect it entails. 
The kind of narrative that emerges from this problematic is represented by Billion 
Dollar Brain, an espionage story involving Harry Palmer (Michael Caine), the spy from 
Len Deighton’s novels. Spy stories generate a very specific topos – that of a crisis for 
ideology – which it turns out is shared by the story of the “up-to-date machine” of the 
brain, i.e. the computer. The problem with spies, succinctly, is that they must possess 
unassailable affection for one nation-state in order to dissimulate as the compatriot of 
another. Allegiance to one ideology rather than another, that is, hinges on affective or 
libidinal investment. In Billion Dollar Brain, the question of the agency of the spy 
merges with the question of the agency of technology. The specialized skill-set of Harry 
Palmer counts as chief in its arsenal a capacity for affective neutrality, an unsusceptibility 
to enemy seductions; yet his skill-set is deployed by Midwinter (Ed Begley Sr.) on behalf 
of the fervid affect of anti-communism. Billion Dollar Brain, though, juxtaposes the 
construction of a spy with the construction of a computer, the billion-dollar brain of the 
title: the reliability of each remains an open question, in that without the additive of affect 
in their operations, they appear to be free of intrinsic loyalties. They appear, we might 
say, to be beyond ideology.
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2001, the Cinematic Brain, and the Ideology of the Subject
2001 is neither a proto-disaster film nor a disaster film proper, and that, it turns 
out, produces its narrative impasse. In 2001, the technological order functions too well, as 
Robert Kolker maintains, such that “perfect order and perfect function decrease the need 
for human inquisitiveness and control” and humans, no longer needed for control, are 
“integrated into corporate technology, part of the circuitry” (A Cinema of Loneliness
135). Of course, if humans are seamlessly “integrated” into the technology and are 
themselves “components” (Kolker 135) then the drama of the proto-disaster film – the 
“human inquisitiveness and control,” the zeal for planning, the contest between the 
rational and physical faculties – drops out. And barring a full collapse of the 
technological order, the drama of the disaster film proper is yet to occur: with the 
technological whole intact, none of the component parts can reemerge as subjects. While 
courting a kind of plotlessness, 2001 produces drama and overcomes its narrative 
impasse by displacing the subjectivity of the debased humans into the computer, HAL 
9000.
It has been often remarked that HAL is the sympathetic center of 2001,10 but the 
way this happens, through the transference of a human narrative-teleology onto the 
object, importantly figures into the implications of this “agon,” as Kolker refers to it, 
between human and computer. It’s important, that is, not that HAL may or may not have 
feelings, which, after all, Dr. Dave Bowman (Keir Dullea) explains is part of his human 
design, but rather that he’s afraid of his death (“I’m afraid, Dave,” HAL says when being 
disconnected), that narrative considerations have been written into his program. More 
pointedly, it’s important that his feelings issue from his self-narration. Describing his 
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phased disconnection in terms of senescence, HAL says, “My mind’s going,” followed 
by the doleful, “I can feel it,” as if to insist that cognizance of one’s lifespan is the 
precondition for feeling. Dave had already expressed concern that, with no record of a 
9000 computer ever having been disconnected, they can’t predict what HAL will “think 
about” his disconnection. HAL’s tenacious will to live, in contrast with the more proper 
“disconnection” of the hibernating astronauts, constitutes the center of 2001’s schema for 
the commutation of human subjectivity to its object other.
The narration of a technology as a means of establishing it as a cogito seems, at 
first, to depend on the end of that technology, taken as a kind of death, but the force of 
2001’s philosophical intervention derives from its investigation into the origin of a 
technology and where we can locate its birth. In postwar America, the multiplication of 
nuclear and space-age technologies exacerbated the question of origins because, as 
Carroll Pursell explains, such technologies “seemed particularly magical in the sense that 
though [they] appeared to work, most people could not explain how, and certainly most 
people would never own their own reactor or atomic bomb” (65). One might have felt 
dominated in the age of machines or the age of factories, but one felt mystified in what 
Newton Minow alternated in calling “the jet age, the atomic age, the space age” (Rhodes 
229).11 2001 trades on that “magical” moment, positing the monolith as the mystification 
of the birth of technology. The monolith, however, has turned out to be the film’s most 
inscrutable move, setting in motion a hermeneutics with no conclusion, a feat that, for 
Hollywood narrative film, counts as the “rarest of all things,” Kolker says, “a film that 
poses a multitude of problems with no easy answers” (Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 8).
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I don’t wish to make an argument for what the monolith means, only for how it 
dramatizes the obfuscation of meaning. In Arthur Clarke’s production diary, he discusses 
the “famous monolith,” tracking its development from a transparent idea (first a 
tetrahedron, then a transparent cube) to an opaque one (a black, rectangular slab). Were 
the monolith a tetrahedron, it would be the monumental form of a shape from nature that, 
as Clarke notes, “inspired all sorts of philosophical and scientific speculations” such as 
“Kepler’s cosmography, the carbon atom, Buckminster Fuller’s geodesic structures” 
(Schwam 62). We would, in this case, recognize the direction in which technology flows, 
with natural structures serving as prototypes for human designs; there would be no need 
to describe it as an “alien artifact” (62), as Clarke does, but rather as “imaginary markers” 
(Kolker A Cinema of Loneliness 136) of the progress of the human brain, which is after 
all profoundly historical. But the fact that they took the form, finally, of black slabs 
renders this a story of the obfuscation of the historical character of those operations, 
suggesting instead a metaphysical explanation, with the corollary adoption of that much 
different operation in which we make “alien” that which has fundamentally human 
origins.
With this operation in mind, I want to draw on Marcia Landy’s reading of 2001. 
Her essay, “The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” considers the film 
an “allegory of the evolution of human intelligence” that culminates in a “conception of 
the ‘cinematographic’ brain,” a shift effected by the “conjunction” of space-age 
technology and the “cinematic apparatus” (87). The evolution of the brain is punctuated 
by episodes of pure body, as seen in hominid behavior prior to the monolith visitation, 
and those of pure brain, as seen in Dr. Floyd’s (William Sylvester) portrait, as Landy 
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argues, of “the brain of the scientist as consecrated to state power” (93). With Dr. Floyd, 
“the human brain has become specialized, capable of purposeful thinking in terms of 
means and ends,” but “detached” from “bodily, sensory-motor connections to the world” 
(93). Landy urges us to associate the shifting attributes of subjectivity from body to brain 
with that shift from “the actual to the virtual” that characterizes the “cinematographic 
brain” (93); herein the “real” that we find secured in immediacy collapses into a “virtual” 
made remote by mediation, as displayed in “the information on the video monitors, the 
telephone-video image, and the surveillance technology” in the film (94). It’s the 
“cinematographic brain,” Landy proposes, with its “potential to generate incorporeal 
images” (89), that best models the commutation of subjectivity from human body to its 
object other that we find modeled onscreen in HAL.
Landy’s reading, in short, suggests that among the panoply of technological 
regimes (the nuclear age, the space age, the digital age) we range the media age as having 
at least equal power to organize subjectivities. We should recall, here, that when Newton 
Minow alternated in calling the period “the jet age, the atomic age, the space age,” he did 
so preliminary to calling it “the television age” (229). Leaguing media technology with 
those other technologies requires that we radicalize how we think of scale: we should no 
longer think of scale, in other words, in visual terms, as something we can measure with 
the eye. In a visual economy, of course, the spectacle of the mushroom clouds ending Dr. 
Strangelove and the deep-space movements in waltz-time from 2001 occur on a greater 
scale, in the shadow of which the human subject plainly gets lost (of which Frank Poole’s 
silent death in 2001 is representative). Against this scale, the onset of television viewing 
hardly seems like a catastrophe in kind to the Weltanschauung of the age, but when we 
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consider that the experience of scale must be anchored in immediacy, the pervasive 
mediation secured through the proliferation of television screens figures scale in a whole 
new phenomenological dimension, not that of being dwarfed in the presence of enormity 
but that of feeling estranged from the phenomena of size and scope because presence is a 
lost condition.
The screens on which everything flashes, Jean Baudrillard will later argue, have 
the effect of undoing the “oppositions subject/object” (126); the mediated subject will, in 
his account, be tossed into a new configuration with the object world in which the 
subject’s old interface, the human body itself, will be replaced by a screen interface, 
granting the very structure of mediation the status of subject and making the humans it 
places in relation its effects. This scale, which we can call the “media scale” after Paul 
Virilio,12 makes 2001’s seven-minute delay during the interview between astronauts and 
earth as great, because it reorganizes perception per se, as the scale on which the atom 
could “destroy the world” – as Minow puts it, denoting that “world” substitutes well 
enough for “human population,” seeing as the perceptual standpoint of the latter is what 
produces the former in this discourse (229). The disaster, on this scale, arises from an 
ideology of the subject in which subjectivity is bound to the immediacy of experience and 
is, therefore, diminished if not liquidated by mediated experience. Minow’s point, then, 
in describing the universal screens of cinema and television as an epochal fact is to stress 
that their effects be construed on the order of jet, atomic, and space technology, and thus 
to campaign for regulation every bit as vigilant.
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Airport, The Museum of Accidents, and Apparatus Theory
The universal screens of cinema and television, Virilio reminds us, have allowed 
us to witness “catastrophes of all kinds” and preemptively imagine the disasters of the 
future (Virilio Reader 259). On Virilio’s account, each technology bears within it its own 
novel accident. And audiovisual technology, he claims, has been applied more to the 
exposure of that accident than to the technology itself, such that the media have “always 
been more interested in derailed trains than the ones that run on time” (259). To the 
extent that cinema and television function in “exposing or exhibiting the accident as the 
major enigma of modern Progress” (256), one could count audiovisual technology as a 
corrective to, a means of examining, hidden fates of the other technologies. Audiovisual 
technology, that is, could abet the construction of Virilio’s “museum of accidents,” a 
museum in which we could imagine and, in imagining, ward off the baleful consequences 
of progress. In this sense, the cinema, say, has always “broadly anticipated disaster 
movies” (259). But I prefer to ask, given a reading of 2001 as attuned to general 
mediation as a kind of disaster for the subject, if the cinema is capable of imagining its 
own disaster?
Airport is known as the first film of the disaster cycle and is, as I read it, a story of 
the disaster of the cinema, with cinema standing in for televisual media tout court, and 
not at all a disaster involving airplanes. Its Boeing jet, in fact, lands safely, despite the 
work of a saboteur, Dom Guererro (Van Heflin), and the film ends with a hearty 
endorsement of the reliable Boeing Corporation (one pilot quips to another, “Remind me 
to send a thank-you note to Mr. Boeing”). In this respect, Airport stands apart from the 
subsequent films in the cycle, such as The Poseidon Adventure or The Towering Inferno, 
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films that imagine one technology or another on a grand scale only to imagine its 
collapse, or a film such as Earthquake (1974), which imagines a complex of technologies 
in a highly-developed phase (hydroelectric dams, skyscrapers) only to imagine their 
demolition at nature’s hands. Airport, outwardly, tells the story of disaster averted and, 
for this reason, has been seen as an affirmation of technocracy.
But Airport affirms technocracy only in the sense that it hopes to restore faith in 
the narrative of progress that subtends technology and the hiving of society into technical 
specialization. It shores up this faith, however, not in the figure of the technocrat, but in 
the figure of the common man, Joe Patroni (George Kennedy). Patroni counts as the 
film’s integral man, a singularity rather than a function (“They don’t call them 
emergencies any more,” he tells his wife, “They call them ‘Patronis’.”). Patroni is not an 
engineer, nor is he in Research and Development; he is a mechanic whose grit solves 
more problems than do the calculations of the “stiffs up in the front office.” His foil, Mel 
Bakersfeld (Burt Lancaster), performs his front-office duties well to the extent that he 
trusts Patroni, and the men on the ground, and not those above in the offices – a set of 
relations, we might remark, that forms a near homology to Strangelove’s General 
Ripper’s (Sterling Hayden) preference for a hierarchy in which war is entrusted to the 
generals and not the politicians. Bakersfeld succeeds as a manager, that is, because he 
returns power to the common man, a power that had been unevenly accruing to what 
Eisenhower called the “scientific-technological elite.” It’s important to note, of course, 
that the symbolic economy on whose behalf Patroni appears as an integral man is a 
traditional, patriarchal one. When not working, which Patroni seems to be doing 
overtime, he stays home and loves his wife. His integrity, then, derives from the fact that 
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his authority over his household remains intact and, issuing from there, his authority 
spreads over the various units of the whole, keeping the rationalized parts coherent rather 
than compartmentalized. “Maintenance, it’s like a circus,” he instructs Bakersfeld, “One 
of us gets in trouble, he yells, ‘Hey, Rube’, they all come running.”
We are meant to juxtapose Patroni’s triumph with Captain Vernon Demerest’s 
(Dean Martin) redemption. Patroni’s capacity for controlling disorder at the airport, we 
might infer, bears a direct relationship to his capacity for ordering his own family life, 
while Captain Demerest’s louche habits leave him a challenged patriarch, both 
domestically (“Someday he’ll come home,” his wife hopes, “for some other reason than 
to just change his clothes”) and professionally (“When I’m setting down over 200,000 
pounds of 707,” Demerest says, “I want something under my wheels that’s plenty long 
and mighty dry,” referring to the runway that, in emergency weather conditions, can only 
be cleared by Patroni). When Douglas Kellner and Michael Ryan treat the disaster cycle, 
they claim that the “threat to social authority and male paternalist power” is generally 
brought on by “the movements of the sixties,” but by “feminism particularly” (Camera 
Politica 51). We might say, indeed, that feminism is the hidden accomplice in Demerest’s 
running together of his domestic and professional life, in that his promiscuity now finds 
its answer in liberated female coworkers. But Gwen Meighen (Jacqueline Bisset), the 
stewardess whose dalliance with Demerest leads to her pregnancy, is not overtly a 
feminist in the sense that we now think of second-wave feminism;13 she is, though, in 
being sexually liberated (“I know you’ve got a wife, I know you’re married,” she tells 
Demerest, “I knew it in the beginning”), supported by a technological infrastructure 
associated with the feminist movement, namely the birth-control pill instigated by 
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Margaret Sanger and Katherine McCormick and the abortion procedure soon to be 
legalized by Roe v. Wade.
In one sense, Airport fears feminism as a sub-movement within modernity, and 
Patroni functions as its guardian of patriarchy, but in a more thoroughgoing sense the 
film fears the movement of modernity tout court. This is why, as I suggest, we are meant 
to juxtapose Patroni and Captain Demerest. Not only does reproductive technology keep 
Demerest from starting a family other than the one his marriage legally sanctions, but the 
film’s more central technology, the airplane, keeps him from converting his legal 
marriage into a proper family. We can say that the conversion of marriage to family is 
stalled because the airplane has vaporized the space of home, considered as a stable 
space, making it the case that Demerest won’t likely “come home for some other reason 
than to just change his clothes” so long as his occupation has him, upon leaving a 
snowed-under Chicago, “checking the Rome weather” where “it’s not too cold and 
sunny.” The airplane, in the film’s logic, appears as the most obvious icon of modernity’s 
collapse of time and space, and because of its force for deracination, it makes sense that 
its pilot, Demerest, has an attenuated relationship with his wife. He can make no home 
for his wife, not in Patroni’s traditional sense, because his home has no fixed spatial 
coordinates. Airport sets up a dichotomy between Demerest and Patroni, rendering the 
former hyper-modern and the latter pre-modern, in order to celebrate the latter, the can-
do potency of Patroni (who will clear the plane from the runway if he has to pull it with 
his teeth, he growls to his wife, who will wait for him at home).
Airport, however, does not celebrate the pre-modern at the expense of the 
modern; it does not, that is, profess anti-modernity. Rather, it calls on the pre-modern to 
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redeem the modern. Demerest, in the final scenes, stands by his pregnant lover, Gwen 
Meighen, the suggestion being that he’ll redeem himself by caring for this new family. 
And it is courtesy of Patroni that Demerest is able to bring his damaged aircraft, and thus 
his injured lover, to the ground; the aircraft, earning its credit, was built strong enough to 
protect the lover throughout the descent. As noted, the film tends to affirm the modern, 
technocratic spirit, but it selectively does so. When Bakersfeld, the airport manager, 
confers with one of the airport’s commissioners, he urges “a modern, expanded airport, 
big and efficient enough to take anything the designers throw at us.” Bakersfeld, who had 
the managerial sense to defer to Patroni, proposes the refinement of modernity as a 
solution to problems wrought by modernity. It’s important, here, to discern the schema by 
which the film selectively endorses technological modernity: it shows, at each turn, a 
preference for rationalized spaces, those in which functions are plainly articulated, such 
as the “big and efficient” airport and the hierarchized Patroni household, but it shows 
contempt for attenuated spaces, the loss of territory in which brute force sustains its 
dominance and the loss of immediacy that endows a kind of brute self-presentation with 
its force.
If the airplane is vindicated, particularly in its quiescent state as a landed object, 
the television media are not. As the hobbled plane lands, Mrs. Demerest rushes to the 
gate. She tells Bakersfeld, “I was home watching television and ….” Bakersfeld replies, 
“I know, a news agency picked up the mayday call and flashed it all over,” his voice 
filled with scorn for how the media slips out of a hierarchy he works hard to fortify. This 
last remark depends, for its full impact, on the symmetrical renunciation Bakersfeld 
earlier made of the media, when discussing the protests with the airport commissioner. 
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“They’ll break it up soon and go home,” he says, “after the TV cameras get a few shots.” 
When the commissioner shows his alarm, “TV?,” Bakersfeld notes that the lawyers hired 
by the group “had arranged for news coverage.” What Bakersfeld deplores in the media is 
precisely its ability to distort the scale of the event, to make, in the case of the protesters, 
one aspect appear in wrong proportion to the whole picture. His problem with the media, 
in short, lies in its first fact, that mediation in all events implies a person with the power 
to control the medium, and in that prima facie power reposes the concealed power to 
control the perception of the event mediated.
This tension at the heart of Airport – that modernity’s rearranged perceptual field 
is the “accident” of its progress – makes itself known chiefly in formal terms. Airport 
rejects classical Hollywood editing grammar, avoiding the logic of shot-reverse shot to 
such a degree that it raises its avoidance to the level of philosophical principle. We need 
to consider the means by which it avoids such conventionalized editing before we can 
assess the philosophical stakes. One means by which Airport avoids shot-reverse shot is 
by placing characters in conversation in two-shot, an arrangement made easy by the 
setting of an airplane, in which it’s most logical to frontally shoot cockpit and passenger 
conversations. The film also accommodates its need to obviate cuts by shooting the 
ground scenes in Bakersfeld’s capacious office14 or in his car. It goes without saying, 
though, that two-shots only work when characters speak to each other in the same space. 
In the airplane, the cockpit will need communication technologies to tether it across 
space to ground control,15 and within the airport, the spaces outside Bakersfeld’s office 
require intercoms and mobile phones to be put in communication. In these 
communication scenarios, the film invariably eschews cuts between spaces, opting 
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instead for the unconventional use of inset images or split screens.16 I will discuss a series 
of representative examples, with the declared purpose of interpreting its strategic 
avoidance of editing language as the film’s inward efforts at disaster management.
We find the most typical use of the inset images in scenes of communication 
between the cockpit and ground control, with the person on the ground, because his voice 
has joined the cockpit crew, being pictured in an iris bubble between Demerest and his 
co-pilot. This method for depicting the two locations seems to purge two possibilities: 
first, that we would hear ground control as a disembodied voice in the cockpit, and 
second, that we would alternate, via editing, between two disparate spaces. Elsewhere 
Airport utilizes split-screens, usually to show the two halves of a telephone conversation. 
When Bakersfeld calls home, we first see him speak to his daughter in split-screen, then 
as his other daughter picks up another receiver, we see the screen divide into multiple 
frames, and then as his wife picks up yet another receiver, the screen breaks into still 
another frame. This multiple-frame imagery ensures that we view the entire family 
onscreen at once. In a last instance, we see the capacious airport fractured into its various 
coordinates when the intercom announces a coded alert; the screen, depicting the security 
guards at their different stations, suddenly fractures into a map of the airport, its space 
otherwise too vast to be recorded in one shot.
David Bordwell remarks that split-screen imagery grants us “a godlike 
omniscience as we watch two or more actions at exactly the same moment” (Film Art
215). It may turn out that the subject position of “godlike conscience,” a subject position 
known in another lexicon as the “transcendental subject,” is an inheritance from classical 
Hollywood narrative forms that strangely vexes Airport. In certain formal decisions, the 
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film seems committed to expelling the self-anchoring of cogitation, to turning the inward 
subject outward. When Demerest, for instance, in the backseat of cab, begins to recall his 
recent tryst with Gwen Meighen, he does so not by becoming glassy-eyed and looking 
inward, so to speak, but by turning his gaze to the split-screen to his left, where his 
memory seems to have material contours, as though it has been externalized and is seated 
next to him in the cab. In a sense, because he looks at the split-screen rather than fall into 
a daze and stare ahead, we can, as viewers, be jarred into realizing that he is actually 
looking at a technique of the cinema. 
We need to think, here, of Demerest’s lapsing into thought as a form of self-
mediation in order to understand Airport’s peculiar anxiety. Were the film to cut from 
Demerest to his memory, his present-tense body would be offscreen and only implicit in 
his reverie, in a manner similar to Jean Mitry’s assertion that “in the cinema I am 
simultaneously in this action and outside it,” which grants the subject the “ubiquity” of 
being “everywhere and nowhere” (Baudry 297). To the extent that Demerest’s memory is 
a medium of his experience – and that remembered experience serves as a fit description 
of the medium of cinema, given the proviso that the cinema is not our own remembered 
experience – we can understand why Demerest’s memory must be present to him in 
material form, why he must externalize what had been internal. For his redemption, he 
must shift from self-contemplation to self-activation, from having his pilot’s imagined 
coordinates to having Patroni’s brute, physical coordinates. In looking at the split-screen, 
Demerest does not look at the cinematic apparatus, as film theory would soon advise, but 
his look nonetheless bears an ideology in which the subject only subsists in immediacy, 
in which the subject, taken as pure thought or cogito, must posit itself as object on the 
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premise that being trumps non-being.17 In other words, this is Airport’s Hamlet moment: 
caught between thought and action, between being and non-being, as Adorno describes it, 
“the subject, thrown back upon itself, divided from its Other by an abyss, is supposedly 
incapable of action” (Critical Models 260).
We might say it’s less important that Airport imagines the cinema’s culpability in 
mediating the subject’s experience, leading to a scene of pure thought and no action, and 
more important that it imputes an ideological function to the camera. In this regard, 
Airport turns out to be an unlikely bedfellow of the contemporaneous French discourse 
known as “apparatus theory.” Apparatus theory, given its canonical formulation in Jean-
Louis Baudry’s 1970 essay “The Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematic Apparatus,” 
holds that cinema completes its ideological work, which is the reproduction of the 
dominant ideology, not at the level of film content, but at the level of cinematic form; the 
apparatus, Baudry believes, is an “ideological machine” (293). It does this, in Baudry’s 
analysis, by constituting the camera as the transcendental subject of idealism, “the eye” 
“no longer fettered by a body,” casting the actual bodies in the theater in a somewhat 
inferior relationship to the apparatus: “Everything happens as if, the subject himself being 
unable – and for a reason – to account for his own situation, it was necessary to substitute 
secondary organs, grafted on to replace his own defective ones” (295). The viewers of 
cinema, then, gain the effect of subjectivity, by way of the transcendental subjectivity of 
the camera, but this mediated subjectivity can only be had “if the instrumentation” is 
“hidden or repressed” (295).
Whether or not we can say Airport wants to unmask the operations of the camera, 
we can at least say that it endeavors to avoid the kind of editing practices that preserve 
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continuity and keep the camera “hidden.” The stakes for Airport, that is, may prove quite 
different from those of apparatus theory: for the latter, the “revealing of the mechanism” 
would induce a desired “identity collapse” (296), and would seemingly generate critique 
on a higher order; the former, in contrast, abhors the reflective ego to the point of anti-
intellectualism (“The good thing about the 707,” Patroni boasts, “it can do everything but 
read”) and instead endorses what Adorno calls “contemporary actionism” (262). The 
point, for Airport, is to win back the immediacy of experience, and thus it takes the 
cinema for its target in the same way apparatus theory does. Broadly, the disaster film 
requires, for its drama, that technological domination be undone, but none of the films 
subsequent to Airport will take the cinema as the locus for such domination.18 Airport
plays a unique role in the cycle, then, by floating a background suggestion that 
audiovisual technology could be every bit as nefarious as the massive technologies 
(skyscrapers, cruise ships) whose disasters were easier, in some sense, to imagine.
The Poseidon Adventure, the Total System, and Old-Fashioned Transcendence
While the singularity of Airport is its choice to seize on Hollywood cinema, its 
codes and techniques, as a metonym for the greater technological armature, the 
commonality Airport has with other disaster films – chiefly, for present purposes, The 
Towering Inferno and The Poseidon Adventure – is the use of this metonymic operation 
which prefers to extract a feature from the armature of techno-corporate modernity and 
treat it as a proxy for the whole system, yet in the form of a reified model, we might say, 
which exhibits hateful traces of the system not as structural but as sequestered from the 
structure and, as such, ready for purging. This allows for Adorno’s “contemporary 
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actionism” in that one can act forcefully on a part without having a theory of the whole. 
Praxis and theory had special historical reasons for parting ways in the 1960s, as Jameson 
has remarked, because theory would first have to retool itself to comprehend 
hypertrophied institutional life, in order to allow for a praxis based on “laws,” “which are 
not those of the individual human action or intention” (“Periodizing the 60s”). Thus, in 
the name of efficacious praxis, in the 1960s, theory and what Adorno calls “abstract 
subjectivity” (260) are often eschewed in favor of the reemergence of individual action 
and experience. The trope of strong leadership, then – even when it comes as the strong 
leadership of a theoretician, as was the case with Herbert Marcuse, who objected to his 
status as leader with the quip that the New Left didn’t need “daddies”19 – unites the films 
of the disaster cycle (Airport, The Poseidon Adventure, The Towering Inferno) more so 
than the objects against which a struggle is led.
Of course, the object of the struggle is important, not only for the value of its 
technological signifiers, but for the fact that it stands in for a theory of the whole. How 
one should act on behalf of social change in a complex society – whether in the mode of 
the Civil Rights movement or the Black Panther movement, whether by the methods of 
Michael Harrington or Ivanhoe Donaldson – is substituted with the question of how one 
should act to escape a collapsing total system. And the answer, predictably, is easier to 
come by. As such, we can say that the luxury liner of The Poseidon Adventure and the 
skyscraper of The Towering Inferno both count as figurations of a social totality which 
otherwise eludes representation. Crucial to their being a totality, they appear as closed 
systems, whose totalizing functions include the people within them. In this light, we can 
call on Adorno, who, as indicated in Chapter 2, helps to explain the interrelation of the 
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defection and disaster films in the sense that, where the former represses the system, the 
latter responds to Paul Potter’s summons to name “the system.” The disaster film, 
accordingly, names the system a machine, and in calling it a machine endows it with the 
look of being, like HAL 9000, now under its own control rather than of its supposed 
human subjects. On this model, we can refer to Adorno and Horkheimer’s excursus on 
the alienating effects of technology, which is able, in order for reason to lapse back into 
unreason, to pass “mention” “of the fact that the basis on which technology acquires 
power over society is the power of those whose economic hold over society is the 
greatest” (Dialectic of Enlightenment 121).
Before considering how The Poseidon Adventure and The Towering Inferno
convert machines into the visible foes, we should recall the means by which Adorno and 
Horkheimer see the total system closing, that of their notorious machine, the culture 
industry. They indeed describe the culture industry in machinic terms; it “impresses” its 
“stamp” on all, and by its “mass production” is bent on “classifying, organizing, and 
labeling consumers” such that “none may escape” (120, 121, 123). However, as Jameson 
notes in his study on Adorno, they do not exactly discuss “culture” in its recognizable 
guise as a space “still offered for the exercise of a non-alienated subjectivity that was 
neither business nor science”; but rather in their analysis it is “the tremendous expansion 
of the cultural sphere and the acculturation of daily life since the 1960s” that serves as a 
Trojan horse for industry or “business as such” (Late Marxism 107, 108). In other words, 
the culture industry, as “the commercialization of life” (Jameson 144), describes the 
means for the “penetration of ‘enlightenment’” – understood here as a conversion into 
ruthless equivalencies – “into the mind itself” and the “reduction and subsumption” of 
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“individual subjectivity” into its machinery for exchange (107). It is this closed circuit 
that Adorno and Horkheimer allude to when they claim that “Kant foretold what 
Hollywood consciously put into practice,” in that culture works out “the conceptual 
apparatus” that then “determines the senses,” or, in its Hollywood iteration, that “in the 
very process of production, images are pre-censored according to the norm of the 
understanding which will later govern their apprehension” (84).
This sense of enclosure, of sealed-off totality and determined subjectivity, grants 
us a perspective on the figures of technology in The Poseidon Adventure and The 
Towering Inferno that resonates with Clark Kerr’s delineation of the university’s merger 
with the military-industrial complex: in all cases, what looks like the subject’s 
development or fulfillment turns out to be the manufacture of an object on behalf of some 
total system. In both The Poseidon Adventure and The Towering Inferno, the people 
celebrate – at a New Year’s Eve party in the former, a gala opening in the latter – while 
behind-the-scenes interests precipitate the collapse of the totality enclosing them. It’s 
important, in culture-industry terms, that the people are entertained while the true 
interests remain behind the scenes. In The Towering Inferno, the builder James Duncan 
(William Holden), accused of having an “edifice complex,” is most invested in the gala 
party as a demonstration of the opulence of his tower, but his son-in-law, Roger Simmons 
(Richard Chamberlain), was subcontracted for the electrical work and acts as a node in 
the corporate venality (“Payoffs and kickbacks”) sustaining the construction of such 
buildings. Yet the users of the building don’t see its operational side, only its decorative 
side. The corporate rapaciousness, that is, is known only to its beneficiaries, and is 
otherwise submerged in the design, for which architect Doug Roberts (Paul Newman) is 
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feted. Likewise, the U.S.S. Poseidon is capsized by a tidal wave, after the representative 
of corporate interests, Mr. Linarcos (Fred Sadoff), orders the ship’s captain (Leslie 
Nielsen) “full ahead” because his consortium loses “thousands of dollars” for every day 
they fall behind schedule. The point in the appearance of these characters is not the 
identification of a scapegoat, but rather the suggestion of a trans-individual agency for 
which they can only be stand-ins, and thus, owing to their insufficiency as causes, they 
make the transference of villainy to the figure of technology a logical narrative step. In 
short, because the corporate person cannot individually bear the weight of trans-
individual agency, the figure of technology must.
The Poseidon Adventure and The Towering Inferno, in this move and others, look 
enough like each other that a discussion of one can cover the other. Catastrophe strikes 
during a party; people are then trapped in an architectural enclosure; rescue of the 
survivors depends on the pairing of a civil servant and what we might call a purveyor of 
culture, in the former a priest and the latter an architect. Pausing to assess the difference 
in these pairings, however, will instruct us as to differences that line the boundaries of the 
defection and disaster genres, insofar as the latter, unlike the former, takes the ruins of the 
social order as an occasion to propound a reconstituted authority. The Towering Inferno
shades toward Airport, in that authority comes in the pairing of architect Doug Roberts 
and Fire Chief O’Hallorhan (Steve McQueen), with the film privileging the “common 
man” of the pair, O’Hallorhan, over the technocrat closer to capital, Roberts. 
O’Hallorhan, it should be said, is less a brute than Airport’s Patroni, and more a practical 
man. The pairing in The Poseidon Adventure, in contrast, privileges the man of spiritual 
vision, Revered Scott, over its practical man, Lieutenant Rogo. That practical means 
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should defer to spiritual means during a state of emergency is only, it turns out, a 
technique for grounding a familiar form of authority.
The familiar form of authority – sacerdotal authority – means, however, to present 
itself in the idiom of the social movements and in the style of youth culture. Reverend 
Scott, conspicuously free of his collar, describes himself as the “best kind” of minister, 
“angry, rebellious, critical – a renegade.” And his work, he implies, is the uplift and 
agitation of an inner city parish (which might recall New Left forays into impoverished 
urban neighborhoods, such as Tom Hayden’s work in Newark). While Revered Scott 
claims to relish being “stripped of most of his so-called clerical powers” because it grants 
him a renegade status, liberated from “all the rules and all the trappings” of the church, he 
still preaches sermons underwritten by the church’s authority; he gains credibility as a 
leader through his institutional affiliation. Indeed, his sermon returns what look like the 
secular appeals of reason to their earlier form of transcendental appeals: “Pray to that part 
of God within yourself,” the Reverend urges those on board. In effect, Reverend Scott’s 
outward rebellion requires the structure of authority rooted in the church. Like auteurism, 
we might say, it’s a form of renegadism that needs an institution as its silent partner. The 
film’s rhetorical program, again like auteurism, needs the dissatisfaction of the youth 
culture in order to reorganize existing institutions, as it suggests when its hippie rock 
band replaces the Strauss waltz. These are the energies Reverend Scott courts on the 
church’s behalf. The old-fashioned transcendence that is so plainly the film’s allegorical 
surface – with the inverted ship forcing its debauched passengers to strive upwards to 
salvation, following Reverend Scott’s lead – has for its effect, and likely its design, the 
113
recontainment of those impulses behind defection: the individual gains the appearance of 
transcending the institution, with the institution’s permission.
Jaws, the End of Disaster, and the Institution of Defection
            If Jaws is the last word for the disaster cycle, as I have claimed, this is so not 
solely because the disaster movie’s model for box-office success wanes at the very 
moment that Jaws marks the waxing of a high-concept model that will issue in the 
blockbuster.20 It is so because Steven Spielberg, in suffusing disaster narrative material 
with auteurist prerogative, stitched together the appeals of the defection and disaster 
imaginaries; in effect, Spielberg is responsible for an industrial shift from the courtship of 
the youth market to the induction of that market into what his contemporary Martin 
Scorsese calls “the spectacular entertainment” (Ebert 42). Indeed, in making first a 
defection film, The Sugarland Express, and then a disaster film, Jaws, and notably 
making inner modifications of each genre, Spielberg proposes a means by which 
subjective autonomy (auteurist prerogative in his own account) can be rescued from the 
outlaw status granted it in the philosophical impasse of the defection film and reinstalled 
within the framework of the law, the very rhetorical work that disaster films undertook.
It is crucial that, before understanding Jaws, we understand the way in which The 
Sugarland Express rewrites the basic principles of the defection film. What makes 
Bonnie and Clyde one term in the proposal for a genre lodging a somewhat novel impulse 
in Hollywood film – distinct from earlier films about fugitive couples, such as You Only 
Live Once (1937) and They Live by Night (1948) – is that the pair leaves no offspring. 
They defect from dehumanizing institutions but neither find nor found any new 
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institutions to mollify their social discontentment; their failure to reproduce functions as 
their failure to envision better social forms that could be reproducible as institutions. In 
The Sugarland Express, the couple defects in order to reclaim their baby. Clovis (William 
Atherton) and Lou Jean (Goldie Hawn) are reproductive before anything else, and their 
telos is simply to be again in control of what they reproduce. And this will only occur 
when they defer to the wisdom and sobriety of their law enforcement chaperones, which 
appear in the film as the retinue of police cars, the eminently patient police captain (Ben 
Johnson), and the patrolman they kidnap and befriend (Michael Sacks). The film goes to 
lengths to depict the couple as benighted and the police as enlightened.
Indeed, existing institutional life plays the hero in The Sugarland Express. 
Spielberg attests to as much when he claims that “the heroes of the picture are really the 
police,” but recognizes that “nobody else sees it that way” (Friedman Interviews 6). 
Perhaps the police were illegible as heroes because everyone was reading them in the 
context of these other films Spielberg describes as “thematically similar,” specifically 
fellow films of 1974 Badlands and Thieves Like Us. Spielberg is right to assert that his is 
an “essentially different” film (7). Because he appropriates the form of the folk ballad, 
which is to say its iconic markers,21 but rearticulates it so the heroic stress falls not on the 
people but on the institutions, Spielberg makes a defection film that misses its essence. 
His film, then, failed commercially, even if it succeeded critically, owing to its 
incoherence as a populist statement that implores greater obedience from the populace. 
This “condescending” tone to “middle America” (7) registers an anxious coexistence of 
youth culture and legal institutions, one in which Spielberg has yet to symbolically 
rework “middle America” into a heroic subject rather than the ignorantly subjected.
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Jaws, as a disaster film of sorts, is the alembic by which “middle America” 
becomes a heroic subject. This is another way of saying that the defection film, being the 
story of individuation, is the wrong form for the celebration of mass society, whereas the 
disaster film, with its plotlines interlocking an ensemble cast, depends on an articulation 
of group life. Yet Spielberg, as he did with the defection film, modifies the disaster 
genre.22 Instead of deploying an ensemble cast in Jaws, Spielberg “credit[ed] himself 
with streamlining the story,” as Hoberman notes, purging it of its subplots of Mafia 
connections and adultery (212). The plot is distilled into the single threat of the shark, 
which calls on individual leadership from a triumvirate of nominees: Brody (Roy 
Scheider), the town sheriff; Hooper (Richard Dreyfuss), the young ichthyologist; and 
Quint (Robert Shaw), the rugged fisherman-cum-shark hunter. Jameson offers a canny 
observation on the “ultimate partnership” between Brody and Hooper, which is arrived at 
when Quint is killed by the shark. Theirs is “an alliance between the forces of law-and-
order and the new technocracy of the multinational corporations,” a “fraternity in which 
the viewer rejoices without understanding that he or she is excluded from it” 
(“Reification and Utopia” 29). The point of this modification on the disaster film, we 
might say, is first that the large-group relations for which the ensemble cast was a screen 
representation has been substituted with the individual heroics of a strong leader; mass 
society, in Brody’s final confrontation, is shunted off-screen and he acts in its behalf. 
And, second, the symbiosis between law-and-order and technocracy now responsible for 
the stability of the social order appears, in the moment of triumph, as the lone figure of 
Brody, the deputy for the entire people, rather than in the techno-corporate figure of 
Hooper, the delegate of an enclave of people.
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This reworking of the raw materials of the disaster genre would be interesting 
enough in itself, but the real work of Jaws occurs when, in replacing the figures of 
technological totality such as the skyscraper or a cruise liner with a figure of nature, the 
shark, the film redescribes the technological state of the social order as a natural state. In 
Jaws, we might say, there are no disasters, only mythic encounters. Yet the status of the 
shark as a natural object is curiously belied by the insistent descriptions of it as a 
machine in both the film and Peter Benchley’s novel. In the film, Hooper instructs Mayor 
Vaughn (Murray Hamilton), “What we are dealing with here is a perfect engine, an eating 
machine.” We could say that Hooper’s words to Vaughn extend the rhetoric used in the 
novel, notably a similar conversation in which Hooper explains his fascination with 
sharks to Ellen Brody, the chief’s wife. “They’re like an impossibly perfect piece of 
machinery,” he says admiringly (117).
But this tendency to describe the shark as a machine, looked at from another 
angle, has a very specific meaning in the film, and indeed in the film industry more 
broadly. The shark used in the film, referred to on-set as “Bruce,” was indeed a machine, 
though it was far from perfect. And Spielberg was charged with the task, which he 
interpreted as an auteurist task, of rendering the machine as a natural object. Indeed, in 
The Jaws Log, Gottlieb refers to the director’s work as traditionally one of managing the 
machinery of the film. The film’s producers, Richard Zanuck and David Brown, “first 
considered getting a director who was a great engineer, one of the old-timers whose 
principal virtues are their ability to move the ponderous machinery of film-making 
around” (30). Spielberg entered as a different kind of director, a “movie brat” fresh from 
a defection film produced by Zanuck and Brown. But his distinction would be to supplant 
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the “old-timers” and stamp the production of Jaws with his name, that of the individual 
capable of coaxing from the machine a series of natural movements. His distinction, as 
Gottlieb remarks, would be to make the shark the star of the picture, which in effect 
would be to make the “machinery of film-making” once again the star. The disaster film 
had been seeking to rescue this machinery by stacking films with celebrities across 
Hollywood eras, but Jaws would transform this machinery by the director’s agency. 
We should recall, for Spielberg’s understanding of his relation to this machinery, 
his own account of Quint’s introduction in the film. He had wanted, he recounts, to 
introduce Quint in a theater watching John Huston’s 1956 version of Moby Dick. Quint 
would have been “laughing all the way through it,” in the screenplay Spielberg wrote. 
“It’s so silly, the mechanical white whale,” as Spielberg explains, “this little mechanical 
figure still sticking the little mechanical harpoon in the whale.” We might construe this as 
what comes to be Spielberg’s particular inflection of auteurism. Part of what 
characterized auteurism was its claim that, as André Bazin phrased it, while “the cinema 
is an art which is both popular and industrial,” such conditions do not, of themselves, 
hinder a filmmaker’s personal vision (“On the politique des auteurs” 251); auteurism, 
indeed, is the impress of that personality. Spielberg posits a version of personal 
filmmaking that is distinct from, say, Martin Scorsese’s version, in that, as Spielberg 
says, Scorsese makes films about “who he is and his old neighborhood,” whereas 
Spielberg thinks of his identity not as a member of a community with a story to tell, but 
as a member of that community being told stories. As he puts it, “I’ve often taken the 
approach from my filmmaking that I am the audience” (Ebert 39). For Quint to laugh at 
the representation of Ahab’s personal quest, in other words, is for Quint to be alienated 
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from representations of the natural by a knowledge that they are technological. Spielberg, 
we might say, retains the auteurist impulse on display in the defection film, that of 
needing to blot out the techno-corporate order, the administered society; but rather than 
blot it out, he inhabits it and restructures its technological mise-en-scène to appear as a 
natural setting for personal quests.
In this respect, Jaws is a simply a new rendition of the Western, with the ideology 
of strong individualism retooled for an age of technocratic expertise. Brody comes to 
Amity as the new sheriff in this small seaside town, and finds himself caught between the 
venalities of government, represented in the person of Mayor Vaughn (Larry Hamilton), 
and the specialized knowledge of the expert class, represented by Hooper. In cleaning up 
the town, which is the act of reinstituting the law of strong individualism over against the 
state and in the name of the people, he must make that law look like it issues from a 
mythic rite rather than technological imperatives. This tension, then, plays out when 
Quint, accusing Hooper of being “some kind of half-assed astronaut” (with reference to 
the space program, which would be the true technological frontier of 1974, in contrast to 
the mythic frontier of Jaws), tells the young expert, “Maybe you’re a big yahoo in the 
lab, but out here you’re just supercargo.” After Hooper disappears in his shark cage, 
Brody is able to kill the shark in the name of the sacrificial Quint, a proxy for the people 
offscreen, both the townspeople absent in the film’s third act and the audience who would 
view Quint’s death, unlike Moby Dick, as more natural than mechanical, more involving 
than alienating. Brody’s individualism is sealed in the event’s believability. The 
believability, of course, is Spielberg’s personal claim as an audience member. 
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It is in this sense that Robert Kolker asserts that Spielberg’s films “are not simply 
ideological bellwethers” charged with “responding or giving shape to ideology,” but his 
films “instead become ideology” (Loneliness 257). His representations are natural enough 
that the imagined seems more believable than the actual. When asked by an interviewer 
whether he “believe[s] in poltergeists,” Spielberg answered, “Yes, I do, I absolutely do. 
In every movie I’ve ever made I’ve essentially believed in what the films were about.” 
But he curiously appended this by saying, “If I ever make a film about a fifty-foot 
woman, I’ll believe that too” (94). As a story about the reemergence of individual 
heroics, it’s perhaps less important that Brody bests the shark, without Hooper’s “real 
fine, expensive gear,” than it is that Spielberg manages the “perfect machinery” of the 
industry such that his success seems to be a product of his own chutzpah rather than an 
effect of the techno-corporate structure of Hollywood. The story of Spielberg’s fusion of 
the defection and disaster film, in other words, is an iteration of auteurism’s half-answer 
to administered society, namely that the subject stakes out its autonomy only by 
repressing its origins in a techno-corporate order.    
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Notes      
                                                
1 I say the genre minimizes technological incursion “in the main” because we find 
exceptions in Brewster McCloud, a film that technologically envelops its characters, and 
Two-Lane Blacktop, a film about two gearheads who fix cars as competently as they race 
them. Two-Lane Blacktop seems, indeed, to rewrite Easy Rider, seizing on the 
relationship between the protagonists and their vehicles as constitutive of their vision of 
freedom. The subcultures punctuating Wyatt and Billy’s motorcycle journey, such as the 
eco-experiment of the hippie commune, become the subculture of mechanics and 
gearheads in Two-Lane Blacktop. Two-Lane Blacktop counts as a defection film, 
interestingly, because the very vehicle that symbolizes mobility, escape, and freedom has 
been reincorporated as accessory to a subculture under the umbrella of consumer society, 
a certain niche demographic now studied for its habits and needs. Technology, then, is 
only a cathexis for the impulses of certain defector personalities, and in this respect we 
can compare Two-Lane Blacktop to its counterpart, Cockfighter, a film in which the 
subculture isn’t gathered around the technological spectacle of auto-racing at all, but 
rather its agrarian analogue, cockfighting.  
2 In part, I say this because, on Leo Marx’s analysis, the pastoral tradition tends to treat 
technology’s incursion as a fixed meaning. The tone it possesses, “characteristic of 
Virgilian pastoral, is a way of saying that the episode [Hawthorne’s experience of the 
train whistle amidst seclusion at Sleepy Hollow] belongs to a timeless, recurrent pattern 
of human affairs. It falls easily into a conventional design because it has occurred often 
before” (31). In a specifically historicist study such as my own, I see little benefit in 
assimilating the entwined themes of defection and technocracy to a “timeless” “pattern of 
human affairs”; I prefer, then, to explain the defection film in relation to the 
contemporaneous disaster film rather than in relation to the pastoral tradition.
3 In The Machine in the Garden, Marx recalls Boswell’s witness to Boulton’s production 
of a steam engine, upon which he wishes “that Johnson had been with us: for it was a 
scene which I should have been glad to contemplate by his light. The vastness and the 
contrivance of some of the machinery would have ‘matched’ his mighty mind” (145). 
4 For critics who consider those films I call defection films, and auteurist cinema more 
broadly, as personal, even revolutionary, see David Thomson’s “The Decade When 
Movies Mattered” and Ryan Gilbey’s It Don’t Worry Me; for critics who consider the 
disaster films conservative, see Peter Lev’s American Films of the 1970s and Douglas 
Kellner and Michael Ryan’s Camera Politica. 
5 In some respect, I take this to be the reason neither Walter Murch nor Gordon Willis has 
ever become the household name or marketing tag that Francis Ford Coppola became.
Film technicians had to be absorbed by film artists if film were to be considered as 
something outside of and uncontaminated by modernity’s armature of advancing 
technology. On this problematic, see my reading of The Conversation in the Introduction.
6 Jameson makes these comments with reference to Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema.
7 Ray Pratt makes this claim most plainly in Projecting Paranoia when he says that “no 
single cultural artifact better represents the disintegration of the American consensus in 
the early and mid-1060s” than Strangelove. Versions of this claim show up often enough, 
from David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest (427) to Robert Kolker’s A Cinema 
of Loneliness.
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8 Mills describes this specialized strata of military men as “the professional soldier at the 
top of a large and permanent military establishment” who must “earn the respect of his 
men by logistical planning in the Pentagon” rather than “by better shooting, harder riding, 
faster improvisation when in trouble (179, 180); this kind of professional military man is 
sustained, Mills asserts, by “a certain kind of social hierarchy” (172). 
9 The analogous character in Fail-Safe is Professor Groeteschele (Walter Matthau), a 
political scientist who, after discussing the aftermath of nuclear war, says, “It’s all 
hypothesis, of course, but fun to play around with.”
10 Barry Keith Grant says “the computer HAL seems a more complex character with 
greater emotional depth than any of the people in the film” (Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey 69) and Kolker says that the “digital construction” of HAL “wins the 
viewer’s sympathies” (A Cinema of Loneliness 136).
11 Newton Minow served as the chairman of the FCC during the Kennedy administration. 
This quotation is taken from his 1961 address of the National Association of 
Broadcasters. 
12 In “The Museum of Accidents,” Virilio describes the “media scale” as being “so vast” 
that it requires “the amplitude of the perceptual field” as “the first stage of a new 
understanding” (Virilio Reader 260). 
13 By the same token, the protesters in the film are not the kind familiar to audiences in 
1970, their protest being against noise pollution rather than war; nor is the disaffected 
soldier back from Vietnam, but likely from Korea or World War II, if he is a veteran at 
all. Airport works hard, we might say, to displace its social conflicts into historical 
moments other than the contemporary one.
14 His office, I should note, is ostentatiously large, recalling Kellner and Ryan’s 
observation that “the marks” of the “environment” in these films “are usually luxury and 
modernity” (52). An airport manager, as befitting a high-ranking technocrat, would bask 
in a large, modern, and well-appointed office, and the camera would need to depict this 
space in a long shot rather than close-up. In this respect, generic content (modernity 
makes spaces luxurious) issues a generic form (modernity’s spaces, being thusly 
luxurious, should properly be rendered in deep-space compositions). 
15 See Paul Young’s essay “Media on Display” for an account of how early cinema 
deployed communication technologies as a means of smoothing its crosscutting between 
spaces. “The plots of films like The Lonedale Operator would have been difficult for 
contemporary audiences to disentangle,” Young argues, “had the telegraph not provided 
justification for Griffith’s crosscutting between one place and another” (229). 
16 David Bordwell remarks that “split-screen phone scenes,” used from the early cinema 
onward, “were revived for phone conversations in Bye Bye Birdie and other 1960s 
widescreen comedies” (Film Art 215). Bordwell’s language is misleading because while 
the device of split-screen was used for phone conversations in early cinema, one can 
observe the phasing out of this device in Hollywood films of the 1930s and 1940s, the 
moment of classicality. Some critics have suggested that it was the innovation of 
Cinemascope itself that provoked the revival of split-screen editing. In Cinema Dreams 
Its Rivals, Paul Young claims that, in the contest between the media of cinema and 
television, cinema used widescreen as a means of marking “film’s superiority” (180). 
Widescreen accentuated a capacity peculiarly its own, Young observes, by 
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“construct[ing] versions of ‘presence’ and ‘liveness’” that recalled early cinema’s “mode 
of attractions” and what John Belton calls “legitimate theater” (181). Widescreen 
comedies, then, reproduce the liveness of theater – in which phone calls between two 
people would necessarily be staged as a phone call between people in the same space –
by using split-screen, as in Bye Bye Birdie, to make it seem like the phone conversants 
share a space. Bye Bye Birdie brings this point home by choreographing one of its dance 
numbers out of phone conversations, bringing all of the people first connected through 
the figure of split-screen into the same literal space, now dancing while retaining their 
phone receivers as props. Indeed, what’s telling about this scene is that phones, in 
Cinemascope’s split-screens, were props all along. Constructing the immediacy of 
liveness, in short, only emphasized the artificiality of cinema’s first fact, mediation. Paul 
Hirsch, an editor who collaborated with Brian DePalma, remarks that DePalma’s 
fondness for split-screen shots ruined the illusions of cinema. “Basically it takes the 
audience out of the movie,” Hirsch says, “The technique works on an intellectual basis … 
But you don’t feel anything. Engaging your intellect takes away from feeling what’s 
happening” (First Cut 189).   
17 I would like to here acknowledge that Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye
makes important contributions along these lines with respect to spectatorship, though I 
would add that her method shows more dialectical subtlety than does Airport’s. “The 
existential act of seeing-in-the world grounds the existential act of seeing the world with 
one’s own eyes,” Sobchack writes. “The former is an anonymous mode of being situated 
that discovers the world as the experience of consciousness, whereas the latter is a 
situated mode of being that discovers the self in the world and recognizes the act of 
seeing as mediated, as the consciousness of experience” (51).
18 I should note, however, that Pauline Kael remarked that Earthquake’s destruction of 
Los Angeles was undertaken with such “pleasure” as to seem like a “death wish for film 
art.”
19 At a talk in December 1968, Marcuse responds to the New York Times christening him 
a leader of the New Left by saying, “And there is one thing the Left does not need, and 
that’s another father image, another daddy” (The New Left and the 1960s 122).
20 Disaster films sat at the top of box-office charts in 1970, ’72, and ’74, with Airport 
grossing second most in the first year’s box-office figures, The Poseidon Adventure
grossing second most in the second year’s figures, and The Towering Inferno grossing the 
most, Earthquake the third most, and Airport 1975 the eight most in the last year. If we 
want to chart the disaster cycle’s diminishing financial returns across the 1970s, however, 
it’s most instructive to look at figures for the Airport franchise: Airport had rentals of 
$45.2 million; Airport 1975 had rentals of $25.3 million; and Airport ‘77 had rentals of 
$15.1. The year following the last year of the disaster cycle, in which the top ten rentals 
was stacked with three disaster films, Jaws outperformed every movie by at least one 
hundred percent. This was the beginning of the high-concept model, which was solidified 
two years later by the monster performance of Star Wars (1977). Figures from David A. 
Cook’s Lost Illusions.   
21 In Film/Genre, Rick Altman designates this side of genre the semantic.
22 In his essay “Nashville Contra Jaws, or ‘The Imagination of Disaster’ Revisited,” J. 
Hoberman calls Nashville and Jaws “each in its way a brilliant modification on the 
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current cycle of ‘disaster’ films” (195). Jaws, however, has been more generally leagued 
with the disaster cycle than has Nashville, for which, as far as I know, Hoberman is the 
only critic to argue its “disaster” status. Peter Lev, on the other hand, treats Jaws as a 
disaster film, and Carl Gottlieb generally discusses it as a member of this genre in The 
Jaws Log, though he distinguishes its script from the more hackneyed ones of Poseidon 
Adventure or Airport, which tended to have “cardboard characters doing plastic things” 
(57). 
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CHAPTER IV
ETHOS OF INCORPORATION: CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
       AS AUTEURISM
In the opening shot of The King of Marvin Gardens (1972), we see only the 
illuminated face of David Staebler (Jack Nicholson) in total blackness. The face is first in 
profile, as he stares off-screen left, and then it turns deliberately toward the camera.  
Stopping the pivot, David starts to speak sotto voce. David is not addressing the camera, 
but rather a microphone: he is a DJ, we soon deduce, and the darkness is that of the radio 
booth. The close-up image of the face, however, reminds us that this is Jack Nicholson, 
star of Five Easy Pieces. As his face rotates toward us, we might interpret it as a source 
of light, that it is luminous rather than illuminated. Indeed, it might put us in mind of 
Bobby Dupea, his character from Five Easy Pieces, the wattage of whose ego had the 
effect of dimming the film’s other characters and events; and, in this mindset, we might 
guess that this is another tale of individualism. We might, just as well, see this as the 
scene of the confessional, David’s hushed voice meant only for a priest who, in the 
analysis of Michel Foucault, exercises the “pastoral power” that, in probing and knowing 
one’s mind, produces one’s subjectivity.
But Marvin Gardens, Rafelson’s first directorial effort following the success of 
Five Easy Pieces, desists from the unbridled individualism of the earlier film. Indeed, if 
Five Easy Pieces is the Ur-example of the defection film, a story that auteurs told 
themselves about the encumbrance institutions placed on individuality, Marvin Gardens
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is the story of incorporation that seldom gets told, a story in which the version of 
individualism bearing the name of auteurism depends on the powers of a specific 
institution, that of the corporation. Put archly, Marvin Gardens knows that the 
corporation authorizes the auteur. 
As Marvin Gardens begins, the character of David Staebler perhaps enjoys the 
luminosity conferred on him by Nicholson’s rising star, but in David’s monologue, he 
plainly understands that he himself is no sufficient power source, no lone hero. His claim 
to authority is not made as an individual but in partnership. His monologue explains 
partnership as the irreducible source of power in the form of an originary myth about why 
he doesn’t eat fish: it chronicles a childhood ritual of Friday fish dinners, enforced by his 
crotchety grandfather, who David and his brother Jason (Bruce Dern), in alliance, leave 
to choke on fish bones. The story recalls Five Easy Pieces in that claiming authority of 
one’s own requires toppling a patriarch. We can gauge how much the dynamic has 
changed, though, by noting that the passage of authority from Nicholas to Bobby Dupea 
is sealed by an individualist credo, one that entails the besting of Bobby’s brother, Carl. 
In contrast, Marvin Gardens insists that authority, in its contemporary form, can only be 
gained and exercised cooperatively: “At that moment, my brother and I became 
accomplices forever,” David says. And, in a later scene, he pronounces the obsolescence 
of individual authority as a historical fact: “The form of the tragic autobiography is dead, 
or will be soon, along with most of its authors.”
This message of “dead authors” comes, of course, as an unlikely one from 
Rafelson, one of the rising auteurs in 1972. But it comes as an unlikely message only if, 
following the impulse of the defection film, we repress the structure of the institution in 
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telling the story of the individual. Rafelson had no need to repress that structure, in that 
the corporate structure was one he knew well. Rafelson had formed Raybert Productions 
with partner Bert Schneider, a colleague at Columbia’s television arm Screen Gems, and 
the two experienced huge success with their sitcom creation, The Monkees. Following the 
success of Easy Rider, the pair formed BBS Productions along with friend Steve Blauner. 
BBS, then, became the patron corporation for auteurist cinema, backing the work of Peter 
Bogdanovich, Henry Jaglom, and even a Jack Nicholson who hadn’t yet decided his 
destiny was in acting, not directing (Drive, He Said [1971]). In the moment of Marvin 
Gardens, we might as easily say that Nicholson’s place was within the corporation, as a 
part of BBS, more than it was that of the extolled actor. His place within the organization 
characterized the corporate sense of auteurism patented by BBS. 
Marvin Gardens clarifies the corporatism BBS favored over individualism, by 
elucidating their ethic of corporate behavior as a source of meaning more vigorous for its 
plurality. As a repudiation of Dwight Macdonald’s dated maxim that meaning is the 
“result” of a “single brain and sensibility” “in full command,” Marvin Gardens regards 
auteurism as the necessary means for fixing corporate meaning as singularly authorized, 
in order to dispel the ambiguity attending meanings whose authorization spreads more or 
less evenly across an organization. Throughout Marvin Gardens, we see such confusion 
figured in the question of which brother, David or Jason, is the artist and which the 
businessman of their partnership. David, considered an “artist” by Jessica (Julia Ann 
Robinson) and a “philosopher-king” by brother Jason, is needed by business because 
“image is everything in business today” and he can, with his craft, present merchandise 
“with style.” But Jason, the obvious businessman who “love[s] all the hustle around 
127
here,” is distrusted by his boss, Lewis (Benjamin “Scatman” Crothers), because he’s “no 
businessman” but “an artist.” Marvin Gardens, in other words, depicts the changing 
business environment of which auteurism was a representative trend, a time in which the 
opposition between creative freedom and conformist hierarchy, the individual and the 
“organization man,” was being undone.
I want to suggest that Marvin Gardens is, in effect, the canonical statement on 
auteurism, insofar as it offers the fullest, most dialectical account of auteurism as the 
talismanic discourse that reconciles individualism and corporatism. This reconciliation, 
adumbrated across the 20th century in the polemic of “corporate personhood,”1 marks a 
set of changes within the operations of capitalism that will elsewhere be described as the 
transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation.2 What I hope to demonstrate, finally, is 
that BBS Productions was no maverick enterprise, no aberration, with what Rafelson 
called its “fuck-all” attitude, but was rather a bellwether for the radicalized business 
practices that would shape the future of capitalism. Before supporting such claims with a 
detailed reading of Marvin Gardens, I want to make a divagation through a cycle of films 
on the corporation, a cycle roughly coeval (1967-1976) with the genre of the defection 
film. This cycle of films includes Point Blank (1967), Klute (1971), McCabe & Mrs. 
Miller (1971), The Parallax View (1974), and All the President’s Men (1976). Unlike 
Marvin Gardens, these films express a philosophical wariness of the corporation, which, 
in their narratives, amounts to a well-nigh epistemological problem. Because the 
corporation cannot be known as a person can, this creates, in these films, a new foe that 
can never be bested because it can never be fully present for a contest.
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The Parallax View: Paranoid Style and the Corporation
Alan Pakula’s so-called “paranoia trilogy” affords good traction on the problem 
of the corporation, as it can be taken as three plots striving to come to terms with 
corporate structure. Only one film in the trilogy, The Parallax View, explicitly concerns 
the corporation; all three films, nonetheless, can be deemed efforts at grasping forms of 
social organization that are prompted by the primordial inscrutability of the corporation. 
Klute, for instance, first seems to be a story actuated by the mystery of city life, but it 
soon becomes clear that city life is no more mysterious than suburban life: the mystery, it 
turns out, attaches to the corporate figure that knits together the divided city and suburbs. 
The Parallax View, as the middle term in the trilogy, is a narrative of the sheer 
inscrutability of the corporation that leads to the sheer impotence of the individual. But 
All the President’s Men offers an imaginary solution to the problem of the corporation by 
converting it into the political party, for which a kind of ultimate accountability is 
incarnated in the president. Woodward and Bernstein, that is, can trace a network of 
wrongdoing back to H.R. Haldeman and then, once in the White House, to Nixon 
himself: all plots end in the authority of the president. I call this “imaginary” because the 
idea of individual causation embodied by the president is every bit as ideological as, say, 
that of the auteur. But the ideological work carried out by the figure of the president has 
an efficacy that the corporation has historically lacked, which may be another way of 
saying that stories about American politics can end, whereas stories about the corporation 
cannot. 
If we want to treat the trilogy as a kind of equation that yields Nixon as a 
sovereign agent, we need to begin with Klute’s story of the breakdown of agency. Klute
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begins with a MacGuffin: Holly Gruneman (Betty Murray) reports to the police that her 
husband Tom (Robert Milli) is missing. In searching Tom’s desk, they find 
correspondence with New York call girl Bree Daniels (Jane Fonda). The letters found 
suggest Tom’s sexual deviance, his predatorial attraction to Bree. After the police work 
on the case for half a year, Tom’s colleague, Peter Cable (Charles Cioffi), decides to 
finance a personal investigation of the disappearance, conducted by Tom’s best friend, 
John Klute (Donald Sutherland). Tom’s disappearance, it turns out, does little more than 
motivate the plot; the film soon forgets Tom as an interest, in favor of Bree. But, 
interestingly, his disappearance motivates an essentially film noir plot about the effort to 
descry intelligibility in urban space, that of New York City, undertaken from the remote 
space of Pennsylvania suburbs. 
Film noir customarily concerned itself with the unintelligible city, with its 
individual lives disconnected by the forces of modernity into atomized units rather than 
aggregated unities. As Fredric Jameson remarks on the crime fiction of Raymond 
Chandler, “Since there is no longer any privileged experience in which the whole of the 
social structure can be grasped, a figure must be invented who can be superimposed on 
the society as a whole, whose routine and life pattern serve somehow to tie its separate 
and isolated parts together” (“On Raymond Chandler” 127). This detective figure 
functioned well for grasping the social structure in totalized form in the interwar years, 
when a Philip Marlowe or Sam Spade lived and worked among the city denizens. But in 
the postwar United States, the G.I. Bill of 1944 and the explosion of Levittowns caused a 
division in which many people now worked in the city but lived in the suburbs. The 
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mystery of the city, for this suburbanizing middle-class, now held less interest in some 
sense than that of the division between urban and suburban life.3
This change in social organization, then, induces a mutation in film noir form. 
The mystery of the city supplies little compelling mystery in itself, but the mysterious 
city, a shopworn concept by now, is being deployed on behalf of something or someone 
else, and that something or someone else accounts for the real mystery.4 Klute gestures to 
this new source of mystery when Bree asks John, “Tell me, Klute, did we get you a little, 
huh, just a little bit? Us city folk – the sin, the glitter, the wickedness?” John’s brusque 
response – “Ah, that’s pathetic” – suggests that Bree is “pathetic” for operating under this 
old understanding, this trite notion that the secret of the city seduces the ingenuous 
suburbanite. Klute resembles a fellow noir of this period, Chinatown (1974), in that the 
clichéd urban mystery serves as a convenient mystification for a set of social relations 
and actions that are perfectly known to their beneficiaries, the Noah Crosses. In other 
words, the invocation “Forget it, Jake, it’s Chinatown” doesn’t imply that, owing to the 
neighborhood’s inaccessible logic, crime can’t be fought in Chinatown, but rather that 
crime can’t be concealed without Chinatown, without the logic of its protocol to do “as 
little as possible.”
When John Klute criticizes Bree’s bluster as “pathetic,” he means that her attempt 
to impress him as a tough woman, proudly lawless and amoral, has fallen comically 
short. But he also means his adjective more literally, that pathos attends her mistaken 
sense that city life is where her kind, the self-identified lawless, are agents. He sees Bree 
as vulnerable rather than in control. And Klute, indeed, floats a version of Bree’s 
liberation (which from one angle looks like an instantiation of second-wave feminism) as 
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a form of absolute vulnerability, that of a mere body in a sensual domain. In fact, the split 
domains of city and suburb translate into the sensual and the spiritual, respectively, such 
that a commitment to the city tends to render one a mere body. And a commitment to the 
suburbs, by corollary, renders one a mere spirit.5 This works in Klute by the trope of the 
tape recorder, a device used by the killer to preserve the voices of prostitutes whom he 
will murder, unless thwarted (as in the case of Bree); the film’s first image is a tape 
recorder playing back the voices of John Klute, Peter Cable, Holly Gruneman, and her 
missing husband, Tom, with the spectral quality of their voices conjuring the remembered 
scene of a dinner party in the Gruneman suburban home. Bree’s clients, then, visit her 
when on business in the city, escaping from spectral suburban life into the corporeal life 
of the city, the erotic promise of which, vouched by Bree, is a permission to use their 
bodies in whichever imaginable way. The difference, hence, between the life of mere 
body in the city and mere spirit in the suburbs makes it “not unique,” as the police 
inspector tells Mrs. Gruneman, that “a man will lead a double life, a Jekyll-and-Hyde 
existence.”
But even if Tom’s double life makes him “not unique,” it does make him distinct 
from Bree. When police inspectors ask Klute if he knew the “subject Thomas 
Gruneman,” they mean that Tom is the “subject” of investigation. The play on the word, 
though, is apt, in that Tom can claim to be a subject because he coordinates the two 
domains of sensuality and spirituality, body and soul, where Bree cannot rise above 
object status, which is why she both works and lives in the city, the domain of sensual 
bodies. Bree is the cynosure of the film because she exhibits a breakdown in agency, 
illustrated by the fact that Bree fails as an actress but succeeds as a prostitute; in short, as 
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an actress she can’t convincingly operate herself as an object, which means that as a 
prostitute she attracts clients who wish to operate her. The real practice of agency, 
though, amounts to the hidden interest of the film, and Tom fills the place of that practice 
but cannot claim it as proper to him. He is “not unique,” in this respect, because a certain 
kind of organization authorizes his place of agency, an agency that could never be 
reducible to him.
As a placeholder, so interchangeable is Tom that, though first suspected of 
stalking Bree, it turns out to be his colleague from the Tole American Corporation, Peter 
Cable, who has perpetrated the crimes threatening Bree. The strange plot mechanism, 
then, of Peter Cable financing an investigation that would, if successful, lead to his own 
exposure – in effect financing an investigation of himself – seems to mark his confidence 
that his anonymity is so great as to render him unidentifiable. In legal terms, Cable has 
shielded his person with the juristic person of the corporation; his liability has been taken 
over as the corporation’s. When Bree tells her analyst, “What I would really like to do is 
be faceless and bodiless,” she is describing the condition of personhood the corporation 
enjoys. Her stalker, it seems, only reminds her that she is too much body, and that the 
only way to be invulnerable is to possess the immaterial body of the corporation. She has 
been stalked, in this sense, by a corporation; thus Bree’s wish to be “faceless and 
bodiless” counts as recognition that the only way to fight back, to make the contest 
winnable, is to convert herself into a commensurate being.
At the end of Klute, Peter Cable has been identified by Klute and eliminates 
himself, yet Bree still decides that she “can’t stay in the city.” Cable’s elimination, then, 
provides an incomplete resolution for Bree. Knowing Cable’s identity hardly vaporizes 
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the threat because she still can’t believe the threat was reducible to him, but rather, senses 
it be some additive to Cable’s body. If Cable’s body cannot finally be said to itself 
constitute the threat, then neither can the city, the domain of bodies. On leaving the city, 
Bree confesses to her therapist, “Maybe I’ll come back, you’ll probably see me next 
week.” For her therapist, she characterizes the problem as one of knowing: “I have no 
idea what’s going to happen.” The knowledge Bree needs, which is some kind of formula 
for becoming a subject within the network of this world-system, is not a knowledge 
occulted by the city. The sense, then, that Klute pondered a false object of knowledge 
(Bree could leave the city or return to it, both options being equal) leads to Parallax 
View, a story founded on the assumption that a threat reposes in corporate structure.
The city might atomize its residents, as it has Bree Daniels, but, in doing so, it 
does not grant agency to those lone individuals; the fact haunting those lone individuals, 
as the “paranoia trilogy” indicates, is that agency still exists somewhere, historical tides 
still turn. Not knowing how this happens occasions the “paranoid style” that makes Klute, 
The Parallax View, and All the President’s Men a trilogy rather than a group of films 
made by similar production crews (Alan Pakula, Gordon Willis, George Jenkins). The 
“paranoid style,” in Richard Hofstadter’s notorious definition, alleges “the existence of a 
vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to 
perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character” (14). Now, “conspiratorial” “acts of the 
most fiendish character” notwithstanding, we might assess this style as an effect of the 
diffusion of corporate structure, where “effective[ness]” often hinges on the “vast[ness]” 
of the “network”; the trade term for the measure of this effectiveness is economy of scale. 
The scale of agency, it turns out, is precisely what confounds understanding, and while 
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Klute might proffer the city itself as an explanatory model for agency on a large scale, the 
film does not finally believe that the city itself organizes such networks. If it did, leaving 
the city would be enough to escape the Peter Cables, but Bree’s uncertainty in the closing 
scene registers the historical novelty of her problem: that locating accountability in the 
person obscures the problem, yet using the city as a higher-order explanation of how 
people fall into interconnection is now quaint, at best describing enclave life in the late-
modern world. 
The Parallax View reformulates the problem of whether Cable acted alone or 
within some larger framework in terms of the epidemic of political assassinations in the 
1960s (JFK, Malcolm X, MLK, RFK, Fred Hampton), which, in paranoid style, gives a 
“fiendish” cast to the opposition between lone agents and corporate structure. In The 
Parallax View, agents are figured as gunmen and corporations coordinate the 
assassinations of leaders; it’s given that gunmen can’t do their work without corporate 
orchestration. If paranoid style, in Hofstadter’s account, swells into “movements” only in 
“episodic waves” (39), The Parallax View bears the paranoid style, we might say, 
because the 1960s rippled with such episodes. As noted, the assassinations of the decade 
function as the “catastrophe” likely to “elicit” paranoid explanations. Joe Frady (Warren 
Beatty), the journalist at the center of the film’s plot, explains that “people were crazy for 
any kind of explanation” because “every time you turned around some nut was knocking 
off one of the best men in the country.” However, on the film’s terms, paranoia is not 
generated by the assassinations only, but it finds Hofstadter’s other catalyst – “a 
confrontation of opposed interests which are … totally irreconcilable” (39) – in the 
irreconcilable interests of the individual and the corporation. In short, by dissipating the 
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culpability of assassins through a corporate network, the film enacts the repetition of 
assassinations paranoically not because the acts are heinous but because the full scale of 
the agency is unknown.
The Parallax View is the purest story of the paranoia trilogy because it assumes 
that the story of the corporation, if told right, will always produce a mood of paranoia. 
The film considers the corporation, in other words, the objective correlative for paranoia.6
Its plot begins with the assassination of Senator Charles Carroll (Bill Joyce) and tracks 
Joe Frady, a crusader journalist, as he tries to uncover the “wider conspiracy” that 
insistently lurks behind Carroll’s death, despite a special committee’s announcement that 
“no evidence whatsoever” supports a conspiracy and that the assassin “acted entirely 
alone.” Frady first resists conspiracy theories and accepts the committee’s version of 
events, but when seven witnesses of the Carroll assassination turn up dead over the 
course of three years, he comes to suspect the lone-gunmen line is a flimsy cover-up. 
Upon following leads, he learns of the Parallax Corporation, a firm in the business of 
recruiting assassins. Posing as a would-be assassin, Frady attempts to infiltrate the 
corporation. A client of Parallax, the Manufacturer’s Intelligence Group, contracts 
Grady’s services but, on his first assignment, Parallax frames Frady rather than utilize 
him and then kills him. The film concludes with the findings of another special 
committee, which sound as rote echoes of the earlier committee’s reports: Frady acted 
alone, “no evidence” to the contrary. For a story focused on the corporation, we have 
seen very little of it – only a surface whose opacity renders an innocent of a stock figure 
for knowledge, the maverick journalist.7
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When Frady visits Senator Carroll’s former advisor in hiding, Austin Tucker 
(William Daniels), Tucker rebukes Frady for his hubristic ignorance. “Fellow, you don’t 
know what this story means,” Tucker warns. The condition of beholding the corporation, 
says Frady’s experience, is the condition of not knowing. This cause one to wonder: Had 
the corporation become epistemologically more intractable in the 1960s than it had been 
earlier in the century? Had the story of the corporation once yielded meaning that it now 
withheld? The debate instigated by the creation of the legal subject of the corporation – in 
Machen’s words that of “corporate personality” – had always tested the limits of thought. 
Walter Benn Michaels gave a formative account of this debate in the context of 
naturalism, that is, at a moment in industrialization when people had been reduced to 
things in the snare of natural and social forces. Referring to Machen, Michaels says that 
“his claim that corporations are ‘entities’ appears now as simply a version of the more 
fundamental naturalist claim that ‘persons’ too are really entities and hence that natural 
persons are as fictitious as corporate ones” (202). In this moment, the corporation 
provides a rehabilitated model of subjectivity in that “the transformation of thing into 
person involves, as it were, the addition of a certain immateriality” (204) and the 
corporation isn’t reducible to its materiality; it “cannot be reduced to the thing it is made 
of,” as Michaels puts it, “and still remain the thing it is” (21). Corporate personhood, 
then, recapitulates subjectivity on the order of the Cartesian doctrine of two substances, 
with the split between materiality and ideality needing a figural union.
We might say the split reemerges, as I suggest, when the country historically 
splits into cities and suburbs. At this point, the corporate figure, known for uniting these 
two geographies, reintroduces a kind of mystery because his anonymity, taken as a form 
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of subjectivity, is so unlike the rugged individualism of the recently favored agrarian 
form of subjectivity. The loss of ruggedness, of cowboy self-distinction, means the loss 
of identity, such that corporate figures look like automatons, rationalized managers. 
Concerning The Parallax View, we can take the shot of the special committee as the 
canonical image of this facelessness. The shot begins as a rectangle hovering in the 
middle of a dark widescreen frame, and within the rectangle the seven men of the 
committee sit behind a bench, all of them but the speaker as mute as figures in the 
Parthenon frieze. As the camera zooms in until the rectangle occupies the frame, the 
men’s stony countenances, staring inexpressively at the viewer, look simply like 
variations on establishment men: all aging white males, conspicuously interchangeable. 
With the closing shot of the special committee, the men disappear upon stating their 
findings; the film thus sums up the anonymity of the establishment. 
   What we must bear in mind is that this anonymity, the stigmatized “organization 
man,” is the residue of a form of corporate management that the 1960s is displacing. As 
Thomas Frank puts it, William H. Whyte’s The Organization Man was above all a 
critique of a style of management, “a sweeping study of American business and its 
problems” (21). As eminent business historian Alfred Chandler remarks, the 1960s saw 
changes in “basic institutional arrangements” of the corporation that mark “a new era of 
managerial capitalism” (606, 621). The firm itself begins to subdivide in ways that make 
for a more complicated structure of greater “scope,” to use Chandler’s word. And, while 
John Kenneth Galbraith claims that it “takes an effort of mind to grasp” the mechanics of 
“group decision-making” and how deeply they “extend[] into the business enterprise” 
(68), this effort of mind had to be redoubled in order to assess that “group decision-
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making,” that plural agency, across the “new markets” firms could exploit in the absence 
of the historical trauma of depressions and world wars; across the “separation of top 
management in the corporate office from middle management in the operating divisions”; 
and amidst the “extensive and continuing divestiture of operating units” and the “buying 
and selling of corporations as a distinct business in its own right” (621). Attending this 
radical change in corporate structure is the radical change in management theory that 
Frank documents. 
By 1974, then, we can say that not only is the story of the corporation more 
bewildering and, owing to its obscure historical agency, being told in a paranoid key; the 
story of managerial style is now told in the mode of caricature, with lone gunmen 
claiming agency vis-à-vis anonymous corporate cogs. The Parallax View simply 
imagines a scenario in which corporations authorize lone gunmen in order to offer a 
figure of accountability to a baffled public. Likewise, All the President’s Men posits 
Nixon as sovereign agent, a figure of final account. Auteurism must be understood as a 
mild rendition of the same scenario. Corporate Hollywood instrumentalized the auteur, 
that is, in the same fashion as The Parallax View sees corporations using lone gunmen.8
Indeed, Jon Lewis explains Paramount’s creation of the Director’s Company (Francis 
Ford Coppola, Peter Bogdanovich, William Friedkin) in the very terms of 
instrumentality, observing that while the company “seemed to perpetuate a growing 
acceptance of the auteur theory in Hollywood,” Paramount instead meant it as a 
“recontextualization of auteurism within the studio superstructure” (16 emphasis 
original).
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Point Blank, Sensationalized Bodies, and Violent Panoramas
In his study Medium Cool, when Ethan Mordden notes that a “cult of admirers 
regards [Point Blank] as one of the most typical of sixties films” and that Lee Marvin as 
Walker “is our sixties archetype,” he explains that the decade is thus signaled not by the 
fact that the film’s violence is raw, but by the fact that, as viewers, “we have to see, hear, 
and watch” its violence (70 emphasis original); that it must not be suggested, but must 
register on our sensorium. Paul Monaco similarly asserts that the essence of 1960s 
Hollywood is a shift from the “cinema of sentiment” (from the late 1920s through the 
1950s) to a “cinema of sensation.” Formerly encouraged to feel with their emotions, 
viewers were now encouraged to feel with their bodies. Of course, it’s not only the 
viewer’s body undergoing a new experience in Hollywood cinema, but the bodies 
onscreen: from the textural quality of the excessive gun-down of Bonnie and Clyde, to 
the balletic massacre that closes The Wild Bunch (1969), to the gory tollbooth murder of 
Sonny Coreleone in The Godfather (1972).
While critics have proposed a variety of film-historical explanations for the rise of 
sensational violence, I want to suggest that this reduction to the body expresses a 
philosophical kinship with the torpid objecthood we see in The Graduate. In other words, 
subjects talk with language, while objects talk with violence. Mordden intimates that 
violence will be the expected option when facing an adversary like the corporation, 
whose scale outstrips conventional showdowns. “When you deal with … ‘the 
organization’,” he says, “violence is like breathing: necessary” (69). It’s of course easy to 
see the logic of his assertion if we consider that subjects who once flexed power have 
been shorn of it under a new regime of subjectivity. The cowboys, lone heroes, and tough 
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guys of whom Lee Marvin counts as an éminence grise, called on violence only as a last 
resort; this was their code. Reduced to objects in films like Point Blank, violence 
becomes their default language because no other resorts exist.
Point Blank’s structure is homologous to Klute’s – a split between body and soul; 
the dual form that Walter Benn Michaels argues gives the corporation its curious status. 
In Point Blank, the split is acted out by Walker and Yost (Keenan Wynn), the former a 
brute body and the latter a guiding spirit. In an early scene, the two men talk on board a 
tour boat to Alcatraz. A voice on the P.A. system dins behind Walker and Yost’s 
conversation, chronicling the failed escapes made by inmates throughout the history of 
Alcatraz. The scene had begun, of course, with footage of Walker escaping the island, a 
fact unknown in the prison’s lore. Having been shot by his partner, Mal Reese (John 
Vernon), in a heist and left for dead in a prison cell, Walker is depicted making his way 
from the cell to the craggy shores, with hurt, animal purpose; the shot sequence is 
remarkable for the sometimes montage way in which it renders the prison’s security 
measures – chain-link fencing, watch towers, thickets of barbed wire – as a landscape of 
sensations, all threats to the body. And in the last shot before we cut to the meeting 
between Walker and Yost, Walker trudges over the rocks to the rough waters of the bay, 
his movements so emphatically languorous yet inexorable that his body recalls the great 
movie monsters. We cut to the tour boat, then, with Walker, now in a gray suit, staring at 
bay waters that prompt memories of his escape, shown in the film form of intercut images 
of Walker now swimming against, now bobbing on the current. The next shot depicts 
Walker isolated at the boat’s stern, then, following the intercut image of Walker 
swimming the bay, another shot depicts him alone but then, with an abrupt cut that is not 
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a jump cut but still startles, joined by Yost, who asks, “How did you make it, Walker?” 
Walker only stares mutely in response. We should interpret his mute response not as a 
man being conversationally aloof, but as a man listening to his own voice. The odd 
quality of dialogue between Walker and Yost, with Walker often turning his back to the 
speaking Yost, suggests that Yost’s voice and Walker’s body form a duality, their actual 
figures being the certain quotient of physicality or intellect shaken out from the whole. 
As such, within Point Blank’s revenge scenario, they have different desires: “You want 
Reese, and I want the organization,” Yost states.
The difference between wanting Reese and wanting the organization is a 
difference in thinking accounts can be settled on a person-to-person basis and thinking 
accounts have been socialized to an extent that persons are made anachronistic. The 
primacy of individual persons had not been recently made anachronistic, as studies such 
as William Roy’s show, in that corporate structure, as dominant site of agency, emerged 
from the “milestone” creation of the U.S. Steel Corporation as the social structure, and 
this occurred in the first year of the twentieth century (3-4). Why the “transformation
from one way of life to another, from a society based on rural, agrarian, local, small-
scale, individual relations to one based on urban, industrial, national, large-scale, and 
organizational relations” (3) should persistently surface as raw material for narratives in 
the 1960s, and not in the 1940s, can be understood on the principle of longue durée 
worked out in Fernand Braudel’s analysis.9 In Point Blank, it matters little that statistical 
data might explain why the emergent situation looked different from the current dominant 
situation; it matters only that accounts can no longer be settled by the old code of honor 
governing the use of violence. Walker stands as “our sixties archetype,” then, because he 
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cannot redress wrongs honorably, and thus his turn to violence is archetypal of the 
changed stress in the passage from Civil Rights to Black Power, or SDS to the Weather 
Underground, the stress falling now on violent means rather political ones.
While the thinking half of the Walker-Yost duality asserts Reese as Walker’s 
target, Walker’s actions do not seem so decisively geared to any single object. After all, 
he kills Reed just over halfway through the film, and yet his assignment continues. In 
part, we can explain his need to continue as honoring his commitment to Yost, who wants 
the organization, not simply Reese. The mantra-like prescription for possessing the 
organization is the purging of “Carter, Brewster, Fairfax.” But we should also remember 
that Walker’s motives are described alternately as revenge and restitution. He claims to 
want his $93,000, and Reese just happens to be the one who stole it. But even Carter 
(Carroll O’Connor), when confronted by Walker in one of the film’s more frank scenes, 
doubts the money is Walker’s real object. “You threaten a financial structure like this for 
$93,000,” Carter questions. “Now, Walker, I don’t believe you. What do you really 
want?” Walker responds sheepishly that he, in fact, wants his money, but a certain 
conviction drains from his voice. The change in Walker’s delivery, from assured to 
nonplussed, suggests his dawning understanding of the dimensions of his foe. When 
Reese said that he put the $93,000 “all into the organization” and that “no one man” had 
it, Walker countered, “If you go high enough, there’s always one man.” Only as Brewster 
lectures Walker do we see that Walker’s hunt has been motivated by the loss of that “one 
man” as an object for righteous anger. “Let me tell you something about corporations,” 
Brewster begins, “This is a corporation and I’m an officer in it. We deal in millions; we 
never see cash. I’ve got about $11 in my pocket.” The unintelligibility of his foe, on this 
143
account, derives from the fact that the larger whole does not even appear to be built of the 
same substance as the individual units; the individual men – Reese, Carter, Brewster, 
Fairfax – do not then make the corporation. Money in its material form, cash, does not 
make the financial structure as men in their material form, bodies, do not make the 
organization. When Walker, now befuddled, says that “somebody’s got to pay,” he 
registers his new ambivalence by straddling the line between revenge (against persons) 
and restitution (of money), as if to deconstruct the project of righteousness.
Point Blank’s final scene reveals that money was not the object of Walker’s quest. 
But the scene functions as a “reveal” in a more technical sense. Brewster, agreeing to 
help Walker get his money, returns with him to Alcatraz, the site of Walker’s first heist. 
There Brewster is killed by a gun hired by Fairfax, the last man in the triad. As Fairfax 
steps into the light, he is revealed to be Yost, the spirit guide to Walker. He tells Walker 
their deal is done, shouting “come and get your money then!” Walker disappears then, 
leaving the money to Fairfax/Yost as the trace of Walker’s disillusioned recognition that 
the corporation cannot be killed, only its officers. Walker finally understands that their 
duality was made of unequal parts, and he was only doing the bidding for a corporation 
of which he was the dupe. The corporation only needed to look like Walker; it had, in 
truth, deployed his image of tough lawlessness in order to reinstitute its own law.
Yet it would somehow miss the point to say Point Blank is a film about 
businessmen co-opting the maverick’s image, or that it’s about heroism in the absence of 
noble quests. Point Blank no doubt requires these social conditions to recognize itself, but 
we should note that these only amount to the conditions for the film’s artistic statement. 
Point Blank participates in a movement of films that take the desperate turn to violence as 
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a new subject, a new palette of imagery, for film art. Like Bonnie and Clyde, it arrived 
prior to the MPAA’s institution of the new Code and Rating Administration in late 1968. 
It emerged in the gap, that is, between the Production Code and the ratings system. And 
this emergence of violence as an artistic subject attested to a recognition on Hollywood’s 
part that renewed social relevance could come from converting a mood of desperation 
into something that looked like art, at least as foreign cinemas had conceived of film as
art. John Boorman remarks that the example of the French New Wave, Antonioni, and 
Fellini led to an “explosiveness” in the Hollywood filmmaking of that period, one that 
particularly encouraged exploration of the medium. “To me,” Boorman claims, 
“composition was terribly important.” And the event of anamorphic widescreen gave 
filmmakers a new shape for composition. Point Blank, then, begins to paint the panorama 
of violence that finds its climactic expression, its stylized and sensationalized peak, in 
The Wild Bunch; it begins this project, crucially, by explicitly linking failed heroism’s 
recourse to violence and the transpersonal structure of the corporation.
McCabe & Mrs. Miller, Naturalist History, and the Status of the Entrepreneur
McCabe & Mrs. Miller is still another variation on the theme of the individual and 
the corporation, but it substitutes a style of naturalism for sensationalism because, we 
might suppose, the naturalistic tones better evoke a historical past than the stylized ones 
of Point Blank, suited best for the contemporary moment.10 While McCabe & Mrs. Miller
adopts its naturalistic look for the sake of historical inquiry, it is nonetheless saturated 
with contemporary themes. Its assimilation of sensational violence – seen, for example, 
when a gunshot leaves Pastor Eliot’s hand dangling from its sinews – reflects the film’s 
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tendency to signal the contemporary dimension of its historical story. Its historical 
moment, turn-of-the-century America, just supplies the matrix for a set of economic 
relations that the film seeks to critique in their present, developed form. As Robert 
Altman’s M*A*S*H (1970) so obviously resonated with concerns about Vietnam, the 
story of John McCabe (Warren Beatty), building a town with entrepreneurial gall and 
know-how just to have it usurped by a corporation with only money and muscle, 
functions as a prism for understanding both the Hollywood subordination of filmmaking 
skill to conglomerate might and the corporate restructuration of the American workforce 
writ large.
John McCabe arrives on horseback in the mining town of Presbyterian Church. 
Upon entering Patrick Sheehan’s saloon, a dark and gloomy interior marking little 
improvement on the rainy exterior, McCabe immediately starts a card game. He brings 
his own blanket and, spreading it on a table, instantly converts the dank backroom into a 
more convivial casino. Shortly, McCabe enacts the same kind of conversion on the whole 
town, hiring men to construct a complex of casino, whorehouse, and bathhouse that 
serves as a leisure locus that transforms the town of miners into a fast community. The 
transformational logic of McCabe’s rapidly developed entertainment complex stands, of 
course, in telling contrast to the town’s perpetually under-construction church; by 
inference, the town, stitched together as a community in its secular pursuits, emerges 
from the darkness of its religious bondage. This is modernity’s civilizing call, and it also 
functioned as the Hollywood ethos that suffused a nation with community feeling.11
It’s appropriate, then, that McCabe & Mrs. Miller is a Western, for that was the 
genre to elaborate the myth of the American civilizing process. And the civilizing process 
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occurred under the auspices of a rugged individual, the cowboy figure whose nature was 
dual. As John Belton puts it, this figure “not only occup[ies] the frontier but also 
embod[ies] it” (210); the figure should express, that is, nature and culture, Eastern reason 
and Western vigor, body and spirit. In this respect, John McCabe very much recapitulates 
the split between Walker and Yost, with the strength of Walker as forerunner to the savvy 
of Yost. McCabe’s reputation as a gunfighter serves to legitimate him, in the minds of the 
townspeople, as a businessman. When Sheehan asks McCabe about his identity, “’Pudgy’ 
McCabe,” he asks, “the gunfighter,” McCabe insists, “businessman, businessman.” But 
of course the establishment of the latter depends on the tacit authority of the former.
But if McCabe has the authority to start a business via his image as a gunfighter, 
he draws the content of his business from his life practices. In short, he knows the 
business of casinos and whorehouses because he himself has long gambled and visited 
whores; when McCabe identifies himself as a “businessman,” a fellow card player 
remarks of McCabe’s losing hand, “Business ain’t so good, is it?” His business is 
continuous with his life, and thus his experience is organic. And the woman of the title, 
Mrs. Miller (Julie Christie), filling the traditional part of the domestic additive in the 
civilizing operations,12 knows how to run a whorehouse with “class girls, clean linen, and 
proper hygiene” because she herself is a whore. McCabe has Mrs. Miller at his side, as a 
partner and perhaps more, because his experience, skills, and business practices form a 
closed circuit. “It’s just my luck the only woman that’s ever been one to me ain’t nothing 
but a whore,” McCabe admits, “but what the hell, I never was a percentage man, I 
suppose a whore is the only kind of woman I’d know.”
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The logic of this closed circuit means that one doesn’t need to be “a percentage 
man” to know what kind of business McCabe will start: knowing his personality is 
identical to knowing his business. Indeed, McCabe and Mrs. Miller, by dint of their 
expertise, build “the fanciest whorehouse in the whole territory.” But once built, it 
attracts the attention of “big businessmen” Harrison-Shaughnessy Mining Company, who 
want to buy out McCabe as they have Patrick Sheehan. When McCabe consults a lawyer 
about legal protections from the corporation, the lawyer speechifies that “this free 
enterprise system of ours works” and “working within it we can protect the small 
businessmen and the big businessmen as well.” Of course, the lawyer, the aspirant “next 
senator from the state of Washington,” offers no legal mechanism by which McCabe can 
be protected from the corporation, only an ideological one. McCabe, he claims, doesn’t 
“need the Marshal”: when they “get this thing in the paper and in the courts” the 
corporation “can’t afford to kill” McCabe because “they have stockholders” who they 
don’t want “thinking [the] management isn’t imbued with all the principles of fair play 
and justice, the very values that make this country what it is today.” The lawyer’s account 
of the public’s ideological investment in the “small businessmen,” the entrepreneurs that 
count as ostensibly national “values,” provides an unconvincing defense for McCabe, not 
simply because McCabe is ultimately killed by the corporation, but because this naïve 
defense assumes that the public’s ideological beliefs are consistent with their real 
practices. The company can very easily “afford” to kill McCabe because they profit from 
his death, as do their stockholders.
However much they profit in the near-term, though, the question of whether they 
can “afford” to kill McCabe may in the long-term be more a managerial question than an 
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ideological one. After all, McCabe knew how to profitably run the business; Harrison-
Shaughnessy, being a mining company, likely does not. While their property acquisition 
raises the old specter of company towns, it also resembles the new specter of diversified 
corporations, specifically the conglomerates that had come to dominate Hollywood. In 
this sense, the one piece of legislation to which the lawyer alludes – anti-trust legislation 
(“Busting up these trusts and monopolies,” he tells McCabe, “is at the very root of the 
problem of creating a just society”) – is precisely irrelevant to the small enterprise. 
Indeed, the Paramount decree of 1948 ended the monopoly studios exercised over 
production, distribution, and exhibition, but it led to an era of even bigger enterprise, that 
of the conglomerates. What the takeover of Hollywood at the hands of the conglomerates 
generated, as it were, was a problem of management, in that corporations such as Gulf + 
Western “had no prior experience or financial interest in the movie industry” (Monaco 
31). The problem, as Galbraith ventures as a thesis in The New Industrial State, is that a 
rift continues to spread in corporations between ownership and management; the two, 
once coupled, have been severed and express increasingly little relationship. Early in the 
century, as Galbraith says, “the corporation was the instrument of its owners and a 
projection of their personalities”; but “the men who now run the large corporations own 
no appreciable share of the enterprise” (2).
The problem, by Galbraith’s light, does not belong to Hollywood alone in the 
1960s, but to the whole of American culture. C. Wright Mills had seized on the historical 
fact that ownership and control were no longer united in his 1951 study White Collar, 
advancing it as an explanation of failed politics and lost subjectivity. Mills thinks of 
political involvement as Jeffersonian, and considers the first integer of such involvement 
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to be made in the style that McCabe makes his way. In the chapter “The World of the 
Small Entrepreneur,” he describes the entrepreneur’s access to politics: “he owned the 
sphere of his own work, and because he owned it, he was independent” (9). This is 
consonant with the Jeffersonian tenets that “Who would govern himself must own his 
own soul. To own his own soul he must own property, the means of economic security” 
(9).13 To the extent, then, that “working skills” were no longer “performed” “upon one’s 
property,” as increasingly became the case throughout the century, the “economic 
authority” that stood in as “political authority” was increasingly tendered to the large-
scale ownership of property (9-10). To Mills, the “new middle class” is marked by this 
discontinuity between the work they perform and the property they own, such that the 
“transformation of property” (what William Roy would call its “socialization” through 
corporate ownership) means workers “cannot realize” themselves in their work, “for 
work is now a set of skills sold to another” (14). When the “white-collar man” displaces 
the rugged individual, he does so not triumphantly, but as a “victim”: he is the “small 
creature who is acted upon but who does not act” (xii). Thus Whyte’s “organization man” 
and Mills’s “white-collar man” – the living proof that “the centralization of property has 
shifted the basis of economic security from property ownership to job holding” and thus 
eroded the “political power” of individualism (58) – remember the McCabes all the more 
piquantly. As Mills describes postwar America, “the old independent entrepreneur lives 
on a small island in a big new world,” which requires that “as an ideological figment and 
a political force he has persisted as if he inhabited an entire continent” (34).
When McCabe is stalked by the corporation’s three bounty hunters, he is 
threatened by men that “don’t make deals” but work on behalf of Harrison-Shaughnessy 
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only “when they can’t make deals.” Their threat is impossible to defuse because it is a 
specialized function: they act as the muscle of the corporation, but have no connection to 
the brain. These men of course kill McCabe, but he kills them as well in the process. The 
deaths, though, can hardly be considered commensurate, as McCabe’s death counts as the 
death of a whole system of politics, that of economic individualism, whereas the bounty 
hunters die the death of strict replaceability. In the closing scenes, a dying McCabe 
struggles through a snowed-over landscape, eventually halting and freezing in place, like 
a monument for the townspeople, a “political force” preserved as an afterimage while the 
economic order of which he was a vital part decays.14
BBS Productions, Management Style, and Mavericks of Capital
The films expressing suspicion of the corporation carry the emotional charge they 
do, at least partially, because they are told from the standpoint of those outside the 
corporation. Their protagonists are “the small creature[s] who [are] acted upon but who 
[do] not act” (Mills xii); in short, they are objects experiencing a relationship with the 
subject of the corporation. They are objects, to recall Mills in his Marxian mode, because 
they do not own the “sphere” of their “own work”; they simply sell their “work skills” to 
an owner, who increasingly cannot be identified as a person, not concretely at least. This 
describes the condition of reification, an epiphenomenon of a pervasive system of 
exchange values, for which Georg Lukács gave the classic account in his essay 
“Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.” The struggle waged by Lukács is 
one of theorizing the implacable reifying forces of commodity-structure, capable of 
reducing all to objecthood, while at the same time imagining means by which people qua
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objects could “comprehend” and “rebel against” these forces and thereby return 
themselves to people qua subjects. The resulting “subject-object” was thought, in Marxist 
forecasts, to be the future claim of the proletariat.
Now, Lukács needed to give a certain cast to capitalism, I would argue, in order to 
say that only the proletariat could supply this revolutionary impetus. He needed, 
specifically, to characterize it as “irrational” in its totality but so compulsively 
rationalized in its parts that its functions are rigid, inflexible, and unaccommodating of 
integral humanity. Namely, Lukács needed Taylorism as the pure expression of labor 
under capitalism. Taylorism issued from that breakdown of the world in which “partial 
functions” were made “autonomous” from each other, in which they evolved their own 
perfectible inner logics; this should be the expected mode, as Adorno and Horkheimer 
note, when life is conducted by the canon of numbers.15 On an order where “science” is 
unmoored from “its vision of the whole” (104), then, one can imagine management as 
“scientific management”; people’s movements can, by such science, be engineered as so 
many machine parts working together, if one represses a broader understanding of the 
brain that coordinates these movements. Of course, this style of management, known in 
revised form as “Theory X,”16 is only deemed effective by a certain philosophical 
mindset, one that Lukács himself might have called the “vantage point” of “reified 
consciousness” (104).
I argue that in these films we view the corporation from the standpoint of “reified 
consciousness,” that the corporation becomes an epistemological problem precisely 
when, during the encounter between “reified consciousness” and corporate structure, the 
latter appears as “a formally closed system of partial laws” to the former (104). 
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Epistemological questions, in this interrogation, do not penetrate their “material 
substratum” and thus produce no “overall knowledge” (109). Given that “reified 
consciousness,” the very reconfiguration of subjectivity under commodity-structure, 
views the world as populated by a like kind – a world of nature morte as Adorno called it 
(“Looking Back on Surrealism” 89) – it is difficult to understand the corporation, a site of 
living agency, as something other than a system of dead objects, or army of automatons, 
the decision-making center of which lies always out of sight. If we take BBS Productions, 
in counterpoint, as the vantage from which to view the corporation, we gain an 
understanding of the corporation from within, as a kind of structure that begins to look 
ontologically distinct from that of the commodity.
When McCabe repudiates partnership in favor of “hav[ing] things [his] own way” 
– “Deals I don’t mind, it’s partners I don’t like,” he tells Sheehan – he cuts himself off 
from the historical drift of economic life. The story of BBS Productions (the movie 
version of which, I will claim, is Marvin Gardens) is one of enfranchising oneself with, 
perhaps even becoming a pioneer of, the economic life of the period. As mentioned, the 
company formed on what appeared, afterward, to be a kind of sage business insight on 
the part of its co-founder, Bert Schneider. This insight amounted to trusting that partner 
Bob Rafelson, and his friend Jack Nicholson, had the sense to ferret out worthwhile 
properties. Schneider, on no further calculation, wrote a personal check to Dennis Hopper 
for $40,000 and Hopper’s band of friends went with cameras to shoot their drug odyssey 
at Mardi Gras. Schneider’s investment in their self-documented revelry became Easy 
Rider. Yet, even if this act can look like capitalism by being assimilated to the brazen of 
capitalist risk-taking, it will still be hard to recognize in the BBS office space at 933 La 
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Brea anything like Lukács’s description of the “rigid and immobile face” that the 
“ceaselessly revolutionary techniques of modern production” turn “towards the individual 
producer” (97). Patrick McGilligan describes offices “decorated with European film 
posters, posters of the 1968 student riots in France, a Peter Max mural” (201). The 
building, as Peter Biskind says, “became a hangout for a rag-tag band of filmmakers and 
radicals of various stripes” (76). Timothy Leary, Abbey Hoffman, and Huey Newton 
were all known to drop by the offices. “A noted Jungian psychiatrist would regularly visit 
BBS,” McGilligan writes, and “a dope courier would also make the rounds for those who 
needed a stash” (201). If reification in the monstrous guise of Taylorism should be taken 
as the norm for capitalist labor, of what kind of economic life did BBS imagine itself to 
be part?
One might object, on Lukács’s behalf, that reification does not begin and end at 
the workplace, but that the workplace, being the site for labor power’s exchange, is only a 
localized experience of the phenomenon. Lukács stipulates, after all, that “the problem of 
commodities” must be regarded as “the central, structural problem of capitalist society in 
all its aspects” (83). Even if one’s labor power is seemingly allowed to comprise the 
integral person, as the atmosphere at BBS seemed to encourage, the sale of that labor still 
occurs on a market of commodities, all of them gutted of their integrity in order to take 
their place as exchange values. I will address this objection shortly. One might, as well, 
object that the work practices at BBS were strictly anomalous, that theirs were peculiar to 
the trendy progressivism of California culture in general and the movie business in 
particular; further, their work practices, one might argue, reflected the values of the 
evanescing spirit of the 1960s, and these values explicitly attached to a counter, not 
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mainstream, culture. The inner workings of BBS, thus, are hardly representative of the 
American corporation from within. I will address these objections forthwith, because they 
seem to be less substantial objections than the first.
BBS prided itself, of course, on unconventional methods, with Schneider offering 
points to most everyone involved in Easy Rider and flattening the hierarchy of the 
company so that its employees participated, as Henry Jaglom said, in “a sensibility that 
nobody was supposed to exploit anybody else, we were all supposed to be sharing, 
working collectively” (Biskind 77). The unconventional, however, was called upon by 
BBS with the rather conventional effect, in managerial terms, of making employees feel 
vested in their work, making their productivity a matter of inner conviction instead of 
outer compulsion. 
Thomas Frank’s study of business culture in the 1960s, The Conquest of Cool, 
suggests that management style at the time was more susceptible to the lessons of the 
counterculture than suspicious of them. “American business,” Frank writes, “imagined 
the counterculture not as an enemy to be undermined or a threat to consumer culture, but 
as a hopeful sign, a symbolic ally in their own struggles against the mountains of dead-
weight procedure and hierarchy that had accumulated over the years” (9). Ignoring 
standard accounts of a divide between counter and business culture, Frank turns to the 
industries of menswear and advertising to show how the former helped revitalize the 
latter. These industries, as management books of the era indicate, were only among the 
bellwether industries for radicalized corporate practices. 
Douglas McGregor stands astride the management theory of the moment, being 
both the author of epochal book, The Human Side of Enterprise (1960), and a consultant 
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for very conventional firms that radicalized their practices at his behest.17 McGregor’s 
book divides all organization management into two schemes, Theory X (“the Taylorist 
‘traditional view’, according to which workers must be ‘coerced’, supervised, and 
‘directed’ by a hierarchy of power” [Frank 22]) and Theory Y (“a more sophisticated 
approach according to which workers’ ingenuity is recognized, and they are motivated by 
progress toward an objective rather than fear of punishment” [ibid]). Recasting BBS in 
this light, we can say they simply modeled “Theory Y” management and, far from being 
out of step with business culture beyond Hollywood and California, participated in the 
“‘permanent revolution’ of capitalism itself” by replacing a rotting core of “hierarchy and 
efficiency” with “individualism and creativity” (Frank 88, 25).
Neither does this management style stand out as a historical curio of the 1960s. In 
his essay “Corporate Pleasures for a Corporate Planet,” Christopher Newfield surveys the 
management literature on the “new economy” of the 1990s, so much of which merely 
extends those insights of the 1960s; as Frank, too, describes the “bloated corpus” of 
today’s management theory as “one long tribute to McGregor’s thought, an interminable 
string of corollaries to ‘Theory Y’” (22). A “fundamental component” of “life on the 
corporate inside,” Newfield declares, is a transformation of “work into pleasure” (31). 
Citing Tom Peters’s Liberation Management, a book “announcing the market death of 
tyrannical bureaucracy,” Newfield notes how insistently Peters offers the pursuit of 
“unending personal liberation and business fun” as the engine within this “new economic 
order” (33). It seems unlikely that Tom Peters’s version of corporate capitalism would 
advocate support for its trenchant opponents, such as Huey Newton, but it seems quite 
likely that Peters would recognize the management style at BBS as belonging to his 
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economic life. The lineaments of recent corporate capitalism still resemble, then, in most 
important features, those of an innovated management of the 1960s, predicated on the 
axiom that capitalism takes health from the seizure of its other, its outside, the case of 
Huey Newton being only an extreme form of this.
Now, if the business style of BBS was not eccentric but rather an augur of 
corporate endeavor in a post-Fordist economy – in contrast, for example, to Coppola’s 
endeavor with Hollywood General,18 an odd return to Fordism – we need to reconsider 
how reification operates, and if it indeed objectifies in a way that prepares a uniquely 
“proletarian truth,” as Jameson summarizes Lukács.19 If the Lukácsian objection that 
reification does not somehow confine itself to the workplace but has penetrated every 
reach of capitalist society, because commodity-structure is in fact general, then it might 
mean that transforming work into pleasure, making the worker feel integral to his 
product, does nothing but mystify the ruthless equivalency of everything (even the 
content of a given worker’s singular life-experience) within that structure. If we grant 
this, however, and concede that the workplace can dissimulate as a pleasure space 
without dissolving the reified sheen of life, we are left to wonder why the proletariat 
alone could emerge as this “identical subject-object” (149)? Why not, for instance, the 
“new middle class” who, as Mills claims, no longer own the sphere of their work? By 
way of explanation, I wish to place Lukács’s voice within this epistemological discourse 
that resolutely evacuates all sites governed by commodity-structure of the prerogatives of 
knowledge and action. Lukács, accordingly, gives a tendentious account of the 
proletarian subject-object because only if this class achieves such status, on Marx’s 
reckoning, can capitalism be overcome. “Classical philosophy,” according to Lukács, 
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“finds itself historically in the paradoxical position that it was concerned to find a 
philosophy that would mean the end of bourgeois society” (148). To the degree that any 
epistemology leaves bourgeois society standing, one would have to judge it 
philosophically incomplete, leaving it a marker of thought’s limits.
I certainly don’t mean to suggest that the problem of the identical subject-object, 
looked at from within BBS, is materially resolved. But I do want to advance two 
associated claims. I want to claim that auteurism concerns a version of this debate and 
offers, in the context of corporate structure, an elegant, if sophistical, answer to what 
might be called an internal limitation of capital, namely its structurally uneven 
distribution of agency. I want, then, to claim that the “class point of view”20 to gain 
consciousness of reification’s pernicious effects turns out to be the “point of view” of the 
corporation, not a traditional class at all but a collectivized structure nonetheless; and its 
repurposing and redeployment of nonreified labor practices, at least as appearances, in 
the form of auteurism, and what Christoper Newfield will elsewhere call “Emersonian 
corporate individualism,” softens the transition from the egregious reification of Fordism 
to that of flexible accumulation.
Before looking at Marvin Gardens as both the story of BBS and a demystified 
account of auteurism, we should look at Head (1968), the first Raybert production and 
Rafelson and Schneider’s first effort in filmmaking. Head tells the story of the Monkees, 
the fictive band Rafelson and Schneider converted into a hit television show. Far from 
being a box-office cash-in on its television popularity, Head is a confession of 
participation in reified life. The film thoroughly deconstructs the Monkees, their 
fabricated nature, and, by plugging them into a sequence of genre films (war, Western, 
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boxing pictures), it strives to deconstruct the fabricated nature of the entertainment 
complex’s representations tout court. A hare-tempo jingle denouncing the band, sung by 
the band itself, plays over five columns of television screens: “You say we’re 
manufactured, to that we’ll all agree,” chirps Davey Jones, now joined by the others in 
chorus, “Hey, hey, we are the Monkees, we’ve said it all before, the money’s in, we’re 
made of tin, we’re here to give you more.” All the while, the television screens fill with 
images, the final one being the traumatic execution of a Viet Cong guerilla, made famous 
by the Eddie Adams photograph. This icon of war violence, then, overtakes every screen 
of the five columns, and is punctuated by a woman’s scream; as this scream swallows the 
whole frame, we see a young female fan, screaming in the audience of a Monkees 
concert. Disavowing the “Prefab Four,” a corporate image masquerading as a rock band, 
was a precondition for forming BBS Productions, a firm so maverick that, as their first 
commercial project, they undid the barriers that kept the commerce of pop culture 
uncontaminated by the politics of imperialism: they placed a critique of pop culture’s 
complicity with the war, that is, on the market alongside all the other guileless 
commercial artifacts. 
That the Monkees were produced as objects by certain corporate procedures is no 
more interesting than their reception as objects by certain contemplative procedures. We 
know the band is manufactured because the jingle’s lyrics confess it, and this receives 
overt depiction in the scenes of the Monkees in a factory, guided by a plant manager who 
expounds the industrial sophistication of the factory in which, we later see, the Monkees 
were made by assembly-line methods. The sophisticated methods are geared, the plant 
manager says, to “a new world whose only preoccupation will be how to amuse itself.” 
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The manager then steers them into a room and, upon forcefully shutting the door, the 
Monkees find themselves in a black box of a room. In this black box, they perform a silly 
part for an advertisement; Davy Jones is dropped into his individual black box to perform 
a dance routine. They execute amusements, in other words, in a space partitioned from 
the military executions of Viet Cong guerillas. The object lesson, here, is that the 
rationalized workplace contributes to reification in the same measure as does the 
habituation of reified consumption; in both the interconnection between corporate 
amusements and imperial maneuvers is suppressed. The black box is the image of 
reification. Lukács summons a matching image of reification from Fichte, who describes 
“the absolute projection of an object the origin of which no account can be given with the 
result that the space between projection and thing projected is dark and void” (119 
emphasis original).
The King of Marvin Gardens, Self-Posited Submission, and Corporate Friendship
We can now revisit the darkened radio booth of Marvin Gardens, better attuned to 
what we are seeing. We see the reified image of Jack Nicholson, disconnected in “dark 
and void” from any setting, any other people, more or less a face caught in tight close-up. 
On a theater screen, his face would overwhelm an audience. Marvin Gardens invokes 
Nicholson’s status as a star only to invert it: this is a story, after all, of irrefragable 
partnership, where, we can infer, the individuality sealed in star power is exposed for all 
the relations concealed by the star’s singular body – the commercial power breathed into 
the isolated star, for instance, by its multitudinous fan base, the corporate power of 
distribution and marketing that props up the star. This story, in short, deconstructs 
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Nicholson’s magnitude as another iteration of that of the Monkees. Marvin Gardens
underscores this not only with its story of partnership, but by “letting Nicholson play 
against type” (53), as Jay Boyer notes, as the contemplative one, withdrawn in his mind, 
next to Bruce Dern’s exuberant one, luxuriating in his body. But the film undercuts even 
his contemplative pose when the unedited close-up of Nicholson’s face, lasting an 
unusually protracted six minutes, is now flashed with a red light, filling in the low-key 
light that had rendered him an object of absorption. While this appears to be public radio, 
and the interruption comes from his brother’s phone call, what it recalls is the 
broadcasting medium supporting his self-absorbed monologues, and the interruption feels 
like that of an advertisement. This is the high artist’s version, we might think, of the pop 
star manipulation of the Monkees – first isolated in a black box, they soon find 
themselves compelled to shill for shampoo.
If Marvin Gardens tells the story of partnership, why does it begin with individual 
portraiture? As it happens, this opening monologue is a staged instance of the corporation 
considering itself an individual, with the power to confess and the need for private 
moments. Such a move enacts and bares the mechanics of auteurism, a strategic splitting 
of the difference between an individualist and corporate ethos. Christopher Newfield 
outlines the philosophical mystifications of individualism in his essay “Emerson’s 
Corporate Individualism” as having a “prehistory” in the antebellum U.S. that has not yet 
ended (680). Beginning with a recognition of American liberalism’s “ongoing ideological 
and material defenses of its assumptions about individuality” “as the effect either of 
autonomy or of administered subjection,” Newfield marshals Emerson’s philosophical 
work as a self-contradictory elucidation of how self-posited autonomy is gained from 
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“obeying a massive (benevolent) administrative power which is private and out of one’s 
control” (657-658 emphasis mine). Newfield insists that loss of agency derives from the 
fact that collective life in America is private by virtue of the corporate charter that 
historically shifted from the common weal to the private. The lost individualism entailed 
in a shift from contract to corporate law (“legal agency” connected less to “ownership” 
than to “transactions” [673]) resurfaces in membership in the corporation, such that “the 
more a person is corporate, the more that person is individual” (663).
This “compromise individualism,” as Newfield explains, demanded rhetoric as 
elegant as Emerson’s, but this demand must be satisfied again and again. As 
“administered subjection” is felt to be redoubled in post-war America, the defection film 
emerges as one kind of proposition about individual autonomy: it becomes feasible only 
in the moment when community life is repressed, a moment that nullifies agency along 
with the body politic. If auteurism possessed an individualist appeal, then Marvin 
Gardens gives a frank account of its “compromise” because it presents a figure we 
associate with individual autonomy, the artist with vision, as enfranchised to corporate 
structure. But this structure assumes Newfield’s parenthetical benevolence because its 
members need not voluntarily pledge their obedience to it; rather they involuntarily love 
it because the structure is transfigured as that of the family. As we might construe The 
Godfather as a palliative version of competitive capitalism by way of its transformation 
into the personal business of family, Marvin Gardens agrees to claim agency under the 
terms of partnership so long as the partner is one’s brother.
The aid of rendering collective agency in filial relations does not simply explain 
how one generation’s paradigm can be retained, though modified, in that of the next; a 
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sort of détente, at a theoretical level, with the fact that authority is borrowed not created, 
what Newfield refers us to with “Herbert’s dependence on the law of the father mak[ing] 
him the explicitly oedipal son” (667). Rendering group submission in family terms has, 
as well, the practical efficacy of making the workplace appear as one of non-alienated 
labor. In this sense, Marvin Gardens tells the story of BBS. The film allegorizes the 
relationship of Bob Rafelson and Bert Schneider as brothers David and Jason Staebler. In 
the military, Rafelson was a disc jockey on “all-night sessions” for which he “took to 
doing long, free-form monologues,” precisely like David Staebler (Boyer 1-2). And 
Schneider, like Jason Staebler, “had the charisma of a movie star,” “was possessed of 
extraordinary personal authority,” (Biskind 57) and clearly “love[d] all the hustle” of 
Hollywood deal-making. Converting their partnership into brotherhood, by film narrative, 
has the effect of making them “accomplices forever.” Indeed, Peter Biskind quotes a 
close friend of Schneider’s saying, “It was almost like you mingled your blood with Bert 
when you were his friend or business associate” (55). 
Of course, converting business relations into family ones did not require the 
alchemy of film narrative, in Schneider’s case, given that his father Abe was the 
President of Columbia Pictures, his older brother Stanley ran the studios from New York, 
and his younger brother Harold was the unit producer for BBS. This filial backdrop, then, 
provided the ethos for the BBS labor environment, where everyone was taken care of as 
family; the flipside of which can be detected in Nicholson’s comments on his casting 
practices for Drive, He Said: “If I hire my friends, the people I work with will be willing 
to do anything for me” (McGilligan 204). In other words, turning work into family 
induces involuntary submission on the part of workers. The approach could be taken as a 
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fusion of styles of capitalism, as Alfred Chandler sees them modeled by the largest 
industrial economies. British “personal capitalism,” with its “family-controlled” 
managerial culture, “assembled smaller management teams” that characteristically were 
“located on or near the largest plant,” “having daily contact” with other tiers of 
management (241-242). Grafting the British-style relations onto the competitive structure 
of American capitalism, such that cozy human contact displaced the “detailed 
organization charts and manuals” (242) of outsize organizations, allowed BBS to operate 
as a unit of Columbia Pictures but functionally appear as a grass-roots, maverick 
company wherein friends nurtured the creativity of friends.
When David and Jason Staebler first demonstrate their radicalized business creed, 
however, it is not their family culture that marks its difference but their ostensibly 
noncompetitive practices. In a scene on the Atlantic City boardwalk, in a store apparently 
not their own, the brothers give away appliances and gadgets to a frenzied crowd of 
women waving dollars overhead, with David insisting, “We don’t want your money, 
ladies!” After the women disperse, the store proprietor questions the brothers, “What 
about my merchandise?” David returns, “Why be so short-sighted, why don’t you think 
of the goodwill that it bought you?” The insistence that the exchange could be termed a 
success without the “receipts” the proprietor needs to “balance [his] books” is elaborated 
in Jason’s “news flash” that “these grandmas are coming back with half the widows of 
South Jersey.” The curious redefinition of business success in terms other than monetary 
profit amounts to the burden of Peter Drucker’s thought. Perhaps the most important 
writer on management theory in the field’s history, Drucker sought to rehabilitate 
Western capitalism by the vehicle of the modern corporation, which, at its best, “might 
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stand athwart the atomizing, existentially harsh modernity” of “twentieth-century 
economic life” (Lichtenstein 11). Among Drucker’s innovations was “that a business 
cannot be defined or explained in terms of profit” (Drucker 35); the only valid purpose of 
a business is “to create a customer” (37 emphasis original).
Jason argues that “half the widows of South Jersey” could be counted as new 
customers “not because they got a handout for nothing, but because merchandise was 
presented to them with style.” The immediate exchange, that is, won’t secure a business, 
but rather the long-term capacity to exchange. What characterizes BBS, if we might step 
back from Marvin Gardens, is not simply the culture within its office walls but the 
culture that they tried to construct beyond their walls, a business purpose that, in 
Drucker’s word’s, “[lay] in society” (37). In this sense BBS would be noncompetitive 
with, say, other filmmakers of the New Hollywood because the urgent business in the 
1960s was to restore a market of filmgoers. And, in keeping with this intent, BBS 
cooperated rather than compete. As Hal Ashby was preparing to film Coming Home
(1978), he solicited television footage from a number of production companies, all of 
which footage entailed a fee. Bert Schneider sent a missive to Columbia on Ashby’s 
behalf, asking that the fee be waived, whether because he wished to save Ashby 
production costs or whether he simply deplored the deadening proceduralism of Ashby 
having to acquire permission for each seconds-long clip. Trafficking in a related film 
aesthetic and traveling in the same circuit of political causes, Schneider and Ashby alike 
cared about enlarging their audience more than their residuals.
Whether by revealing market segments in a hitherto monolithic market, such as 
the youth market, or by demolishing barriers to markets unpenetrated by decree of the 
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national security state, BBS sought to reimagine world markets as a network of friends. 
When Schneider accepted an Oscar for Hearts and Minds (1974) at the 1975 Academy 
Awards, he used the opportunity to read a letter from the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of Vietnam conveying “greetings of friendship to all the America people” 
(New York Times May 4, 1975). Of course Schneider incited the anger of the Hollywood 
old guard, such as Bob Hope, for whom the USO likely represented the farthest reach of 
Hollywood’s market. Frank Sinatra, in turn, read his own message “on behalf of the 
Academy” decrying Schneider’s (Kinn 198). And just like that the Oscars telecast staged 
a spontaneous debate on whether the Hollywood market should be fractured by 
geopolitical alliances, a debate riven by generation (as jeers at Sinatra registered) and 
haunted, no doubt, by a McCarthyist past, which made high drama of Hollywood’s 
obligations to what Jerome Christensen calls “an old customer, the national security 
state” (“Time Warner” 596). Schneider may have breached industry orthodoxy but, in 
doing so, he likely grew rather than shrunk his scope of customers that night.
Marvin Gardens had construed the global dimensions of markets several years 
before that Oscar ceremony. When David and Jason meet Japanese businessmen who 
may invest in their proposed island resort, the point is that you don’t “settle every last 
detail over a lobster” but that lobster dinners do forge the friendships that mean new 
investment money and new audiences. By the mid-1970s, Schneider had acknowledged 
that part of business was widening this circle of “friendship,” denoting in this case 
potential sources of financing. He remarked that “the advent of civilian money into 
Hollywood” had changed the business atmosphere, that an “influx of Arab oil money is 
one example of the new funding sources” (“Finding the Cash”). In the narrative of 
166
Marvin Gardens the geographical ecumenism of their investment initiatives lends 
support, on the face of it, to a corporate domain beyond geography; the domain created 
would be Staebleravia, the locus of which would be in the South Pacific but the 
ownership of which, in terms of shareholders, would be transnational.
But the modality of corporate friendship, as intimated already, though maverick 
vis-à-vis the insularity of Old Hollywood studio practices, is only revolutionary in the 
sense that the very core of capitalism is revolutionary, what Joseph Schumpeter calls its 
“creative destruction.” BBS is otherwise an outrider of an incipiently “flexible” “regime 
of accumulation” (Harvey 124). The flexibility, it turns out, allowed BBS and such 
production companies to obviate union rigidity, and the principle of friendship and work-
as-pleasure here served as an alibi. Concurrent with the production of Marvin Gardens, 
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) filed an “unfair labor 
practice” charge against BBS, claiming that a new firm with a “fictitious” name had been 
set up to avoid “obligations under existing agreements” (Variety Sept. 27, 1972). BBS 
had set up N.B. Productions, alleged Gerald Smith of IATSE, “to avoid hiring” “an 
American citizen,” preferring instead to “import” “so-called artists” from Europe. BBS, 
Smith claimed, threatened the local “to take the pic to Canada” in order to work with the 
cameraman of their choice (Variety). 
Of course this occurred under the auspices of global friendship, not under the 
industrial labor laws generated by nation-states. Global friendship, in another lexicon, 
was known as “runaway production,” and Robert Altman had raised the hackles of 
organized labor by shooting McCabe & Mrs. Miller in British Columbia, thereby hiring 
nonunion crews and creating conditions where a crew member stands, in Altman’s words, 
167
“up to his ass in mud and water building this bridge with some other, and I mean this is 
really hard work. Those people up there – and I know they’re not on dope, so they’re not 
just up there stoned – they really love what they’re doing” (Thomas 62). The pride of 
New Hollywood, to revisit Nicholson’s quote, is to break compliance with labor practices 
by turning work into a friendship in which workers are “willing to do anything.”
Fundamentally, the hegemony of corporate friendship recognizes that, as Jason 
Staebler reasons, you don’t “insul[t] the wrong people”; by corollary, you befriend the 
right people. Jason explains to his brother David that their island resort was refused a 
gambling license when Donald Dimbleby applied for it, because “Dimblewit” thought he 
could “do it without politicians.” But “you never can,” Jason lectures. Like The 
Godfather, Marvin Gardens inculcates a series of business maxims, none of which 
support the “efficiency theory” of business success. In Chandler’s influential account, 
“efficiency theory” explains business success in terms of rationalized management, a 
“visible hand,” replacing market forces as the coordinating force in modern enterprises. 
William Roy’s Socializing Capital refutes Chandler’s efficiency model, explaining that 
business success is rather determined by power arrangements – befriending the right 
people, on Jason’s philosophy. We might say that it is for this reason that Marvin 
Gardens renders business protocols in a criminal milieu. For that matter, all the above 
films (Parallax View, Point Blank, and McCabe & Mrs. Miller) place business in a 
criminal milieu. The sense that capitalism is not a meritocracy but a distribution of power 
pervades all these films; thus honor among thieves necessarily displaces labor laws. 
Marvin Gardens, we might say, is the only film that seeks to redefine the grammar of the 
system rather than sound an agonized denunciation of it.  
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Indeed, Marvin Gardens makes a point of renaming the “hustle” so that it seems 
like something else. In the way that Drucker renames capitalism’s inveterate profit 
motive as the creation of customers, Marvin Gardens renames the “hustle” of the 
criminal milieu as the domain of the philosopher-king, the visionary artist. And 
explaining the naming of the domain as itself the business of the domain has an a fortiori
power if, as David claims, “image is everything in business today.” If, in other words, 
businesses succeed by creating customers, they engage in what Thomas Frank calls 
“nothing other than the construction of consumer subjectivity” (24). And they do this by 
means of “image,” by presenting merchandise “with style.” Jason Staebler simply calls 
this the work of an artist. When the Staebler brothers purchase the island of Tiki, they 
will get to rename it; and David, as the artist, “can consider that [his] department.” The 
question, then, of which one is the artist and which one the businessman becomes 
redundant: if business success turns on the production of style, then the successful 
businessman will in all cases be an artist.
Marvin Gardens, we observed, begins with individual portraiture, that of David 
Staebler qua contemplative artist, only to open onto the relations of partnership, the 
mechanics of group behavior. And the film closes, likewise, on the image of David sealed 
in his radio booth, engrossed again in the pathos of monologue, as if to suggest that the 
collective personality expresses its integral unity in the form of a lone individual. Told
from David’s standpoint, the story of business partnership – with its “middle-age kewpie 
dolls,” “Japanese businessmen in bibs,” and “Lilly’s dolphin” – can be construed as 
figments of the artist’s imagination, a world of interesting characters posited by the 
contemplative mind. BBS, by corollary, expressed its personality to the public in the 
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figure of Jack Nicholson, and their corporate structure concealed itself in his bravura 
individualism. If the corporation cannot be known as a person can, it cannot have friends 
as a person can; and auteurism, in this context, offered a concrete response to the 
abstractions of corporate personality, such that operations on a large-scale could be 
performed, after a kind of legerdemain, on the small-scale of friendship between 
individuals.  
           
                
      
  
170
Notes
                                                
1 In The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism, Walter Benn Michaels gives a 
substantial account of the corporate personhood debate, exploiting its often abstrusely 
theoretical character to help theorize the status of personhood in the fictions of American 
Naturalism. See his chapter “Corporate Fiction,” specifically pages 195-206. The locus 
classicus for this debate is Arthur Machen’s essay “Corporate Personality,” published in 
the Harvard Law Review in February, 1911. Machen’s essay first surveys the Continental 
debate on the subject, which he notes is much more involved than that of English law. He 
then engages “two basic propositions, (1) that a corporation is an entity distinct from the 
sum of the members that compose it, and (2) that this entity is a person” (258). See also 
John Dewey’s essay, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,” 
published in the Yale Law Journal in April, 1926. Dewey refers to the decisive influence 
for “English readers” of Frederic William Maitland’s account of the corporation’s 
personhood as a “synonym” for its status as a “right-and-duty-bearing unit” (656). Dewey 
intercedes in the debate on behalf of the philosophical notion of “personality,” the 
conceptual instability of which, subtending the “jural person,” has “generated confusion 
and conflict” in the legal concept (658). The philosophical position, which is thoroughly 
intermixed in the legal position, refers back inexorably to modern German philosophical 
accounts of the “subject” and “subjectivity,” and for that, Dewey writes, one needs some 
knowledge of “Kant in particular” (660). I chiefly call on Machen’s and Dewey’s 
accounts because they are both formative in the larger debate and because they best 
evoke the philosophical dimension of the legal debate. 
2 In The Condition of Postmodernity, David Harvey, drawing on the models of the 
“regulation school,” describes this shift in terms of a problem basic to Fordism, its 
“rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production 
systems that precluded much flexibility of design” (142). When the Eurodollar market 
formed in response to a forsaken Bretton Woods agreement, the profit principle called for 
more flexible production models, which meant more flexible labor markets as well as 
more flexible government (i.e., the scaling down of the welfare state). This led to flexible 
accumulation, which “rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour 
markets, products, and patterns of consumption” and “is characterized by the emergence 
of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and 
organizational innovation” (147). Arguing for how this shift fed into the production of 
new subjectivities, Harvey says that “the extent of this kind of downsizing, and the spread 
of temporary contracts in the non-Fordist sector, have created some of the social 
conditions for the fluidity and insecurity of identities that typify what can be called 
postmodernity” (Spaces of Capital 14). I would here add, without recourse yet to notions 
of postmodernity, that identities are secured, in this new regime, by identifying with the 
corporation over against the state or organized labor. 
3 In Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity, Edward Dimendberg contends that the city, 
as represented in film noir, was never truly a period snapshot of the totalized city, but 
rather manifested a “nonsynchronous character” that’s “best apprehended as a tension 
between a residual American culture and urbanism of the 1920s and 1930s and its 
liquidation by technological and social innovations accompanying World War II, as well 
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as the simultaneous dissolution of this new social compact of the 1940s and 1950s by the 
society emerging in the 1960s, in which the simulacra and spectacles of contemporary 
postmodern culture are clearly visible in retrospect” (3).  
4 Dimendberg describes this retrospective postwar gaze on the past as one still exercising 
a “palpable fascination” for a vanishing “period in American society whose seemingly 
transparent social structure” was stitched together with “relative ease by a morally 
irreproachable detective figure” (4). The city still fascinates, in his account, but not for its 
mystery alone. “Eclipsed by the dispersal of space in the suburbs and the geographic 
ubiquity and impersonality of the large corporation and the more opaque social and 
economic relations developing in its wake,” Dimendberg claims, “the dark cities of film 
noir nonetheless retain a firm hold upon the contemporary imagination” (4). Dimendberg 
suggests, that is, that viewers, from a standpoint in “dispersed” and “centrifugal space,” 
return to old noirs for an “image of the city” (6, 7). I take Dimendberg’s reading of the 
genre to be canny, and would add to it that, when noirs were made after the main cycle 
(dated 1941-1958, give or take several years), they registered an interest in the city from 
a wholly different diegetic standpoint. Dimendberg notes how investigative agents once 
found “egress from the violent metropolis” in a “snowy wilderness” (7), as Robert Ryan 
did in On Dangerous Ground (1952); this occurred, we might say, because the agents 
lived in the metropolis. In a film like Taxi Driver (1976), those who would wish to 
investigate the city are Betsy’s parents in the suburbs, who take interest in her transition 
between suburb and city, how she got from one to the other, rather than in understanding 
the city itself. Once Betsy is saved from the city, one presumes, her parents likely lose 
interest in the melee it becomes. 
5 For a different reading, see Fredric Jameson’s chapter “Totality as Conspiracy” in his 
study The Geopolitical Aesthetic. Jameson remarks on this opposition, city and suburb, in 
terms of Lukács’s valence of the “political” in the historical novel, held in place, as it 
were, by an “opposition of public and private,” which was structurally necessary for any 
“distinct, specialized ‘political’ literature about public life” (48). In turn he suggests that 
the specificity of the “conspiratorial narrative,” because it’s predicated on the loss of the 
private, is to “stand as a symptom of the tendential end of ‘civil society’ in late 
capitalism” (48). 
6 Again, I acknowledge Jameson’s “Totality as Conspiracy” for its treatment of the films 
of the “paranoia trilogy” as well as other conspiracy films, such as Three Days of the 
Condor (1975) and Videodrome (1982). He explains conspiracy stories as the effort to 
cognitively map the world-system, and thus the inscription of transportation modes as 
well as communication technologies becomes a necessary textual feature for tracking the 
circulation of both people and information through this system. In discussing a scene 
from Condor in which Redford descends “into the interior of the telephone central” to tap 
the lines of the conspirators, Jameson claims that this scene is a topos of the genre and in 
fact the “promise of a deeper inside view is the hermeneutic content of the conspiracy 
thriller in general” (15). I understand the “deeper inside view” of these paranoid stories to 
give onto the corporation itself, its nerve center and seat of action, whereas Jameson 
tends to characterize the view more broadly as that of the world-system. These two views 
could be congruent, in that glimpsing the inner workings of the large-scale corporation 
might well be tantamount to glimpsing the inner workings of the world-system. 
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7 The film regularly infantilizes Joe Frady, showing him on a miniature train in a 
children’s zoo, for example, or having him order milk in a bar where the rough patrons all 
drink liquor. A moment in the film’s opening sequence best establishes this motif: Frady, 
trying to sneak onto the elevator in the Space Needle where Senator Carroll will be 
assassinated, is stopped by security and left to watch like a child as the authorized press 
ascend the Space Needle. The scene emblematizes Frady being debarred from 
knowledge.
8 I would note that Jerome Christensen uses the same analogy with respect to Oliver 
Stone’s JFK (1991). In his essay “The Time Warner Conspiracy: JFK, Batman, and the 
Manager Theory of Hollywood Film,” Christensen writes: “Although [Michael] Albert 
eagerly followed Stone in his rejection of the suspiciously simplistic lone gunman theory 
of the assassination, he strangely adhered to the equally simplistic lone crusader theory –
if not Kennedy, struck down in his prime, or Garrison, stonewalled by government 
bureaucracy, then Stone himself, pilloried by a mainstream press unwilling to tolerate 
challenges to its prerogatives. Albert did not feel the pinch of the contradiction because 
he was a victim of theory – and not political theory but film theory. Despite his able 
critique of persons as causes, he embraced the explanatory model of the auteur theory, 
which proposes the director as agent of the distinctive vision of the motion picture” 
(592).
9 See Chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of Braudelian analysis, carried out by 
Giovanni Arrighi in his study The Long Twentieth Century. In particular, refer to the 
section “Economic Orders and Borders.”
10 Of course it’s inaccurate to say that McCabe & Mrs. Miller is less stylized than Point 
Blank; it is the case, though, that the stylization is of a naturalistic kind, meant to recall 
antique photographs or a “The Potato Eaters”-era Van Gogh painting. Cinematographer 
Vilmos Zsigmond “flashed” the film negative to give the film its worn look.  
11 As only one testimony on the ideologically cohesive effect of Hollywood classicality, 
Robert Ray cites William Manchester’s remark that “even in the 1970s, middle-aged 
strangers could relate to one another and find a meeting ground by references to The 
Philadelphia Story, Mutiny on the Bounty, or any other of a hundred films remembered 
and cherished, over thirty years later, by virtually an entire generation” (130).
12 As Belton notes of Westerns, women “embody the values of family, community, 
education, domestication, and cultivation that inform the male hero’s transformation of 
the wilderness into a garden” (214). 
13 Mills is here citing A. Whitney Griswold’s interpretation of “Jefferson’s doctrine.”
14 By comparison, we might recall a similar frozen death in a film at the start of the next 
decade, The Shining (1980). Unlike the comforting figure of McCabe, the frozen Jack 
Torrance (Jack Nicholson) is a monumental warning of the kind of megalomania that 
comes from a resistance to the present social realities in favor of a romanticized version 
of bygone social realities.
15 In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer say that “number became the 
canon of the Enlightenment,” and this abetted the functioning of a bourgeois society 
“ruled by equivalence”: “It makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to abstract 
quantities” (7).
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16 “Theory X” comes from Douglas McGregor’s schematic breakdown of organization 
management styles in his 1960 book, The Human Side of Enterprise.
17 For an account of McGregor’s role in Proctor and Gamble’s radicalized practices, see 
Art Kleiner’s The Age of Heretics.
18 In Whom God Wishes to Destroy, John Lewis tells the story of Coppola’s 1980 
purchase of the studio facilities of Hollywood General, characterizing Coppola’s vision 
for the studio as a throwback to “the old days” of the studio system. With new facilities 
for his production company, Zoetrope, Coppola projected a “positively nostalgic 
production structure”: “a place where you could have writers and actors and designers 
and special effects people and photographers, all of whom agree to come to work under 
the highest possible standards with real discipline” (8).
19 In Marxism and Form, Jameson turns the Lukácsian model around so that it applies 
less to the “ideals of scientific knowledge,” and still less to scientific management, and 
more to the “nineteenth-century novel” (189 emphasis original).  
20 Lukács claims that a way out of reification “can be seen only from the standpoint of the 
proletariat because the meaning of these tendencies is the abolition of capitalism and so 
for the bourgeoisie to become conscious of them would be tantamount to suicide” (181). 
My claim, then, that the corporation comes to form a class with such consciousness only 
means, on Lukács’s diagnosis, that the contradictions of capitalism “will remain 
unresolved and will be produced by the dialectical mechanics of history at a higher level, 
in an altered form and with increased intensity” (198). 
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CHAPTER V
FROM COWBOY TO VIETNAM VETERAN: THE LIFESPAN OF
       AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUALISM
We have seen how the disaster film’s imagination of technology in ruins was little 
more than the obverse of the defection film’s bucolic imagination, each joining a more 
general effort to reinstate the conditions of possibility for autonomous individualism. 
Both imaginations are retrogressive, I submit, when compared to the corporate 
individualism of Marvin Gardens. They wish to return to a lost frontier culture in which 
the spread of capitalist markets still allows one to think of an inside and an outside to the 
economic and juridical order. They wish, in other words, to confect their stories from 
outmoded materials. 
The period of 1967-1974, though, is one in which new economic and juridical 
realities are triggered by the undoing of this inside-outside model in the name of the 
transnationalization of corporate capitalism, occurring in plain sight (from the Marshall 
Plan to Bretton Woods to the advent of Eurodollars and the boom of foreign exchange 
markets). Everything, in this new order, happened within these corporations that traversed 
national borders. We can thus say that, in a narrative register, Hollywood film records 
this shift when Bobby Dupea, at the end of Five Easy Pieces, divests himself of his 
money and identification – all the markers of national citizenship – and then the Staebler 
brothers, in the course of Marvin Gardens, invest themselves in the identity of 
Staebleravia – a new dream of corporate membership. The trouble in using these two 
films to measure this shift, and the ideological accommodations it compelled, is that, 
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having been made only two years apart, they foreshorten the historical process; they offer 
but a synchronic view on it. 
To gain a proper long view on the ideological vicissitudes of individualism, which 
we might suppose is first and foremost economic individualism,1 we should turn our gaze 
on the changing fortunes of the Western hero, the cowboy, a representation so evidently 
sensitized to economic and juridical realities. If we recognize auteurism as a means of 
recasting an individualism in disrepair, as I suggest we ought, then tracing the trajectory 
of the cowboy hero will help us see how individualism came to fail its ideological 
exigencies over the course of the postwar period. As a stock icon of individualism, the 
cowboy hero was given its classical expression in John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939), and 
then it was Ford, as well, who delivered its valediction in The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance (1962).2 After Liberty Valance demystifies the “classic configuration of the 
individual, self-reliant Westerner,” to use Thomas Schatz’s words, as a mythic golden 
mean between “natural and cultural forces” (70), in effect eulogizing the figure, the 
cowboy hero does not simply become “a museum piece,” as The Shootist (1976) says, 
because it has outlived its time. Instead, in 1970s Hollywood film the cowboy hero 
mutates into the Vietnam veteran, suggesting that the figure’s location on the edge of the 
juridical order, once needed for that order’s vitality, now introduces dissonance into that 
order.
The agent of disorder the cowboy hero has become by 1962 – best displayed by 
his confrontation with the reality principle in Lonely Are the Brave and his consecration 
as myth in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance – is so because his sense of self-reliance 
entails a refused internalization of the existing order, a refusal which passes for ethics as 
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such. The cowboy hero, that is, promises to negate the social order again and again, and 
this act would tally as ethical on the same rationale that structures the “ethos of 
disaffiliation” behind the defection film. At the dawn of the sixties, then, the cowboy 
hero shows the features of the defector, and therefore as a part of living history, rather 
than as a “museum piece,”3 he connotes revolutionary politics rather than the Manifest 
Destiny underwriting the progress narrative of American imperialism. Lonely Are the 
Brave’s protagonist, Jack Burns (Kirk Douglas), hiding from law enforcement in the New 
Mexico mountains, has most in common with the Foco-school revolutionaries in the 
Sierra Maestras and the Viet Cong guerillas in jungle undergrowth. Burns is a repudiation 
of the technocrat’s version of modernity. That Burns should preview the characterology 
of the defector in 1962, the same year as David and Lisa exhibited early generic traits of 
the defection film and enjoyed sleeper popularity, marks the year as a kind of switching 
point for sensibility, after which the cowboy hero will either induce nostalgia, as an 
afterimage of former lifeways, or become the sign of radicalism.4          
The burden of this chapter, then, is to connect the dots between Lonely Are the 
Brave and David and Lisa and their predecessors and successors, to clarify a relationship 
between the auteurist moment, which I designate roughly as 1967-1974, and the longer 
period of postwar American culture.5 The postwar period forms an economic unity, one 
that Theodore Roszak, for instance, calls “the Age of Affluence” and claims stretches 
from 1942 to 1972. His bookend years mark the end of the Great Depression and the 
entrance into the war – a move that “rebuilt” the “entire industrial plant of the United 
States” into “the world’s only state-of-the-art technological establishment” (xii) – and 
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then the beginning of the oil shortages that pricked the exuberance of affluence by 
reintroducing the principle of scarcity. 
What I wish to demonstrate, in turn, is that the period forms a cultural unity as 
well, in that storytelling practices, unwittingly pegged to economic practices, follow a 
trajectory that resolves in the moment known otherwise as the sixties. While I 
acknowledge that non-narrative culture might as fully disclose the era’s dynamics of 
subjectivity, I seize on “storytelling practices” as an instance of cultural production 
chiefly because the institution of Hollywood is defined, classically, as a narrative cinema, 
and I wish to chart the rise and fall of certain narrative tendencies in Hollywood film. I 
recognize, however, that I could open this period in 1953, when Merce Cunningham’s 
“Suite by Chance” (a product of Cunningham’s “chance operation” collaborations with 
John Cage, dating back to the 1940s) underlines the way in which the organization of 
economic life informs the disposition of the expressive arts on questions of how the body 
is determined. In this alternate telling, I might select Elinor Langer’s 1973 publication of 
“Notes for Next Time: A Memoir of the 1960s” as the twilight of this cultural moment, 
for its confession that defection from institutions had made the New Left “heroes and 
heroines of imaginary revolutionary,” prepared not for “engagement but detachment” 
(76). Instead, I take the sounding of similar concerns in various domains of culture as a 
license to claim that a preoccupation with the form of the individualist credo did not 
simply denote a film-historical inward movement (i.e. Hollywood needed to tweak or 
render novel an old story). It indicated that the basics internal to the Western genre had a 
general purchase in U.S. cultural history.
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Of course, claiming that the stuff of the Western genre also informed the dance 
ideas of Merce Cunnigham might lead one to surmise, after the strong model in which 
base expresses itself as superstructure (denounced as vulgar Marxism), that the “stuff” in 
question is sheer economics. Rather than grant total determining power to economics, I 
prefer to regard this stuff as transactions between the economic and juridical, in which 
priority falls alternately on the economic system and the state apparatus. In support of 
such an analysis, I refer to Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century, which builds 
on Fernand Braudel’s longue durée studies of capitalism as a world system broken into 
phases of capital development. The phases split into “material expansion” in which 
“money capital ‘sets in motion’ an increasing mass of commodities,” and next into 
“financial expansion” in which “an increasing mass of money capital ‘sets itself free’ 
from its commodity form” (6). Arrgihi calls these two phases, taken together, a “full 
systemic cycle of accumulation” (6 emphasis original); these two phases will solicit, one 
expects, different regulatory environments.6
Arrighi’s schema is useful for the task of assessing the ideological curve of 
individualism because it frames the interplay of the economic and juridical, the jostling 
between economic and state imperatives captured, for instance, in what David Harvey 
describes as the yielding of the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation to that of 
flexible accumulation. Harvey remarks of the transition that, while there had “always 
been a delicate balance between financial and state powers,” this had “evidently meant a 
shift towards the empowerment of finance capital vis-à-vis the nation state” (3). I will 
offer a scenario, accordingly, in which this provokes an individualism with new contours, 
leaving behind those of a material body bent on staking out its own territorial 
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sovereignty, and replacing them with those of an immaterial body, whose sovereignty 
derives from its independence from fixed territory, like the corporate prerogative of 
vanishing and reappearing wherever it is most propitious.
Beyond its frame for economic-juridical issues, Arrighi’s schema can endow with 
a sense of deep history the postwar era as a period, insofar as it accentuates the “patterns 
of recurrence and evolution” that fit it into the longer life of a world system. Pinpointing 
the exact dates and punctual events that begin and end a period is admittedly a fool’s 
game, because periods tend to phase in and out gradually rather than punctually. But 
given that only a fool’s game can make a period intelligible as such, I will structure this 
chapter by considering two story cycles of the Western hero, the sequence of which 
constitutes a period. The first cycle runs from Stagecoach to Liberty Valance (1939-
1962), and it exhibits, under the curatorial hand of John Ford, the waxing of the cowboy 
myth. I draw selectively on the films of this cycle to describe the balance sought between 
natural and positive law in the classical figure of the Western hero. The second cycle, 
then, runs from Lonely Are the Brave (1962) to First Blood (1982), and it tracks the 
waning of the cowboy myth. I compare the homologous structures of these films from 
1962 and 1982 for the fact that, though they are strikingly alike, their telling difference is 
that the former film has a cowboy for its protagonist, and the latter film a Vietnam 
veteran. In the intervening years, moreover, two important films – Taxi Driver (1976) and 
The Deer Hunter (1978) – negotiate, in both concealed and overt ways, a merger of the 
Western hero and the Vietnam veteran, disclosing the philosophical coordinates used in 
constructing both figures and supplying them their ideological suasion. An explanation of 
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the waning value of the cowboy myth will, ultimately, make sense of the auteur as a 
preferable figure of ideology.
Economic and Juridical Orders and Borders
I have made preliminary remarks on how Arrighi’s long cycles of capital 
accumulation might give shape to the postwar period, but looking at the finer details of 
his framework will allow us to thusly ask broad questions: Does the fixity of commodity 
capital versus the flexibility of finance capital bear calculably on the style of 
individualism encouraged in such economies? Do these forms of capital result in 
territorialist or capitalist logics of state-making? And, as an important corollary, does one 
logic issue in, or stabilize, the state-form more naturally? And, last, if the state-form 
derives from one logic rather than the other, how will the individualism so implicit in 
liberalism accommodate itself to one logic or the other? Working out these questions sets 
the parameters in which the cowboy myth takes on its historicity; in setting these, we see 
like a series of chess moves the historical modifications needed to remake this figure into 
the Vietnam veteran, who can only menace the order the cowboy once vouchsafed.
Arrighi divides capital development into four systemic cycles of accumulation. 
He identifies the most recent of these as the U.S. cycle and claims that it begins in the late 
19th century and supersedes the British cycle in the early 20th century. The cycle, as 
noted, comprises a phase of material expansion and a phase of financial expansion. 
Arrighi takes these phases to be a “restatement” of Karl Marx’s “general formula of 
capital” expressed as “MCM’,” or money capital, commodity capital, and second-order 
money capital. This essentially means that capital prefers to remain liquid, but in order to 
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expand it must do so in the form of fixed production (the production of this or that 
commodity), only to return as “expanded liquidity” (5). In terms of the rise to prominence 
of the U.S. economy, the point to be made, with respect to a period of growing 
commodity capital, is that the expansion of the U.S. economy that led to its eclipse of 
British hegemony was sustained by “the comparative size and growth potential of the 
domestic market” (61). In that regard, the U.S. held a territorial advantage over an 
expanding economy such as Germany. Owing to the U.S.’s “continental dimension, its 
insularity, and its extremely favorable endowment of natural resources” (61), the size and 
kind of land within the U.S. state accommodated its capital development. Thus, its period 
of state expansion (Manifest Destiny) – which we’ll take to be its annexing of large
markets then used for production as well as consumption – had the effect of looking the 
same as its capital expansion.
And this fact – that for Benjamin Franklin, as Arrighi says, the “territorialist 
spirit” was the same thing as the “capitalist spirit” (60) – powerfully shapes the style of 
individualism characteristic of the icon under consideration, the cowboy hero. We might, 
moreover, refer again to the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal touted by C. Wright Mills, an 
arrangement in which the individual “owned the sphere of his own work” (White Collar
9). We dimly sense, here, that the individualism once supposed “economic” could just as 
well be “territorial,” and that their conjunction might be strictly conditional. Indeed, the 
fact that no necessary overlap obtains between “territorialism” and “capitalism,” and that 
they could be deemed “opposite modes of rule or logics of power” (Arrighi 33), is a 
lesson made plain at the conclusion of the material expansion phase and the 
commencement of the financial expansion phase, the hunt for liquidity behind the 
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Marshall Plan. That the two logics could decouple and each support distinct “modes of 
rule” – long occluded by the circumstance that their blend supported a single mode of 
rule – became apparent when, in the postwar economic climate, “capitalist enterprises” 
became progressively more “enmeshed in dense trans-statal networks of production and 
exchange” causing “the segmentation of these networks into discrete political 
jurisdictions” to “have a detrimental bearing on the competitive positions of each and 
every capitalist enterprise” (32-33). This is an esoteric way of saying that, in different 
moments of accumulation, corporations could be impeded by states. At this juncture, 
were the corporation to unmoor itself from the segmented territories of states, and their 
juridical spaces, we would see a new style of individualism.
In sum, corporations could seem to hew to a “territorialist” logic just as much as a 
“capitalist” one7 to the extent that the state had power over liquidity (the U.S., for 
example, held “a virtual monopoly of world liquidity” in 1947 when “its gold reserves 
were 70 per cent of the world’s total” [275]) and a sustaining share of “productive 
capacity and effective demand” (the U.S. national income was “more than twice that of” 
“the combined national incomes of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux 
countries” [275]). With these logics harmonized, during the U.S. phase of commodity 
capital, the capitalist logic of corporations seemed to support the territorial logic of the 
state. But, as the explosive growth of the foreign exchange market throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s led liquidity off the rails of monetary governance established at Bretton 
Woods in 1944, in tandem with the liberation of Third World countries from colonial rule 
(which system had been, in another lexicon, the territorial-extension of the dominant 
states) and the opening of these markets for certain input-output combinations for the 
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world economy, the corporation will now seem to cut against the territorial logic of a 
state system. As such, during the U.S. phase of finance capital, a corporate hegemony 
subordinates the territorial logic that had long underpinned state-making. And, within this 
hegemony, the terms of territorial logic no longer organize the style of individualism.
The labor done by the word “seem,” in the paragraph prior, is to suggest that the 
source of a juridical order could never, with much conviction, be assessed as precisely the 
function of the territorial logic of the state or the capitalist logic of the economic system. 
As Arrighi contends, if states impede business, “capitalist enterprises may well mobilize 
governments to reduce rather than increase or reproduce the political division of the 
world-economy” (33). In this scenario, the juridical order would not derive from those 
divided territories known as states, but a supraterritorial demiurge would wear the mask 
of state government as it fashions the laws of the land. This scenario spells the end of an 
outside to any given juridical order, because the source of laws could never be located 
inside anyway, not at least in authentically democratic means. If corporations could thus 
produce the appearance of state expressions, then what appears as the outside of the state 
could likely be called the inner space of the corporation. The principle of the corporation, 
in short, could always cast suspicion on the project of the state, on the juridical order it 
had meant to circumscribe. 
This description, one might observe, echoes the argument of Hardt and Negri’s 
Empire, which holds that Empire, the formation of a transcendent economic-juridical 
order, has supplanted the former imperial system of nation-states. This occurs, in part, 
through the elimination of an “outside” by means of the “formal” and “real” 
“subsumption” of the noncapitalist world, which describes bringing labor and value from 
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non-capitalist practices under capitalist “relations of production” (Empire 255). More 
generally, the loss of an outside counts as the work of modernization, which is always 
“the internalization of the outside, that is, the civilization of nature” (187). (In both 
respects, the Green Revolution would be understood as such a subsumption of the 
outside.) In all events, this loss of borders and of an outside marks a crisis in our icon of 
individuality, the cowboy hero, whose place it was to be on the border between 
civilization and nature, a locus privileged in modernity as a “border place,” as Hardt and 
Negri claim, “that serves as the standpoint for the critique of the system of power” (184). 
Henceforth, the figure constituted outside the juridical order, the representation of which 
will slide, I argue, from cowboy to Vietnam veteran, will be regarded as a highly 
suspicious figure, not one celebrated for its capacity to critique power and renew the 
system but one feared for its power to resist subsumption into that system.
The John Ford Cycle: An “Intuitive Understanding” of the Western
In discussing the evolution of the Western genre, Schatz muses that it was perhaps 
John Ford’s “intuitive understanding of what made the Western genre work” that caused 
him to resolve Stagecoach with an “ambiguous ending” that would inspire “postwar 
productions” to reconsider the genre along the lines of Ford’s film. The “ambiguous 
ending” in question involves an expulsion from society of the film’s cowboy hero, Ringo 
Kid (John Wayne), that still allows him to begin a marriage. The ambiguity lies in the 
genre’s need for the cowboy hero to restore order in community life but never be 
incorporated into it. As Schatz remarks, “earlier silent Westerns and their later low-
budget counterparts” accomplished this by sending the Western hero “into the sunset,” 
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“thereby sustaining the genre’s prosocial function while reaffirming the hero’s essential 
individuality” (52). Stagecoach seizes on this ambiguity as the core of the genre, and this 
might be the “intuitive understanding” Schatz attributes to Ford. What we find at the core 
of the genre, in other words, is something like a crisis. Ringo Kid is good for the 
community, because he can purge it of bad elements like the Plummer brothers (“There’d 
be a lot more peace in the territory if that Luke Plummer were so full of lead he couldn’t 
hold his liquor”); but the community is bad for Ringo Kid (“Well, they’re saved from the 
blessings of civilization,” Doc says as Ringo and Dallas depart).
Of course, while the ambiguity first seems to lie in the fact that the community 
needs but can’t incorporate Ringo Kid, it lies fundamentally in the fact that Ringo Kid is 
the character we most want to start a family because he stands as the one most likely to 
begin the desired community (the existing community, in other words, is flawed, and 
theirs is the ideal community on the horizon). Stagecoach resolves this by having Ringo 
Kid purge the community of the Plummers, thus establishing his bona fides in community 
protection, and then taking Dallas (Claire Trevor) across the border to his ranch, where 
they might start a family. We can understand the two poles of this ambiguity by noting 
that Luke Plummer is not the villain, but rather only the occasion for a proof of Ringo’s 
bona fides. The film takes the banker, Henry Gatewood (Berton Churchill), for its true 
villain, thus making its two poles, hero and villain, represent the logics of territorialism 
and capitalism. Ringo Kid will more likely start the desired community because he 
identifies with the land; his ranch is a “nice place” constituted from nature (“trees, grass, 
water”). Gatewood’s identification with capital, in contrast, is the very opposite of 
Ringo’s elemental stability, given that Gatewood absconds from the community of Tonto 
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with the payroll deposit for the employees of the mining company. Capital cannot be 
trusted, in short, to stabilize a community, because it seeks further profit, we might infer, 
and not necessarily the cultivation of land that will become the stable grounding of 
community. 
As Peter Lehman says, “For Ford, the West is won by families who care not for 
money but for the land” (150). It should be said, however, that this forms a crisis for the 
genre not for the historically obvious reason that the U.S. is a capitalist country. Rather, it 
forms a crisis for the genre because, though its stories so often concern the courage to 
enforce law, it remains unclear what the source of this law will be. Stagecoach prefers 
Ringo’s moral code, the sort of natural law that emerges from his land stewardship, 
because the film disdains the notions of lawfulness that attend Gatewood, the self-
righteous law propped up by the logic of capital. Gatewood professes admiration for the 
cavalry (“fine-looking bunch of soldier boys”) to the extent that they enforce the laws 
written by those with capital. He wishes, after all, that the country had a “businessman for 
President” because his “slogan” is that “government must not interfere with business.”  
Knowing him to be an embezzler, the audience hears his slogan to only mean that law 
should yield to and shapes itself around the movement of capital, no matter its 
prerogative. Once the “fine-looking bunch of soldiers” leaves the stagecoach vulnerable, 
Gatewood turns swiftly indignant at the “impertinence” of the lieutenant. We can hear in 
this banker’s rant against government “impertinence,” especially his antipathy to “bank 
examiners” (“as if we bankers didn’t know how to run our own banks”), the gap opened 
up between the prerogatives of the country and those of capital in the tightening 
regulatory environment of New Deal government.
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In this respect, Stagecoach could be read as part of a populist reaction against big 
business, a reaction conditioned by the trauma of the bank failures during the Great 
Depression. But if we can specify the venal banker as a Depression-era caricature, we can
assimilate the ladies of the Law and Order League to a much longer tradition, perhaps 
one with cinematic origins in D.W. Griffith’s films, such as the women’s reform group in 
Intolerance (1916) who, from their position of privilege, lord their values over the poor 
couple. And this longer tradition concerns itself precisely with the justice that derives 
from families who care for money, not for land. Stagecoach’s ladies of the Law and 
Order League, for instance, don’t care that Dallas, as a kid, lost her parents in “a 
massacre on Superstition Mountain,” throwing her back on her own devices, which led to 
her livelihood as a prostitute. They don’t care, in other words, that Dallas’s parents were 
slain as part of the country’s western territorial claims. They banish her from Tonto, 
rather, because she can’t keep up genteel appearances – appearances permitted by not 
having to do certain forms of work. As such, it’s no surprise that a prominent member in 
the Law and Order League is the wife of Gatewood: he, as the caricatured capitalist, 
underwrites her de facto legislating. 
Not only is their version of positive law tainted by its proximity to amoral capital; 
it seems, too, to be haunted by an older aristocracy, the ghost being the Southern 
gentleman in disrepute, Hatfield (John Carradine). For Hatfield, respect for law is strictly 
a matter of appearances, the performance of good manners, being as his true habits –
gambling and shooting people in the back – make him an outlaw of the craven kind. We 
can imagine these characters as having been hemorrhaged by the Eastern establishment, 
and its law books followed in their wake. We find confirmation for the family relation 
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between this positive law generated by capital and an old aristocratic order when 
Hatfield, with his dying words, requests, “If you see Judge Greenfield, tell him his son 
…” Because he dies mid-request, we are left to wonder if the law can repress this 
relationship. The important point, though, must be that this form of law, which is no more 
than a performance that disguises its origins, is moribund. Hatfield will not contribute to 
the future of the West, his will not be its juridical precepts.      
Ringo and Dallas are, of course, the future of the West. We know these two 
outcasts bear future hope by the recognition Ringo expresses on seeing Dallas hold a 
newborn. That Ringo and Dallas both lost their parents only means they aren’t chained to 
tradition, like Hatfield and Lucy; Ringo and Dallas are the robust characters, instead, 
whose capacity to nurture and protect ordains the pair, in the film’s scene, as being ready 
for a family. Still, it’s hard for Ringo to model a set of juridical precepts that could be 
formalized as positive law, under which society could grow, because so much of what he 
does is mere negation of what existing society does: he accepts the pariahs, Dallas and 
Doc, because he rejects the social norms under which they’ve gained a stigma; he 
eliminates the Plummer brothers because he abhors their random, unmotivated acts of 
violence. But without seeing what kind of community Ringo and Dallas might start, the 
concern lingers that, owing to a basis in non-normativity, law in such a community might 
not be able to take a positive form. Ringo may finally be sui generis, and his personal 
“style,” as Schatz calls it, might not withstand being conventionalized.
Stagecoach manages the slippage between natural law and positive law, and their 
ostensible sources in land and money, by having recourse to a border (a spatial beyond or 
horizon) as well as to a future instead of a past, such that a germinal tradition is projected 
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rather than an ossified tradition recollected (a temporal beyond or horizon). We see this 
same set of moves deployed in the subsequent Ford films My Darling Clementine (1946) 
and The Searchers (1956), but the moves evolve different meanings over the intervening 
years. In Clementine, Wyatt Earp kills the Clanton family in order to establish his bona 
fides a second time over: the first time in Dodge City, and this time in Tombstone. He 
kills the Clanton family because they represent a sort of vacuum of law subtended by the 
logic of capital, and he does this specifically in the name of his brother James, his 
emblem of the future. “Maybe when we leave this country, young kids like you will be 
able to live and grow up safe,” Earp says to the tombstone of his slain brother. 
Clementine ends in such a way as to suggest that the future will be secured for “young 
kids like you” through the twin establishments of school and church. But Earp must leave 
Clementine (Cathy Downs) in order for her charge as schoolmarm to officially begin, 
which is only another way of saying that his natural law must leave the scene in order for 
her to teach literacy in the community and thus inculcate positive law. We still see 
slippage in Clementine in that, while the law of capital is voided, it seems to be 
compensated by the law of the church, on which Earp puts his begrudging imprimatur (he 
goes to the church dance, it should be said, because his love interest Clementine goes).
But if Wyatt Earp, through the specific loss of his brother, understands himself 
vis-à-vis the general protections that would be codified for all families, Ethan Edwards of 
The Searchers can by no means transfer the rights of his private family to a generalized 
other and, as such, his condition of being “beyond the border,” of being debarred from 
the interior of society, is an absolute condition. Ethan best embodies Schatz’s observation 
that the moral code of the Western hero, “as the genre develops,” “emerges as an end in 
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itself,” with his former “role as promoter of civilization” becoming “almost coincidental” 
(51). When Schatz remarks that The Searchers “might be read as a procession of 
characters with whom Ethan is doubled” (72), he is observing a circumstance that could 
be no other way: every person Ethan encounters will be his opposite, in that they are all 
other than him. Ethan’s trenchant commitment to specificity makes something of an 
anthropologist of him: he knows the Comanche language, the Spanish language, and the 
customs and rituals of different groups. He knows, for example, the cultural differences 
between the homesteaders and the Comanche well enough to explain that shooting the 
eyes out of a dead Comanche will make no difference by what the homesteaders 
“preach,” but by what the Comanche believe, it will prevent him for entering the “spirit 
land.” But he brandishes cultural difference, which he believes rests on biological 
difference, as reason to refuse community tout court. Because community is so hard to 
keep pure (Debbie is “Comanche now,” Martin is one-eighth Cherokee), cultural 
difference will always exist in any community. And thus Ethan has to limit his family, 
finally, to only himself (in his will, he disavows Debbie as “blood kin”) as a means of 
radically limiting what he will claim as his culture.
By Liberty Valance, then, the reconciliation of natural and positive law has 
worked, if at all, by way of banishing sheer individualism from the communitarian setting 
or else deferring, as a task for future generations, the synthesis of the specific/individual 
with the general/communal. Liberty Valance is such a self-knowing account of this crisis 
that it has come off, in some appraisals, as “stylized,” a “world of formal artifice,” with a 
“sharpened consciousness of the thematic level” of the work.8 It functions as a 
postmortem of the Western, filled with references to earlier moments in the genre: such 
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as Ransom Stoddard’s (James Stewart) arrival in town on the Overland Stage, the same 
line that Buck Rickabaugh (Andy Devine) drove in Stagecoach; and Link Appleyard 
(Andy Devine) having married a Mexican woman named Julietta, as he said he would in 
Stagecoach in the role of Rickabaugh; and Tom Doniphon (John Wayne) is building a 
bedroom on his ranch, as though it were Ringo’s “half-finished ranch” from Stagecoach, 
still under construction these many years later; and Liberty Valance (Lee Marvin) and his 
flunkies number three, as Luke Plummer and his brothers did; and “when Tom shoots 
Liberty from the shadows of an alley,” as Parick McGee notes, “he uses a rifle just as 
Ringo did” (134). Indeed, McGee argues that we could take Liberty Valance as “an 
attempt to bring together and resolve the tensions” that issue from Stagecoach and Destry 
Rides Again (1939). While it must be true that Liberty Valance intends to draw together 
Ringo Kid and Thomas Jefferson Destry (James Stewart), it does so not because the two 
characters had distinct relationships to law and order. Though Ringo seems to endorse 
natural law to the extent that his rifle can enforce it, and Destry doesn’t believe in 
“shootin’ irons” but instead “law and order” “without guns,” they both, ultimately, gain 
the authority to implement their versions of law by being dead-eye shooters. Destry, that 
is, can promote a positive law that grants rights to individuals, irrespective of the force of 
the individual, because Destry himself can display great individual force. Liberty 
Valance, we might say, puts both films together because their traditions both suppose that 
natural law and positive law are blended together, with the former being the teeth of the 
latter, and the effect of them being joined in a single figure has been to mystify the source 
of law altogether.
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Liberty Valance disarticulates the figures of natural and positive law and suggests 
that their union in a single figure – in either Destry or Ransom Stoddard – was mere 
“legend.” Instead, Liberty Valance implies that these two figures of law compete with 
each other. Tom Doniphon antagonizes Stoddard, “I know those law books mean a lot to 
you, but not out here.” Doniphon explains how far natural law extends when he then 
admonishes Stoddard, “Out here a man settles his own problems” by “packing a 
handgun.” Such law emerges from the individual, and extends only as far as his might. 
Ethan Edwards has shown how problematic such law is, because he used his might to 
protect only the people who met his capricious standard of family. In fact, we might say 
that natural law, in this regard, results in a problem of nativism: those families who are of 
the land will be protected by such law. Liberty Valance, however, wants to explain this 
reference to natural law, that “a man settles his own problems,” as an axiom that best 
serves the logic of capital. After all, Liberty Valance is a hired gun for the cattle barons 
“north of the Picket Wire.” It’s a logic that survives on the other side of the border, where 
it can escape the jurisdiction of territorial logic; it needs, in other words, for there to be 
such a space as “north of the Picket Wire,” and thus it fights statehood with its hired 
guns. Stoddard, indeed, understands Doniphon’s words on just these lines, and declares 
that Doniphon doesn’t oppose Valance’s logic but reproduces it himself. “You know 
what you’re saying to me,” Stoddard questions Doniphon, “you’re saying just exactly 
what Liberty Valance said.”
At a philosophical distance from Doniphon, Stoddard is free to enunciate the 
territorial logic behind his version of law and order. Stoddard explains to his classroom, 
which is at once a literacy and a civics course, that “if the big ranchers north of the Picket 
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Wire River, if they win their fight to keep this Territory an open range, all your truck 
farms, your corn, the small shopkeepers and everything, the future of your kids – it’ll all 
be over, all gone.” This sense of state law as a precondition for the right use of land (not 
open-range cattle farming, in Stoddard’s account, because this is the lot of the cattle 
barons, the avatars of capital) should count as an advance on The Searchers’ Jorgensen 
family’s future-tense sense of territorial logic: “Someday this country will be a fine, good 
place to be,” Mrs. Jorgensen says, “Maybe it needs our bones in the ground before that 
time can come.” Her sense in which the land could generate lawful life requires the 
sacrifice of her own life to “kill-crazy” natural law, as Ransom Stoddard describes it. In 
her outlook, her family prepares the land for future generations; they don’t have the 
chance, though, to employ its right use. In the last act of Liberty Valance, Dutton 
Peabody (Edmond O’Brien) explains for a delegate convention the successive phases of 
land stewardship and their attendant forms of law: passing through the “law of the 
tomahawk and the bow and arrow” and, next, the “law of the hired gun,” the Territory 
arrives at a new threshold in which “the people,” brought by the railroads, populate the 
land and use it, and this, as Peabody declares, is the preordained outcome of 
development. For these “steady, hard-working citizens,” among whom Peabody counts 
“the homesteader, the shopkeeper, the builder of cities,” they “need roads to join those 
cities, dams to store up the waters of the Picket Wire,” and, of course, “statehood to 
protect the rights of every man and woman, no matter how humble.”
Stoddard is, on Peabody’s account, the man to codify those protections for “every 
man and woman” because Stoddard, rather than “packing a gun,” came “carrying instead 
a bag of law books.” But given that Peabody himself admits that “you can’t shoot back 
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with a law book,” the question of how such protections will be instituted remains. The 
answer, in an idealized narrative that Stoddard is known to tell, is that because the U.S. is 
governed by the people (“The people are the boss,” the conspicuously Swedish-accented 
Nora declares, because “the United States is a republic”), education will inculcate the law 
of the land in them. Michael Bohnke, in a legal meditation, describes this source of law 
“as developing within society, being spontaneous and growing upwards, independent of 
any dominant will” (48). And thus, as Stoddard has written on his chalkboard, “Education 
is the basis of law and order.” So Stoddard, as he’s announced at the delegate convention, 
is necessarily both a lawyer and a teacher; his teaching functions, putatively, as the teeth 
of his law. Indeed, the moment in which Stoddard believes he has “got Liberty Valance 
just exactly where he wants him” is also a moment in which he discovers Hallie’s (Vera 
Miles) illiteracy. Hallie has never known which laws Liberty Valance could be charged 
with violating because she has never had the power to read a law book. 
But, then, Stoddard has never really taken literacy, a facility with words, to 
possess power enough to legitimize the law. Enforcement of the law, that is, can’t come 
from within itself, but must draw its force from without. In this respect, Stoddard’s 
confession that “When force threatens, talk’s no good anymore” is only another version 
of Peabody’s mocking description of Stoddard’s power to scare Liberty Valance by being 
“the spectacle of law and order here rising up out of the gravy and mashed potatoes.” In 
short, the crisis of positive law, insofar as it prescribes the workings of domestic 
tranquility, is that its power to remain integral cannot come from within; it must have 
recourse, when threatened, to a brute force from without, to a reminder of the “law of 
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survival” that Peabody claims, in his oratory, to be a sedimentary layer of national 
history. 
Liberty Valance poses a simple enough solution to this impasse: When the town 
of Shinbone needs to eliminate Liberty Valance, Doniphon kills him and passes it off as 
the work of Stoddard. This act confers legitimacy on the peaceful order Stoddard
advocates by way of positing a chimerical originary moment, one in which law has its 
own teeth, “spontaneous and growing upwards.” The elegance of this solution lies in the 
fact that the social order can rid itself of the border, across which the righteous criminal 
fled (Doniphon doesn’t have to flee, only become a revenant of the juridical order), as 
well as of its reliance on future-tense resolution of incompatibilities within the law. 
Indeed, Liberty Valance inverts the Western’s formal tendency to look forward (to a time 
when the Jorgensen’s bones are in the ground, and the land is safe for the young James 
Earps) into a tendency to look backward (to a time when Tom Doniphon and Ransom 
Stoddard could seem, in a kind of mirage, to be the same person). In consequence, the 
territory need not have borders, in that its juridical order can extend forever. Still, for its 
legitimacy, positive law must at once retain its mythic roots in natural law, but banish 
from its interior the actual traces of an authority that was, a fortiori, above positive law: it 
must nostalgically recall Doniphon as it buries him.
Criminalizing the Cowboy: From Lonely Are the Brave to First Blood
Having solved the problem of the relationship between natural and positive law, 
whether sophistically or otherwise, Liberty Valance pushes another problem more 
squarely into the foreground. We might say that the Ringo Kids and the Doniphons 
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deplored those who brought westward a positive law elaborated on behalf of capital, and 
therefore they turned to a natural law born from a communion with land, forging, in 
reaction, an individualist credo that might never detach from the individual and extend to 
community. In response to the fact that the individualism of natural law carried no moral 
charge – it could yield a Scar or an Ethan Edwards, a Liberty Valance or a Tom 
Doniphon – a new positive law had to be formulated on behalf of territorial concerns. 
This law of the Territory would cover all its people, converting the Territory into a state, 
and its people into citizens. The problem, then, emerges in the new form of how you 
delimit the citizenry? And the two solutions come in the form of Ethan Edwards’s 
nativism or Ransom Stoddard’s education, and neither solution is coherent. Walter Benn 
Michaels has convincingly argued the outcomes of nativism, all of which result in the 
extinction of the endogamous family, and the solution of education (a scenario in which 
anyone who learns and observes the law of the land is granted access to it and its rights) 
is flawed because it doesn’t delimit but rather makes the possible citizenry infinite, 
whereas the land is obviously finite.
In response, a new kind of logic is floated, one better fitted to the transnational 
territoriality of corporate capitalism. We see that logic in Five Easy Pieces’s renunciation 
of the markers of citizenship and then Marvin Gardens’s displacement of that citizenship 
by something like corporate fraternity, or corporate friendship as I call it in Chapter 4. 
And an early film to float this new logic happens to be a Western, Lonely Are the Brave; 
indeed, the film might be described as a swan song to the cowboy hero.9 The plot of the 
film involves Jack Burns, whose rugged individuality is signified by his cowboy dress 
and horse, and his visit to Duke City, New Mexico, where good friend, Paul Bondi 
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(Michael Kane), has been imprisoned. Burns comes to town with the purpose of breaking 
Bondi out of jail and, to that end, gets himself imprisoned, with a hacksaw blade stashed 
in his boots. Burns finds Bondi in the cell, but Bondi won’t take part in Burns’s prison-
break because he has a wife and son and, for their sake, refuses to be a fugitive. So Burns 
breaks out alone, and then becomes the object of a manhunt. He outfoxes the police, 
however, and eludes their search party. A truck hits Burns, then, as he tries to cross an 
expressway on horseback, making the film’s point obvious enough that the contest 
between people belonged to a heroic era, while the contest between people and their 
machinery is the true one in a fully modernized era.
For insight into the film’s reconsidered logic of territory, though, we should 
compare the film with its source text, Edward Abbey’s The Brave Cowboy (1956). Dalton 
Trumbo’s adapted script remains quite close to the novel, but the change he does make, 
the reason for Bondi’s imprisonment, italicizes the stakes to thinking in new ways about 
nation-states and territory. In Abbey’s novel, Bondi goes to prison for “refusin to register 
for the draft” (24). It’s important to note that he refuses to “register for the draft,” not to 
fight in a war,10 because we’ve already seen that Jack’s refusal to register for the 
Selective Service is of a piece with a larger refusal to carry identification (no “draft card, 
social security, driver’s license” [72]). Burns refuses draft registration, then, because he 
views it as the state’s intrusion on his autonomy. “Don’t need none,” Burns says of I.D., 
“I already know who I am,” indicating that his rights are constituted from self-
knowledge, and are not conferred by the state’s knowledge of him. It’s clear enough that 
neither man is a pacifist; they direct their refusal, rather, at the state’s efforts to regulate 
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them. Bondi tells his draft board, in fact, “it’s the law itself that I object to,” because the 
law of “compulsive military service” is “unconstitutional” (108).
Bondi’s philosophical position seems to show inconsistencies. He claims to be 
serving his prison sentence, rather than breaking jail as Burns would like, because he has 
“a great deal of respect for law and order,” yet he also labels himself a “no-account 
Jeffersonian anarchist” (100, 107). Any sense in which he’s truly Jeffersonian or 
respectful of law must be understood in terms of the opposition he constructs between 
individuals (“immediate concrete things”) and the state (“the giant abstractions”). If he is 
indeed lawful, it cannot be “Jeffersonian” in the sense that citizens would be “enlisted by 
all their interest” to the “moderate powers” of the state, as Jefferson himself wrote (The 
Republic of Letters); it must, rather, be that Bondi has subtracted the state from 
Jefferson’s individualism and then placed that individualism into a new bonding form. 
And that bonding form, expressed in his “pledge” to “choose my friend” if made to 
choose “between my country and my friend,” will fall outside the organizational bodies 
recognized by the nation-state (“Great nations may fall in ruin before I shall sell a 
friend,” says Bondi [109]). But notions of law and order under such organization will not 
have the character of Burns’s “romantic, outlandish, impossible, nineteenth-century 
notions,” the old-fashioned character that Bondi elsewhere says passed with “Thoreau, 
the frontier, the I.W.W.” (100, 113). He does little to articulate the contours of such an 
organizational body on a large scale, preferring instead to identify the bond in the 
domains of immediacy – “my wife and my son and you and myself” (109). But one can 
imagine that the corporation might be the full-blown organizational expression of the 
laws intrinsic in the natural formations of self, family, and friendship.
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The corporation might not only give some consistency to Bondi’s views on law 
and order once the state-form is eclipsed; it might also explain a hidden consistency in 
the change Trumbo makes to Abbey’s novel. In Lonely Are the Brave, Bondi is not in jail 
for protesting the draft, but for helping illegal immigrants once they crossed the U.S.-
Mexican border. If we can clear up Bondi’s ostensible inconsistencies by understanding 
that he cares for law, but simply not for those laws rooted in the state, then it follows that 
he would show no respect for the state’s boundaries. Bondi “helped” the immigrants, “hid 
them and fed them and gave them directions about where to find work,” which is a 
“crime” that owes its special relevance to a territorial logic of law and order, one that 
subtends the kind of protectionism that made “igloos” of “nation-state economies,” to 
again use Hobsbawm’s language. In fact, it’s a crime that offends not “nineteenth-century 
notions,” but the twentieth-century ones of the labor movement, making sense of Bondi’s 
inclusion of the “I.W.W.” among his outmoded styles of lawfulness. The labor union 
movements depended on states, appealing to them to mediate the relationship between 
business concerns and labor. We might infer that the I.W.W. is outmoded, in Bondi’s 
mind, because states are outmoded, and therefore he commits no ethical breach in helping 
illegal immigrants “find work” on the U.S. side of the border. He anticipates, rather, a 
new ethical order, a new juridical order, one in which friendship displaces citizenship as 
the guarantor of rights.
But I am less concerned with projecting the sort of juridical order in which 
Bondi’s principles would eventuate than I am concerned with showing the fault line 
between the principles of Bondi and Burns. The novel and film present Bondi’s 
individualism over against the individualism of Burns. Bondi will accept a term in prison 
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for his individualism; Burns won’t. In both cases, they premise their individualism on a 
belief in natural law and a rejection of positive law; they both fell in love, as Burns says, 
with a girl called “Do what you want to do and the hell with everybody else.” But though 
the film has Burns and Bondi refer to their shared belief in “natural man,” it omits the 
philosophical dialogue that the novel uses to delineate the opposed logics that license 
their different brands of individualism. They both detest the positive law that has, through 
its institutionalization and expression in bureaucratic functions, become impersonal. As 
Bondi laments, “I see my own country overwhelmed by ugliness and mediocrity and 
overcrowding” (106), all of which ensues from the institutions of modernity. But, unlike 
Burns, he doubts that modernity is reversible – or escapable. Burns, in the tradition of the 
cowboy hero, still takes there to be some wilderness into which he can flee from 
civilization. He wishes to take Bondi and his family with him into this sanctuary, where 
they might teach Bondi’s son how “to read and write, I suppose, and better things too –
how to track deer, how to fish through ice, how to trap the silver fox, how to make things, 
useful things like bows, arrows, snowshoes, bullets” (101). In short, Burns still derives 
his individualism from a territorialist logic, which is, as seen, an earlier phase of law and 
order, on Dutton Peabody’s account.
But Bondi eschews the territorialist logic, evident in his disregard for border laws. 
Bondi tells Burns, “I don’t believe in your form of escape” (112-113). While he can’t 
blame Burns “for wanting no part” in the political system, he’s “not yet ready to 
withdraw,” “even if withdrawal is possible, which,” as he admits, “I doubt.” Burns 
disputes him, “It is possible … I know of places right here in the American West where 
white men have never been” (106-107). Burns represents, in this respect, the impulse 
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behind the defection film, but his failure lies not in his inability to imagine a new political 
system, but in his need to imagine a prepolitical way of life. Bondi, in contrast, imagines 
a world completely absorbed by political systems, and as such asserts a style of 
individualism, with its own attendant legal forms, from within the system. He carries this 
out as an educator, as he says, so that he might “make an honest living introducing a little 
philosophy into the heads of engineers, druggists, future politicians” (107). The 
difference between Bondi and Ransom Stoddard, though, is that Stoddard saw education 
as the means to inculcate positive law in the people of the territory, whereas Bondi views 
education as a potential virus in the body politic, and teaches so that his students might 
repudiate the positive law of a mediocre and overcrowded country. In short, Bondi 
derives his individualism from the seeming autonomy that education has gained from the 
state. He affiliates with an institution that can pursue its charter in antagonism with the 
state, even if the state had originally granted it its charter.11 It is in this sense that we 
might think of Bondi’s individualism as one that would find its congenial organizational 
culture in the modern corporation.
The philosophical rift between Burns and Bondi crystallizes a bifurcated moment 
in the crisis of individualism, with one solution oriented to the future and another to the 
past (this is said, of course, from a future standpoint in which individualism, irrespective 
of its repercussions, is ideologically sound). In this respect, their dispute recalls the 
movement from Five Easy Pieces to Marvin Gardens, where first the character of Bobby 
Dupea relinquishes all personal identification, all proof of citizenship, and then wanders 
off into a political wilderness; and then the Staebler brothers decide to create their 
personalized polity, the domain of Staebleravia, not by renouncing the laws of their 
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society, but by considering those laws amenable to revision in the name of friendship. 
Burns represents the first moment, the absolute repudiation of the system, and Bondi 
represents the second moment, which we might refer to as accommodations within the 
system. Thus we can take the movement from Five Easy Pieces to Marvin Gardens to be 
roughly the same movement made, in a single plot, in Lonely Are the Brave. 
Lonely Are the Brave chooses the past, as it were, proffering its cowboy hero as 
either a stay against history or an indictment of its ruthless march. The film does not, 
namely, dwell on Bondi’s emergent form of individualism so much as it observes the 
passing of Burns’s form of individualism. In fact, Lonely Are the Brave views the passage 
of the cowboy hero not as one from relevance to obsolescence, but as one from the status 
of ego-ideal to that of criminal. When Burns escapes prison, he provokes a manhunt that 
calls on the state’s most advanced means, such as the helicopters lent to the sheriff’s 
posse by the army. It’s hard to imagine, however, that the state marshals its greatest 
powers because Burns himself poses so pernicious a threat; his crime, after all, was 
nothing more than fisticuffs. The state hunts him so aggressively because, if it is to show 
the reach of its surveillance technology, it must snuff out what Burns symbolizes: an 
outside, a place beyond the system. Burns must be rendered a criminal, then captured, 
because it reassures the state of its own omnipotence. 
Of course, the irony of Lonely Are the Brave is not that the machinery of the state 
can apprehend Burns and, having done so, show its unlimited reach. The irony is that 
unlimited reach is attributed, instead, to economic development. Burns is struck down by 
a delivery truck with the logo “Acme” emblazoned on its side and a cargo of “privies” in 
its trailer. The truckload of toilets is much more than an undignified hand of death. More 
203
broadly, it signals that the dams have stored up water, as Dutton Peabody requested, and 
that indoor plumbing is spreading throughout the West, perhaps as quickly as the 
construction of the interstate highway system permits. The ignominy of Burns’s death, 
then, is that he is killed by the fixture that was once placed outside the domestic space, 
but is now being drawn indoors, a signifier of the completed internalization of 
wilderness.
Criminalizing the cowboy, it should be emphasized, marks the first moment in his 
transformation into the Vietnam veteran. His criminal status has to do, chiefly, with the 
fact that he has trained in surviving outside the juridical order. Edward Abbey, 
understanding that the capacity to exist alone in nature affronts regimes of law, developed
first the character of Jack Burns, an outlaw cowboy, and then turned his interest to the 
character of George Washington Hayduke, the Vietnam veteran in The Monkey Wrench 
Gang (1975) who is the munitions expert in a band of eco-terrorists. In transferring the 
qualities of cowboy to Vietnam veteran, Abbey might be one of the first to note the 
homology in the inner formation of these icons, in terms of their representations.
Of course, Abbey based Hayduke on real-life friend Doug Peacock. Peacock, in 
turn, represented himself in the memoir, Walking It Off: A Veteran’s Chronicle of War 
and Wilderness, and in some respects his self-representation both reproduces and fends 
off Abbey’s representation. Peacock credits Abbey, on one hand, with noticing “my 
talents – my useful training and that great anger going to waste – and determined how it 
might best be used”: to raise a “fist against the blind greed of technology” (27, 34). 
Peacock, on his own account, needed a representation of the source and value of his “own
militancy” (27). And it was Abbey’s representation that sorted out the philosophical 
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stakes to his character, “forged” in the “crucible” of Vietnam and now “identifying for 
me my real enemies and the real war, the one being waged against life on earth” (27). 
But, on the other hand, Peacock sees pathos in how the representation must be lived out 
in real-life. “The trouble,” Peacock writes, “was that, unlike Hayduke, the real man was 
not content to stay out in the cold; he wanted to cross back over into the human realm” 
(102). The “human realm,” for Peacock, debars what he sees himself as, a warrior, 
because “warriors, however necessary, are not fit company for society” (102). But rather 
than retain his language, which has a kind of mythic quality, pitting warriors against 
humans, we might hear his “warrior” and “human” as simply “noncitizen” and “citizen.” 
Vietnam, simply put, rendered Peacock unfit to be a citizen.
And, in this sense, we might think that the cultural value attached to the cowboy 
hero dissipates because, at some point during the spectacle of the Vietnam War, it 
became hard to imagine how special training in noncitizenship could help rather than 
harm society. We might look to media representations of Huey Newton or Katherine 
Boudin as episodes in the emergent cultural management of the figure of the militarized 
outlaw. Huey Newton’s murder trial caused consternation in main media outlets, 
seemingly reflecting or stimulating public response, likely both. Katherine Boudin’s 
involvement in the Greenwich Village townhouse explosion raised another kind of 
specter: that of a child of affluence being initiated into bomb construction and the skill set 
of the special forces. We might suppose that putting such heavy emphasis on how 
amateurish were these bomb-builders was one means of managing anxiety about the 
general spread of these specialized skills. 
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Furthermore, the medicalization of the Vietnam veteran’s unfitness for society, 
seen in the growing diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), counts as the 
surfacing in another discourse of that peculiar relationship of which the cowboy is an 
icon – the relationship, that is, between law and lawlessness, and the marginal status 
relegated to those trained outside the norms of a society to protect the inside of a society. 
When Veterans Affairs pronounced Peacock’s PTSD “100%” and “Total and 
Permanent,” they officially avowed what Peacock himself hoped to disavow, that, 
because the war had shown “that all things are indeed permitted,” it had been able to 
“disfigure the core of my being” and that “I was totally whacko and forever unsuited to 
operate within what they called civilization” (109, 112, 113). It is in this regard that “in 
Vietnam, the myth of the gunslinging Western hero swaggering into the frontier sunset 
had finally died an overdue death” (124).
The Trauma of the Cowboy: The Deer Hunter and Taxi Driver
While no film more explicitly rewrites Lonely Are the Brave than First Blood, and 
thus none more publicly declare the conversion of Western hero into Vietnam veteran, I 
wish to consider first a group of films that creates a psychological profile of the Vietnam 
veteran. Though this cycle may begin with Hi, Mom! and it may include Tracks (1976), 
Coming Home (1978), and others, I will only address The Deer Hunter and Taxi Driver
for their expression of a certain philosophical sequence, one in which the lesson of the 
Vietnam War is that natural law had always been a cultural construction and, thus, the 
practitioners of natural law had always been inside society, along with a corollary 
procedure for reconstructing those subjectivities constituted outside the juridical order. In 
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analyzing these films, I mean to accentuate the ways in which they keep the Western hero 
as their reference point, either explicitly or implicitly, though they depict Vietnam 
veterans, and this end will be kept in view to show, finally, how the originary icon, the 
Western hero, is all but effaced by the time of First Blood.
Unlike Liberty Valance, The Deer Hunter opts for naturalist settings and details, 
relying on the unvarnished effect of location shooting rather than the kind of studio sets 
and broad characterizations that placed Liberty Valance’s nested tale, as Schatz remarks, 
in an allegorical realm. But The Deer Hunter is still laden with symbolism, and it will be 
through those means that the film elaborates a kind of philosophical crisis. Most 
immediately, symbolism inheres in the mise-en-scène. In the opening shot, a highway 
overpass frames a Pennsylvania hamlet, in a centered, square portrait. The town of 
Clairton looks sleepy from this distance, but not so much from want of activity as from 
the fact that it’s morning, everything seems to be shut down, and a fog resting on the 
town makes it look as though seen through gauze. But a tanker truck speeding under the 
highway breaks the illusion that we are beholding a village tucked in green hills; this is a 
fully industrialized landscape, and the smoke given off by the truck only adds to that of 
the steel foundry’s smokestacks, the source, it would seem, of the foggy portrait. The 
town seems sleepy merely because its activity is hidden within the steel foundry, where 
the men of the town labor in shifts throughout the day. We again encounter the locus 
classicus of the American romance, as outlined by Leo Marx, with the scene of nature 
(Pennsylvania hillside) interrupted by the signs of industry (steel foundry, fuel truck). The 
Deer Hunter takes its title, though, from the habit of its male characters to hunt in these 
hillsides when not working in the steel foundry. The film holds the experience of nature 
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as a bulwark against the figure of industry, the truck rushing headlong at the townspeople 
below, bearing something of the inexorable fate of the truck from Lonely Are the Brave.
Though mise-en-scène first suggests the film’s symbolic economy, its characters 
quickly reinforce it in their dialogue. As they emerge from the foundry, Stevie (John 
Savage) points at the sky and exclaims, “What the hell is that?” Michael (Robert De 
Niro) looks up and says, “You know what that is? Those are sun dogs.” And when the 
others react quizzically, he explains, “It means a blessing on the hunter send by the Great 
Wolf to his children.” If we don’t already gather that the opposition being laid out is the 
old one between Native American traditions and those of an encroaching European-style 
civilization, established in the Western genre, then Michael clarifies it, “It’s an old Indian 
thing.” The film deploys Michael, indeed, as the liminal character, in touch with both 
nature and civilization, squarely in the tradition of the Western hero. Yet we might 
associate Michael with a longer Western tradition, with roots in James Fenimore 
Cooper’s Leatherstocking tales; the film’s title, of course, recalls Cooper’s The 
Deerslayer (1841). In this respect, The Deer Hunter bypasses the codification of the 
Western hero through Ringo Kid and Tom Doniphon and Ethan Edwards, but still draws 
on the same set of philosophical concerns by going to a different font. Natty Bumpo, as it 
happens, gave early voice to the riddle of natural law and its basis for legitimacy. In 
argument with fellow hunter Hurry Harry, Bumpo remarks that, though they “live in the 
woods” and thus appear to be “beyond human laws,” “there is a law” yet, “and a law 
maker, that rule across the whole continent” (18). 
The fact that a “law maker” presides over “the whole continent” places people in 
some contract with the land and its creatures. Michael, in the same mode, feels 
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reverentially towards the animal he hunts, believing there to be a code for taking a deer’s 
life. He shares his philosophy of “one shot” (“One shot is what it’s all about,” he says, “a 
deer has to be taken with one shot”) with not only Natty Bumpo, who scorns Hurry Harry 
for taking an errant shot at a buck “when there is no occasion for the meat, or the skin” 
and describes the echo of his missed shot as “the voice of natur’ calling out ag’in a 
wasteful and onthinking action” (45); this purposefulness of his hunting methods, as 
Bumpo self-proclaims, makes him “a slayer” but “no slaughterer” (45). Michael shares 
the principle, as well, with Ringo Kid, who asks the marshal for only three bullets to use 
against the three Plummer brothers (and his efficiency is contrasted with a Plummer 
brother, who takes a potshot at a cat and misses). We might say that back of this credo 
lies not only an interdiction on “wasteful and onthinking action,” but a belief that an 
outcome is preordained. Reserving only “one shot” for one’s mark presupposes an 
understanding of that prey, its habits and abilities, as much as it presupposes the rightness 
of hunting that prey in the first place. The hunter, that is, is permitted his prey by his 
knowledge of the larger design.
The Deer Hunter develops Michael’s religious feeling for nature in order to 
explain the trauma of Vietnam. Robin Wood has delineated the structure of the film as 
one of an “alternation pattern” between “geographic locations,” breaking into five 
“narrative blocks” the alternation between Clairton and Vietnam. Further, the principle 
for the alternation is “diminution,” with each block being “significantly shorter than the 
one that precedes it” (Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan 246). As Wood explains, this 
structure signals a passage “from plenitude to impoverishment” (247) – his main 
examples being the death of Nick (Christopher Walken), the amputated legs of Stevie, 
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and the lost leadership of Michael. Pace Wood, I would instead suggest that the form, 
because it suggests attenuation and gradual abrasion, is a bad fit for the trauma of their 
experience in Vietnam. The formal diminution, in fact, might be calculated to absorb, bit 
by bit, the shock that comes from the very sudden, very absolute epiphany that their 
experience of nature was a purely cultural one. Michael and Nick, and the others less 
poignantly, are forced to accept that they had never been experiencing nature without 
mediation, but had instead been bringing notions of civilization and culture into nature. 
They sharply realize, once in Vietnam, that nature imparts no law; Nick’s early 
confession to Michael that “I don’t think about one shot that much anymore” functions as 
a way of preparing the film, philosophically, for Vietnam.
Sylvia Shin Huey Chong offers a compelling way to understand the film’s 
“alternation pattern,” noting that the “Clairton sequences rely on a thickness of 
naturalistic detail,” whereas the “Vietnam scenes draw on a thickness of corporeal 
experience” (92). But we might qualify that the film produces a “thickness of naturalistic 
detail” in service of documenting cultural practices. The scenes of the Russian Orthodox 
wedding and reception famously last twenty-five minutes. But we are given to understand 
that community functions, such as those of the church, are not the sole venue for the 
enactment of cultural values; even when hunting in the mountains, which has been 
depicted as an escape from civilized life, the characters are insulated by culture, as we 
learn from the choral music scored to Michael’s tracking of the deer, the same musical 
cue from the wedding. This ritual of individual solitude, that is, has community sanction. 
Contrast with this the cut to scenes in Vietnam, which has only the chopping of helicopter 
blades for its soundtrack. In these scenes, Michael, Nick and Stevie are thrown into a 
210
nature that has no logic, no mercy. This nature – perhaps suggested in the juxtaposition of 
excessive vegetation with the starkness of the trees that Nick loves so much in the 
mountains – is not efficient and purposeful. Indeed, the correlative for its wastefulness is 
the Vietcong torture practice of Russian Roulette, which is a figure for the body’s brute 
subjection to chance. The “thickness of corporeal experience,” as Chong calls it, is 
nothing more than the body’s response to a nature freed from mediations, a nature which 
gives rise to no law or fair play, whether individualist or communitarian.
If the trauma occurs, though, when the body loses the cultural integument it 
turned against nature, we might construe this trauma, in socio-historical terms, as that 
which occurred when Vietnam became nothing more than a vacant space onto which pure 
capitalism could be projected. The Deer Hunter, after all, is completely unconcerned with 
the politics of Vietnam.12 In this respect, it hews to the “tradition of the Western,” as 
Wood writes, in evacuating the politics of the Other and projecting “uncontainable
energies” into that space (emphasis original 253). What had hitherto contained the 
energies of capitalism, we might say, was a territorialist logic. But the tension in which 
the latter logic held that of capital is now gone, and a totally unregulated environment 
begins to form itself before the imagination. The Deer Hunter, now freed from any 
naturalist commitments, imagines this phantasmagoria in which Vietnamese capitalists 
wave dollars around, speculating on the probabilities of human life itself, as the imputed 
torture technique of Russian Roulette is now recast as the very figure for the unbridled 
speculation of finance capital. When Michael chases his friend Nick as he leaves the 
gambling den, and then sees Nick throw dollar bills from his fleeing convertible, with the 
dollars scattering in the air for the excited villagers, we can imagine that The Deer Hunter
211
is not a meditation on the Vietnam War at all, but on the explosion of the foreign 
exchange market and the emergence of what has been called the “capitalist archipelago” 
of East and Southeast Asia.13 The film’s final scene, indeed, gathers its main characters in 
the industrial town of Clairton, Pennsylvania, to mourn at once the loss of their friend 
Nick and their territorial sovereignty: “God bless America,” they sing in chorus, “land
that I love.”
Next to the The Deer Hunter, Taxi Driver is a much more truculent film. While 
both films pathologize the Vietnam veteran, Taxi Driver presents its protagonist, Travis 
Bickle (Robert De Niro), as a full-blown sociopath. We might begin to consider their 
different characterizations of the returned veteran by attending to similarities in the 
openings of the respective films. Both films begin with a shot of an automobile cutting 
through the vapor: in The Deer Hunter, we see the fuel truck barreling through a smoggy 
morning toward Clairton, while in Taxi Driver we see the taxi emerge from the vapors 
hovering just over the sewers and streets of New York City. But where Clairton retains 
something of a bucolic quality, albeit one punctured by industry, the New York City of 
Taxi Driver is cleft from nature for good. Thus, no feeling of opposition remains, as it 
does in The Deer Hunter, where we might think the truck represents an incursion on the 
town, that its mass of metal hurtles toward and endangers the people below. Taxi Driver, 
rather, presents the taxi as a kind of agency of its own, a character in the story. Though 
we alternate between a view on city life and the close-up eyes of Travis Bickle, 
underlined by a Bernard Herrmann score alternating between sinister percussion and 
lyrical saxophone passages, we do not have a sense that we are beholding the scene from 
the standpoint of human subjectivity. Instead, we see our surroundings from what feels 
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like the merged perspective of the taxi and Travis Bickle, a sense conjured by the 
electronic font of the opening credits that transitions into the digital smear the streets 
become through the rain-streaked windshields of the taxi.
Seeing the world from this perspective is, as Wood says, sharing the viewpoint of 
an “efficient killing-machine” (45). But the identity between Bickle and his taxi is meant 
to recall the relationship a cowboy had with his horse, such as Jack Burns and his horse, 
Whiskey. When Burns says he “fell in love with a no-good horse” (96), however, he 
invokes a relationship with nature that Bickle doesn’t have. In fact, Bickle’s relationship 
with nature has already passed through the phase of its technological transfiguration, 
evidenced in the fact that Bickle’s horse is his taxi. The distinction, then, between nature 
and civilization dims to the extent that Bickle, a self-styled sheriff riding into town to 
clean it up, notoriously confuses natural and human forces. “Someday a real rain will 
come,” he says, “and wash all this scum off the streets,” and, in saying a “real rain,” we 
are expected to hear a distinction from the rain he thanked God for, the natural rain that 
washed the “garbage and trash off the sidewalks.” The “real rain,” we come to 
understand, will be Bickle armed with an arsenal of weapons, affixed to his body as 
though he were a humanized tank. But the point, in some respects, is that Bickle doesn’t 
fully know if he’s waging war on nature or society. When Bickle meets the arms dealer, 
Easy Andy, and asks him about a .44 Magnum, Andy tells him that the gun will “stop a 
car at a hundred yards, put a round right through the engine block.” We sense that this 
might fit Bickle’s conception of his mission, it being a stark war between machines. Yet 
Bickle, though in command of high-tech weapons, sees his passage through the city as 
one through a jungle, noting, “All the animals come out at night.”
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Taxi Driver attributes the fact that Bickle has been made into an “efficient killing-
machine” to his tours in Vietnam. In his interview with the taxi company, he says that he 
was a Marine, “honorably discharged in May, 1973.” His military-issue jacket has a 
“King Kong Company” patch on its left shoulder, and he uses a kay-bar knife. Still, no 
mention of the war itself is ever made, no matter how plain the clues; we are meant to 
recognize him as a Vietnam veteran, rather, by the effect the war had on Bickle. But if 
The Deer Hunter seeks a film form that might approximate the psychological condition 
of PTSD, Taxi Driver simply uses the old form of the Western, specifically The 
Searchers, to show the ideological depletion of that form in the contemporary moment. In 
short, the cowboy was a hero under specific cultural conditions, but, correcting for 
cultural change, the cowboy is pathological and monstrous. Wood claims that the fact 
that the hero of a bygone ideology now appears monstrous accounts for the film’s 
inconsistent “attitude to its protagonist,” such that it is now a Western, now a horror film. 
I suggest instead that the film, far from being tonally incoherent, gains its coherence by 
recording the shift in the pathos of the cowboy hero from noble to horrific. The remarked 
irony of Taxi Driver’s ending, then, issues from the misrecognition behind media efforts 
(“The papers always blow these things up,” Bickle says) to recontain this horror by 
reconstructing Bickle’s outlaw persona in the name of Iris’s parents – representatives of a 
small-town culture as bygone as the cowboy ideology – rather than in the name of the 
corporate reorganization of American life.
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“Why One of Your Machines Blew a Gasket”: Ideological Recuperation in First 
Blood
While Taxi Driver presents Bickle’s appeal to natural law (“a real rain”) with 
reference to the cowboy hero (Ethan Edwards) in order to show the perversions natural 
law can easily undergo, First Blood will render horrific any appeals to a law other than 
the positive one, but, in doing so, will repress the source of legitimacy for natural law in 
the cowboy hero. In large part, this comes from the fact that Vietnam is identified with 
nature, as illustrated in the rhetoric of The Deer Hunter, and the guerrilla tactics and the 
reliance on the natural terrain that characterized that war made obsolete Hague and 
Geneva Convention-style warfare and thus threatened U.S. might. In other words, the 
deregulation of currencies that occurred from the 1960s on was mirrored by the 
contemporaneous deregulation of warfare, demonstrating the ramifications of the natural 
law put in play by capitalist expansion. Understood this way, First Blood distances itself 
from the cowboy hero, making John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) look more like a Viet 
Cong soldier (wearing a headband, hunting wild boar with a wooden spear, setting booby 
traps in the verdant growth of the Northwest terrain). Still, First Blood reproduces the 
philosophical makeup of the cowboy hero, whose outsiderism creates tension with figures 
of positive law, such as seen between Ethan Edwards and Captain Clayton. We hear this 
echoed in Rambo’s assertion to Sheriff Teasle (Brian Dennehy), “In town you’re the law, 
out here it’s me,” a blunt declaration that nature is his dominion.
Given that First Blood needs to outflank the specter of the cowboy hero, it is 
worth dwelling on the fact that, mutatis mutandis, it is the same film as Lonely Are the 
Brave. In Lonely Are the Brave, Jack Burns rides into town to visit his old friend, Bondi, 
who sits in jail; Burns gets himself thrown in jail, only to escape that evening; after his 
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escape, he is the object of a manhunt for which law enforcement marshals all its 
technological might, (including, in the source text, a helicopter for bird’s-eye surveillance 
of Burns’s progress); relying on grit and his training in nature, Burns eludes his pursuers 
through mountainous terrain; once free of the law, Burns is struck down and killed by a 
commercial truck. In First Blood, John Rambo walks into town to visit his old friend, 
Delmar Barry, who has died recently of stomach cancer; Rambo gets thrown in jail, 
almost despite himself, only to escape during booking; after his escape, he is the object of 
a manhunt for which law enforcement marshals all its technological might, including a 
helicopter for bird’s-eye surveillance; relying on grit and his training in nature, Rambo 
eludes his pursuers through mountainous terrain; once free of the state law, 
representatives of vaster law, namely Colonel Trautman (Richard Crenna), rein in 
Rambo, not in the name of the small-town law, but, as we understand in sequel films, for 
the purposes of the Pentagon.
The differences between the two films, however, tell the story of ideological 
change between 1962 and 1982. In 1962, when Liberty Valance famously professed, 
“When the legend becomes fact, print the legend,” it concerned precisely the printing of 
the legend that would give positive law (law, that is, in printed form) its mythic 
legitimacy; it did not, however, desire further instantiations of that legend. Recognizing 
the death of such heroic individualism, among mundane administered life, Lonely Are the 
Brave eulogized the passing of the cowboy. Twenty years hence, First Blood tells the 
same story but swaps out the cowboy hero with the Vietnam veteran. It, then, effaces its 
protagonist’s origins in the cowboy hero and, in the spirit of recuperation, does not kill 
this figure but saves him for reassignment. Another crucial difference emerges in the 
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characterization of the small-town sheriff, with Lonely Are the Brave’s Sheriff Johnson 
showing grudging respect for the ideals of Jack Burns mutating into First Blood’s Sheriff 
Teasle’s murderous abhorrence for the proficiency of John Rambo.
Kirk Douglas, for one, did not approve of the shift in the story, whether or not it 
were ideologically true. Douglas, who had incarnated Jack Burns for the first story, was 
first cast as Colonel Trautman in the second story. Douglas himself discusses this in his 
memoir, The Ragman’s Son. He recalls accepting the role because he “liked the concept,” 
on the condition that Trautman kills Rambo in the end. It is unsurprising that Douglas 
“liked the concept,” given that it’s the same concept as Lonely Are the Brave and that 
film had been his “favorite movie” (450, 337). It’s perhaps equally unsurprising that 
Douglas wished to alter the script so that his character killed Rambo: this would, in 
effect, be the cowboy hero asserting itself across history. If the cowboy hero had bested 
the Vietnam veteran, after all, it would provide a stay against ideological change, and by 
extension historical change, and it would suggest that cowboy individualism were simply 
a transhistorical theme. Douglas hopes for such static themes when he says, “I love the 
theme that if you try to be an individual, society will crush you” (337).
What I want to suggest is that Douglas’s theme indeed underwrites First Blood, 
but that the decision to interject Colonel Trautman as the force working on behalf of 
Rambo’s survival is best understood as part of an enterprise in ideological recuperation. 
When Sheriff Teasle asks his staff, “What ever possessed God in heaven to make a man 
like Rambo,” voicing another rendition of the concern that natural law could produce an 
Ethan Edwards, Colonel Trautman makes his entrance and states, “God didn’t make 
Rambo, I made him.” Trautman arrives like a deus ex machina, the great administrator 
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that modernity calls on to lift its ideologies onto its higher order of social development. In 
this respect, First Blood’s rewriting of Lonely Are the Brave is a way of saying that the 
presence of a great administrator might have saved Jack Burns from the commercial 
truck, the deus ex machina of modernity. If we are to understand Sheriff Teasle’s 
abhorrence of Rambo, as well as his resistance to Trautman, we need to understand that 
he abhors the effects of modernity, chiefly its tendency to organize power such that the 
law of the land, and local power as such, drop out of the larger structure. Once Teasle 
learns that Rambo is a Green Beret, he begins to understand him as the best-built machine 
of power in its highest order. Repulsed by the fact that such training could be turned 
indiscriminately against the civilian population, Sheriff Teasle says, “Colonel, you came 
out here to find out why one of your machines blew a gasket.” He hates Rambo, in other 
words, because he can’t effectively fight him face-to-face; for him, Rambo’s face is just a 
portal into the transindividual institutions of corporate capitalism.
In order to connect the situation of Rambo up to that of auteurism, which stands at 
a nearer remove than we might first wish to think, we need to first consider that the Green 
Berets, being a highly-specialized and flexible unit of the Army, is nothing but the 
military expression of the organizational logic of the evolving corporate models of the 
20th century. Colonel Trautman, in such a model, doesn’t need to be the face of this 
organization; he can, instead, condense all the powers of that institution into the face of 
Rambo, a recognizable maverick and anti-hero. The process should not be seen as much 
different than that of the vast conglomerates putting on the face of the maverick movie-
brat, such that Columbia could be seen as the young radicals, Bert Schneider and Bob 
Rafelson. But the problem with Rambo, of course, is that he recalls the militarized icons 
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of the 1960s and 1970s, those who made themselves domestic proxies for the military 
conflicts abroad. There was a need for his transfigured individualism, purged of its 
military impulse. There was a need, to take but one example, for Bernardine Dohrn to be 
a member of the law faculty at Northwestern University, not a bomb-builder in the 
Weather Underground. Auteurism, it might be said, made the corporate world safe for 
such maverick individualism.
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Notes
                                                
1 I grant the economic aspect priority in the ideology of individualism to the extent that I 
assimilate the ideology to the tradition of classic liberalism. Indeed, outside the New Left 
individualist appeals, the other mid-century stimulus for debates on individualism came 
from the reassessment of liberalism carried out by those associated with the doctrines of 
“Austrian School” economics, such as Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Karl Popper. 
These theorists tended to formulate their positions on individualism over against 
collectivist economic models. 
2 It has become a critical truism to deem Ford’s Westerns the standard-bearers of the 
genre’s classicality. Ford himself helped strengthen the association of his name with the 
genre by declaring before the Director’s Guild, “My name’s John Ford. I make 
Westerns.” Because Thomas Schatz uses Ford’s films to describe the evolution of the 
Western in his study Hollywood Genres, I cite Schatz as a representative critical opinion 
on Ford. 
3 For the extent to which the cowboy hero still popularly functioned as a “museum 
piece,” refer to J. Hoberman’s discussion of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater’s 
tendencies to don the costume of this hero and present themselves as this kind of rugged 
individual, suggesting that the icon now had the same venerability, in the political 
imaginary, as did the iconic founding fathers. See Dream Life, 102-112. 
4 Hoberman emphasizes the Leftist pedigree of the makers of “post-Westerns”: “The 
Misfits (1961), was directed by self-exiled John Huston from HUAC-harassed Arthur 
Miller’s screenplay; Lonely Are the Brave (1962) was produced by star Kirk Douglas and 
written by Dalton Trumbo; Hud (1963) was directed by the gray-listed Martin Ritt” 
(Dream Life 104).  
5 Though, as Theodore Roszak is intent on noting, “the upheaval of those years was more 
than an American phenomenon.”
6 Keynesianism, for example, will count as the “mode of regulation” (Arrighi 2) for the 
Fordist period, as the F.A. Hayek Road to Serfdom-school will serve as theoretical dogma 
for the deregulation of economies following the centralization efforts of Bretton Woods.   
7 This holds true despite the fact that, as Arrighi quotes Stephen Hymer, “US corporations 
began to move to foreign countries almost as soon as they had completed their continent-
wide integration” (241). It holds true because the U.S. was an “autocentric” rather than an 
“extroverted” economy, such that the U.S. mode of accumulation, in its early phase, 
could retreat from the British free-trade practices into those of protectionism, a lapse into 
the “igloos” of “nation-state economies” as Eric Hobsbawm puts it.
8 Schatz describes it as a “world of formal artifice, a timeless theatrical realm in which 
the allegory is enacted” (77). Both he and Robin Wood describe it as “stylized.” Wood 
explains that its characters are “conceived more in terms of their functions than in terms 
of naturalistic characterization,” making of it a “morality play” and marking Ford’s 
“sharpened consciousness of the thematic level of his work” (“Shall We Gather at the 
River?” (24).
9 In saying that Ford delivered the Western hero’s valediction in Liberty Valance and that 
Lonely Are the Brave is a swan song for that hero, I don’t mean to say that filmmakers 
stopped producing Westerns after 1962. I only mean to show how their ideological 
suasion changed. The philosophical discourse that was refined by postwar Westerns, once 
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demystified by Liberty Valance, seems to have detached from the genre and, as I argue, 
attached to film representations of the Vietnam veteran. The Westerns produced after 
1962, then, tended to either join a valedictory litany (The Wild Bunch [1969], The 
Shootist) or deconstruct the genre in various ways (Little Big Man [1970], McCabe & 
Mrs. Miller). One might refer to John Cawelti’s essay “Chinatown and Generic 
Transformation in Recent American Films” for observations on the philosophical 
mutations the genre underwent.
10 In fact, Bondi claims, “But I love war,” when asked by his draft board why he won’t 
simply register as a conscientious objector. He tells them, “my father got rich off the last 
one canning dogfood for the infantry; all Bondi’s love war” (108).
11 In fact, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward is very much a historical instance 
of an educational institution using a contract consecrated by the state as means of 
autonomy against that very state, and as such the case served as an important precedent in 
the development of corporate law that leads to the historical moment under discussion. 
But I thusly qualify my statement not to suggest that Bondi teaches at a state-chartered 
institution; his institution could well be private. I make the qualification, rather, because 
he could feel such autonomy even if it were state-chartered, owing to the evolution of 
corporate law.
12 Perhaps this explains why, as Robin Wood remarks, we scarcely can know if the 
character that Michael exterminates with a flamethrower is North or South Vietnamese 
soldier. “The problem is partly that one doesn’t think about it – the direct impact of the 
scene discourages any analytical distance – but more importantly that the perpetrator, 
whether American-trained or not, is still an Asian” (emphasis original 242). In The Deer 
Hunter, in other words, the war is not a matter of borders and territorial sovereignty.
13 Giovanni Arrighi cites this coinage of Bruce Cummings’s (22).
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